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**THE CONCEPT OF ICONIC SIGN IN THE
WORKS OF SELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE LVOW-WARSAW SCHOOL: KAZIMIERZ
TWARDOWSKI, TADEUSZ WITWICKI,
STANISŁAW OSSOWSKI, MIECZYŚŁAW WALLIS
AND LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN**

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The terms "iconic sign" and "image" are found in a number of works by the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, quite early on speaks about image, and although he is not explicit in formulating a theory of image, he does supply the tools for the analysis of its structure — he distinguishes between the content of the representation and its object. The first theory of image in the Lvov-Warsaw School was presented in Stanisław Ossowski's *Analiza pojęcia znaku* [*The analysis of the concept of sign*] of 1926. Tadeusz Witwicki makes references to the writings of Twardowski and Ossowski in his investigation of the relation between the image and the reproduced object of representation (in *O reprezentacji, czyli stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego* of 1935 [*On representation, or relation between an image and a reproduced object*]). Leopold Blaustein, inspired by Twardowski and Husserl among others, was aware of Witwicki's ideas on the nature of image, creates his own concept of iconic object (*Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki*, 1930 [*Imaginary presentations. A study from borderline of psychology and aesthetics*]), and *O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień* [*On*

eyewitnessing as a property of some presentations], 1931). In 1933, Ossowski published the book *U podstaw estetyki* [*The basis of aesthetics*], where he presents the theory of image, differing from his earlier theory. It is to this work that Mieczysław Wallis refers in tract *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki* [*On understanding presenting elements in works of art*]. Wallis develops his conception of iconic sign throughout his lifetime, thus creating the most complex theory of iconic sign from the Lvov-Warsaw School.

The purpose of this paper is the presentation of the concept (definition and theory) of iconic sign by the following representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Witwicki, Stanisław Ossowski, Mieczysław Wallis and Leopold Blaustein. In a number of cases, I reconstruct the concepts which are not explicitly described by these scholars. I also undertake the description of the relations between the terms used by individual philosophers in terms of their denotations.

ICONIC SIGN IN THE CONCEPTION OF KAZIMIERZ TWARDOSKI

Kazimierz Twardowski does not explicitly use the term "iconic sign," but on a number of occasions he discusses objects that other scholars of the same school might term "iconic signs." The founder of the school does not provide an explicit definition of iconic sign. On the basis of this concept as well as some others he formulates, though, one can venture to draft a definition.

Twardowski defines sign by making a reference to the relation of expressing, and he defines the relation of expressing by making a reference to the relation of expressing-itself-in. In Twardowski's opinion, some psychical creation x of person O is expressed in person O 's psychophysical creation y where two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the psychical creation x is a partial cause of the formation of the psychophysical creation y ; (2) the psychical creation x does not fall under the senses, while the psychophysical creation y does (Twardowski 1965a: 230). A psychophysical creation y expresses some psychical creation x , where x is expressed in y and where the psychophysical creation y is a partial cause of the formation of the psychical creation z in another person, likened to x (Twardowski 1965a: 231). The author believes that "psychophysical creations that express some psychic creations are called the SIGNS of these psychical creations, and the very psychical creations are their MEANINGS" (Twardowski 1965a: 232). The definitions of expressing-itself-in, expressing and sign which Twardowski gives, can be

reconstructed as follows.

(Def.expressing-itself-in.Twardowski) $\forall x \forall y \forall O [x \text{ expresses itself in } y \equiv (x \text{ is a person } O\text{'s psychic creation} \wedge \neg x \text{ is perceivable by senses} \wedge y \text{ is person } O\text{'s psychophysical creation} \wedge y \text{ is perceivable by senses} \wedge x \text{ is a partial cause of the formation of } y)]$.

(Def.expressing.Twardowski) $\forall x \forall y [y \text{ expresses } x \equiv x \text{ expresses itself in } y \wedge \exists z \exists O_2 (z \text{ is } O_2\text{'s psychic creation} \wedge y \text{ partially accounts for the formation of } z \wedge z \text{ is similar to } x)]$.

(Def.sign.1.Twardowski) $\forall x \forall y \forall O (y \text{ is a sign of } x \equiv y \text{ expresses } x)$.

The latter definition upon expansion takes the following form:

(Def.sign.2.Twardowski) $\forall x \forall y \forall O \{y \text{ is a sign of } x \equiv [x \text{ is person } O\text{'s psychical creation} \wedge \neg x \text{ is sensorily perceptible} \wedge y \text{ is } O\text{'s psychophysical creation} \wedge y \text{ is sensorily perceptible} \wedge x \text{ is a partial cause of the formation of } y \wedge \exists z \exists O_2 (z \text{ is a psychical creation of } O_2 \wedge y \text{ is a partial cause of the formation of } z \wedge z \text{ is similar to } x)]\}$.

A question arises whether one can distinguish between a set of iconic signs just on the basis of the above psychological conception of sign. Can a sensorily perceptible psychophysical creation that has a form be considered as an iconic sign of a non-perceptible psychical creation that has no form? This seems to be possible with some additional assumptions that are in line with Twardowski's philosophical conception. For an object y to be an iconic sign of x , on top of accepting a premise that y is a sign of x , we must also assume that: (1) the psychical creations x and z are representations, that is, phenomenal representations, and that (2) between the psychical creation x and the psychophysical creation y there obtains a certain relation R . In particular, it can be assumed that the relation R is about the representation of x and the perceptual representation of y are similar (in terms of content if we introduce the notion of the content of a representation). If all the above assumptions hold true, we will be able to say that some psychophysical creation y is an iconic sign of a psychic creation x , such as the pastel *Helenka* by Stanisław Wyspiański is an iconic sign of the representation of Helenka — the artist's daughter — which Wyspiański had in mind. In Twardowski's psychological concept of sign it cannot be said, though, that the drawing

Helenka is the iconic sign of the living person, Helenka — Wyspiański's child. Notably, Twardowski believes that although colloquially the words "representation" and "image" have "the right of citizenship almost only within the domain of eyesight" (Twardowski 1965c: 130), these words can be applied to all the other senses.

In the treatise *O czynnościach i wytworach* [*On actions and products*], Twardowski asserts that alongside true, real creations, there are artificial ones, which he calls artefacts, such as an actor's pose which is supposed to express wrath, but which does not really express it as the actor only acts it out rather than feeling it. The pose of the actor, that is, a certain psychophysical creation, does not arise thanks to a real feeling, but it usually does thanks to a representation of a feeling — a presented feeling.

Twardowski repeatedly speaks on image. The concept of image appears in his treatise of 1894 *O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień* [*On the content and object of presentations*], where an analysis of such acts, eg. presenting phenomena to oneself, is investigated. Twardowski makes a fundamental distinction between the content, the act and the object of presentation there. He transfers the results of the discussion of the psychical activity of presenting onto the relation of presentation, which connects the image with what we can call a designation (Twardowski doesn't use the term the "designation of image"). To begin with, let us consider the distinction Twardowski makes between the act, content and object of presentation as per a specific person — John, who is looking at a friend of his, Peter. John and Peter are two members of the relation of presenting to oneself (left and right). The action of John presenting Peter to himself is an act. Peter — as the right-hand-side member of the act — is the object of presentation, something which in Twardowski's terms "EXISTS OUT-OF-ITSELF and onto which our presenting phenomena to ourselves [...] is directed," something real (Twardowski 1965b: 4). In John — the left-hand-side member of the relation of presentation — a more or less approximate "image" of something real occurs (in our example of Peter), which is the content of presenting to oneself (Twardowski 1965b: 4). In the tract *O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień*, we find this: "Both when the object is presented and when it is judged, on top of the act and its object, there is something more, which is at the same time the sign of the object — its psychical "image" as long as this object is presented, and there is its existence, as long as it is judged" (Twardowski 1965b: 8).

Twardowski is convinced that the relation of presenting to oneself that obtains between the object of this relation (here: Peter) and the subject

of the presentation (John) by means of the contents of presentation (the inner, immanent "image" of Peter) is parallel to the relation of presenting something by way of an image (this is why "it had become customary to call presentation a form of mental reflection" Twardowski 1965b: 12). If the relation of presenting and the relation of presenting to oneself follow the same pattern, then their members are identical, too. And just as you can speak of the act, content and the object of presentation in the case of presenting to oneself, so we can speak of the act, content and object of presentation in the case of presenting. But although presenting to oneself is a relation that takes place within inner experience, the relation of presenting something by means of an image is one in the domain of external experience: "like the verb "paint" the verb "present to oneself" initially corresponds to a double object — an object that is presented and the content which is presented. The content is an image and the object — a landscape" (Twardowski 1965b: 12).

In the treatise *O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień* Twardowski writes:

It is colloquially said that a painter paints a picture but they also say that he is painting a landscape. The same action by the painter is directed at two different objects, THE RESULT BEING ONE AND THE SAME (my emphasis, A.H.). When the painter has painted the picture, possibly a landscape, he has before him both a picture and a landscape. The picture is a painted one, rather than carved or drawn — a true painted picture. The landscape is a painted one as well, but it is no true landscape — it has been "painted." The painted picture and the painted landscape ARE IN FACT ONLY ONE THING (my emphasis, A.H.); the picture represents a landscape, so it is a painted landscape; the painted landscape is the image of the landscape (Twardowski 1965b: 11).

Twardowski's discussion on the relation of presenting things to oneself by means of an image which he presents in the tract, leads one to the following conclusions: a picture can present things such as a landscape. A landscape is the object of presentation of this picture as well as an actually existing self-standing object. The picture here is a painted landscape. A painted landscape, which is an image of the landscape, is the content of presentation. It can be thought that in the above statement Twardowski puts the equation mark between the content of presentation and a physical object (a true painted picture, which is the same part of the reality as an actually existing true landscape) — a canvass surface transformed by the painter by way of placing on it particles of paint in various colours.

Apparently the word "image" is not unambiguous (to differentiate

between various notions, subscript will be used). When we say that the National Museum in Cracow features a number of paintings by Jacek Malczewski, the word "image" then refers to material objects — canvasses with particles of paint, framed (image₁). "image" is also understood as an act of imaging or its result (the left-hand member of the two-member relation of imaging) (image₂). The word "image₁" is absolute but "image₂" is a relative term. I am far from equating the contents of presentation with a physical object. I would say that a painted landscape (in the sense that modifies the word "painted") is an image₂ of the real landscape and the contents of image₁. I think that the creation of two actions Twardowski writes about (painting a picture and painting a landscape) are two different objects: in the case of the first one — image₁; in the case of the other one — image₂.

Images and sculptures are discussed in a tract by Twardowski, coming from 1912, *O czynnościach i wytworach*. In this tract, Twardowski distinguishes between actions (objects designated by verbs such as "to jump" and "to shout") and their products (Twardowski 1965a: 220) (such as object designated by the respective nouns such as "a jump" or "a shout"). He distinguishes between two kinds of the products of actions — persistent and non-persistent¹. Non-persistent products of actions last no longer than the actions themselves whereas persistent products take longer than the action itself (Twardowski 1965a: 228). Persistent products, in Twardowski's opinion, are made possible thanks to the action "passing" onto material, that is, on something that has existed before and is in no part (does not belong to) the action (Twardowski 1965a: 228).

In the tract *O czynnościach i wytworach* we read: "Strictly speaking [...], the product of an action is only a new arrangement, a transformation of the material [...]. But since the arrangement, displacement, form, etc., exists only in some material, to put it in vague terms, we call some whole [...] a drawing, painting or sculpture" (Twardowski 1965a: 229). We can thus say that in Twardowski's conception the expression "a persistent product of an action" is ambiguous. In the strict sense of the word, we call a new system, a transformation of the material a "persistent product of an action" whereas a "persistent product" in vague terms is used about a thing. The action itself that results in a persistent product is about transformation of material and

¹Twardowski makes a reservation that there is no strict boundary between persistent and non-persistent products because „the persistence of persistent products can vary," which should be understood in this way that the duration of an object after the completion of the action can be very different — from a moment to lasting for ages (Twardowski 1965a: 228).

a change in the arrangement of the material. In the case of the action of painting, the persistent product in its strictest sense is some displacement of paint on the canvas, and the persistent product in its vaguest sense — a certain displacement of particles of paint on the canvas, that is, a painting. In the case of the action of sculpting, the persistent product in the strictest sense is a form imposed on a chunk of clay or marble, and in vague terms — a chunk of some form: a sculpture. In the case of the activity of drawing, a persistent product in the strictest sense is the arrangement of lead particles or charcoal on paper, but in vague terms — graphite particles arranged in a certain manner — a drawing.

A question arises: what kind of products can these objects be on the grounds of Twardowski's conception, which by representatives of the School including Wallis or Ossowski are considered iconic signs. I believe these objects might be either persistent or non-persistent. The examples of objects regarded as iconic signs classified as non-persistent include such processes as a Norwegian folk dance representing the catching and processing of fish or Ireneusz Krosny's pantomime showing the high school leaving exam. The example of objects considered to be iconic signs and classified as persistent are such things as a drawing by Wyspiański that shows his daughter Helenka or Michelangelo's sculpture that presents David. A painting or sculpture are, however, persistent objects only in a vague sense. Apparently, along with Twardowski's ideas, no object that the representatives of the Warsaw-Lvov school consider as an iconic sign is ever a persistent product in the strictest sense. If some object, considered an iconic sign, is a persistent product, it is a persistent product in a vague sense — a thing.

ICONIC SIGN IN TADEUSZ WITWICKI'S CONCEPTION

Tadeusz Witwicki does not use the term "iconic sign;" rather, like Ossowski, he uses the term "image." Although Witwicki does not analyze the very notion of image, he investigates the relation between the content and the object of presentation as well as the relation that holds between an image and a reproduced object. He devotes two of his studies to it: *O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawienia* [On relation of a content towards an object of the presentation], coming from 1931, and *O reprezentacji, czyli stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego*, from 1935.

Witwicki upholds Twardowski's proposition on the analogy between these two relations — between the content and the object of presentation and the relation between things such as a painting and the object it represents:

The relation between the contents [...] to the object of presentation is very similar to the one that obtains between a painting, photo or a sculpture and the objects they represent. It is only that this "make-believe" nature and the sharp distinction between the representing and represented objects shows much more clearly in images than it can be in the case of the contents and object of presentation because an image and a presented object can be seen many times and both these objects are seen at the same time (Witwicki 1931: 6).

In both of his works, Witwicki answers the question why we see other objects in some material objects, such as a person we know in a photo. In an earlier work *O stosunku treści do przedmiotu przedstawienia*, Witwicki answers the question by making a reference to the concept of view: "The view becomes the content of presentation thanks to it being ascribed a series of actual or make-believe features that are eligible for the object of this presentation and in this way we recognize it as an object" (Witwicki 1931: 7), and further "a view is discerned as the object in question in a make-believe fashion" (Witwicki 1931: 7). Witwicki notes that when we perceive an object, such as a table, what we are given directly is its view, and this view is recognized in actuality but unduly as a table. So it is too in the case of images – we recognize a view as a face of a friend, but we are not serious about it – this is make-believe. In a work published several years later, *O reprezentacji czyli stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego*, Witwicki resumes the discussion of how it happens that we see other objects in things such as painted pictures. He asserts that between an image and a reproduced object there occurs a relation of psychological representation. This relation is "strictly tied with some psychical experience — it is dependent and based on it" (Witwicki 1935: 12).

Witwicki believes that the feelings of psychological representation are kinds of conscious illusions, that is, ones where we no longer believe in that which — though visibly untrue — is still vividly self-imposing" (Witwicki 1935: 19). The main constituent part of a representational experience is a thought, rid of a conviction, that a set of spots is identical with a person. The subject of such an experience only makes a presumption, that is, a judgment – only represented — that there is such an identity: "When closely watching an image, deep inside we almost always believe that what we see and imagine is object A rather than B. It would thus follow that we truly see and imagine object A only and that we are only deluded in seeing object B" (Witwicki 1935: 78).

Let us now have a closer look at Witwicki's psychological represen-

tation theory. Representation is about us taking "one object to be another with emotion rather than seriousness" (Witwicki 1935: 9) when "in one object we see what we believe to be another, a numerically different object" (Witwicki 1935: 19), whereas in a photo we see a real person. Psychological representation is obtained when "person *O* thinks that the *x* that perceives is in fact *y*." Representation is a three-member relation, with *x* being a representing object and *y* — a represented one. This relation can be rendered in this way "*x* represents *y* for *O*." Regarding the conception of psychological representation, which Witwicki devised, a question arises about what is the first member of this relation and what is the other one.

Because the terminological grid used by the protagonists of the Lvov-Warsaw School is not a homogeneous one, I suggest that the following objects be identified in reference to an iconic sign (image): first, a physical object, such as a theatrical performance, canvases covered in particles of paint, a chunk of marble of a certain shape — "the representer;" second, that which we see "in" a theatrical performance, a painted picture, a sculpture, and which will be called "the representative agent;" third, the designation of theatrical performance, painted picture and sculpture respectively, for which we will use the term "the represented."

One can believe that in Witwicki's conception, the representer is the first member of the relation of psychological representation, the other being the represented. Why? First, Witwicki believes that image is a material object, such as an arrangement of colourful spots on a two-dimensional surface. Second, he refers to the 1926 paper *Analiza pojęcia znaku* by Osowski, where author believes the members of the relation of representation (holding between an image and its designation) to be the representer and the represented, and overlooks the representative agent. Third, Witwicki bases his ideas on "a generally stated fact that, in a good photo, sculpture or painting, reproduced objects can be seen directly and one of these are taken to be the others" (Witwicki 1935: 3), an arrangement of colourful spots is identified with an object it represents, and this arrangement is thought of as if it were a man, tree and the like (Witwicki 1935: 14). A question remains though of how the relation of psychological representation can be rendered by using the concepts of the representer, the representative agent and the represented. Witwicki's statements are vague and allow for two possibilities: (1) somebody spuriously identifies that which they see in the representer with the represented or (2) somebody identifies the representer with the represented in a make-believe fashion. Interpretation (1) seems to be supported by Witwicki's statements included in *O stosunku treści*

do przedmiotu przedstawienia concerning view, whereas interpretation (2) is reinforced by his remarks from *O reprezentacji, czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego*, where the author identifies things as a set of strokes and colourful spots with the representer and writes that the set of strokes and colour spots is identified with a person being represented (the represented).

Witwicki raises the problem of the similarity between the representer and the represented. He believes that in order that representation be psychically experienced, this similarity "cannot be of just any kind — it must be visible, and it is best if it occurs on account of the characteristic features of the object" (Witwicki 1935: 26) with "the representing object not necessarily similar at first sight to the represented object as long as it highlights the traits the subject means at a given moment" (Witwicki 1935: 26). Witwicki does not stop at stating that the representer and the represented are similar, but he strives to explain how it occurs that e.g. in the case of a painted picture some arrangement of colour dots and strokes, for a certain subject, looks like a three-dimensional object, such as a tree. Witwicki believes that some features of the representer correspond to some features of the represented, but are not always the same traits (e.g. the same colour). Some trait of the representer are suggestive ones, corresponding to features that describe the represented on account of which the representer is interested in the represented object — the essential traits. "It happens that some suggestive traits of the representing object are not [...] the same as the corresponding essential traits of the represented object, but they are very similar to them, so it is very easy to be confused and take some for the others" (Witwicki 1935: 28). On top of the essential traits, the represented also has non-essential traits, which hardly, if at all, find counterparts in the representer (Witwicki 1935: 27-28). Suggestive traits suggest, to the subject of the psychical and representative experience, a thought that the representing object (such as the arrangement of spots on a two-dimensional surface) is a represented object (such as a person) (Witwicki 1935: 27). Witwicki notes that "under the influence of suggestive traits we often pretend to attribute to the representing object traits which we know the object does not have really, and which therefore can be called fake" (Witwicki 1935: 28): on the basis of an arrangement of some light and dark colours, we ascribe to the representer a convex quality although in fact it is flat. We can say (although Witwicki does not do that) that some make-believe properties of the representer (an alleged convex quality) correspond to some essential traits of the represented (real convex quality) and in so doing we attribute

an alleged convexness of the representer to the represented. From Witwicki's words, however, it follows that the suggestive traits are properties that hold true for the representer, while fake traits are make-believe traits of the representer; in a psychical-representative experience, we attribute fake and suggestive traits to the represented rather than to the representer. Note, that which is the subject of Witwicki's reflection is not objective similarity but subjective similarity, similarity for the subject.

On top of psychological representation, based on a psychological-representational experience, Witwicki also studies logical representation based on a logical-representational experience. If, however, in the case of psychological representation, the subject spuriously thinks that object *A* (representing) is object *B* (represented), in the event of logical representation the subject does not equate *A* with *B* but thinks that *B* is something like *A*; in even more precise terms, realizing the similarity between *A* and *B*, the properties of *B* are inferred from the properties of *A*. In Witwicki's opinion, logical representation, deprived of visuality, occurs between all sorts of models and the objects they represent, such as between the model of the Solar System and the Solar System itself. To Witwicki, models are objects of a completely different type than images and cannot be counted as images. Wallis does not share this view; for him models are iconic signs. What is characteristic for Witwicki's concept is the strict connection between the type of semiotic object and the type of psychic experience in which this object is described and expressed. The logical classification of the experiences of representation closely corresponds to the division of semiotic objects. In connection with the above, a conclusion arises that in the case of images Witwicki argues for similarity in terms of appearance rather than any similarity: it is impossible for someone to take one object for another in a situation where there is no similarity of appearance between objects.

ICONIC SIGN BY STANISŁAW OSSOWSKI

Stanisław Ossowski does not use the term "iconic sign" but he operates with the word "image." In his writings there are three different definitions of image. In the first two — the first one having been presented in *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, 1926, and the second one coming in chapter VII of the book of 1933 *U podstaw estetyki* ("Dwie rzeczywistości w sztuce" ("Two realities in art")) — Ossowski makes a reference to the two-member relation of presentation. If the first definition of image by Ossowski there is an idea of similarity, in the second one it is a peculiar kind of similarity — the similarity of appearance. In the third definition of image, included in chapter

VIII *U podstaw estetyki* ("Zagadnienie realizmu" ["Problem of realism"]), the concept of a three-member relation of presentation is used. In order to distinguish between the three notions of image, subscript will be used to differentiate between the terms.

The definition of image₁ coming from the tract *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, could be reconstructed as follows: an image is a material object which is semantically subordinated to a designation and which is bound to the designation by the relation of presentation (Ossowski 1967: 35-36).

(Def.image₁.Ossowski) $\forall x \forall y \forall O [x \text{ is an image}_1 \text{ of } y \text{ for } O \equiv (x \text{ is material} \wedge x \text{ presents } y \text{ for } O)]$.

The relation of presentation that associates image₁ with the designation is, in Ossowski's idea, a collation of the symmetrical relation of similarity, consisting in the consistency of the elements of image₁ and the representative agent object and some asymmetrical relation which is, as we can imagine, a subject having an intention of assigning one object to another. Whereas the symmetrical relation of similarity is objective, the asymmetrical relation that Ossowski writes about is subjective as it belongs to some subject. Therefore the relation of representation, which is a collation of objective and subjective relation, is a subjective one: thus the *definiendum* in the definition (Def.image₁.Ossowski) is "x is an image₁ of y for O" and not: "x is an image₁ of y."

Ossowski cares very much about emphasizing the difference between the relation of presentation and the relation between a model and a copy. The latter is not a presentation relation as it is a collation of a symmetrical relation of similarity and a genetic asymmetrical relation, which consists in a copy being made in line with a model (Ossowski 1967: 37). Hence a newly-released car, which was made after a model of a car manufactured previously, is not an image of the model. Ossowski does not discuss a situation where we would be dealing with a copy of an image. On the one hand, as we may suppose, on the grounds of Ossowski's conception, a copy of Wyspiański's drawing that presents Helenka is not a painting of the image of Helenka, but it is an image of Helenka, as is the model. On the other hand, apparently, if someone made a copy of Wyspiański's drawing with an intention that the copy should present this painting, then the copy would be an image of Wyspiański's drawing.

The designation of image₁ is, in Ossowski's opinion, a presented object but — as Kazimierz Twardowski demonstrates — the term "presented object"

is ambiguous. The term "presented object" can thus signify the content of presentation and the object of presentation, that is, a really existing object, possibly some intentional object. Ossowski does not write in what sense of the word he uses the phrase "presented object." The examples Ossowski gives include a map as an image of terrain, a photo of a mountain place called Morskie Oko as an image of Morskie Oko as well as a rhythm tapped on the table as an image of a melody. The above examples make one think that the designations of at least some images₁ are really existing objects. It is problematic, though, what is the designation of an image in the case of an illustration showing a brownie or any other object that does not really exist. Ossowski does not discuss this.

The definition (Def.image₁.Ossowski) speaks of a similarity between the image and the presented object. In *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, Ossowski writes that he means a similarity in some sense but, quite remarkably, he does not write that he means the similarity of appearance: "This simple similarity is about the correspondence of the contents: an image and a presented object are brought down into such sets of elements that a mutually unambiguous correspondence can apply between both of these sets. In some cases, there is similarity between the elements of both sets and in others the correspondence is solely about an identical spatial or temporal arrangement [...]" (Ossowski 1967: 36). Note that with such an idea of similarity between image₁ and the presented object, which is not limited to the similarity of appearance, the scope of the term image₁ is extremely broad. One can look to see an identical structure of the various objects and recognize a certain work of music to be the image₁ of an architectural object (if the creator wants to render the rhythm of the colonnade spacing with the rhythm of a piece of music) or a note where quotation marks have been used to mark who was speaking as the image₁ of the conversation the people were having. Moreover, we can even consider the sentence "Alice has a cat" as the image₁ of a situation where Alice has a cat, arguing that we are dealing with a correspondence of two structures — semantic (two names and the functor – predicate) and ontological (two things and the relation that brings them together).

In chapter VII of *U podstaw estetyki*, Ossowski presents a different concept of another idea of image — here it will be referred to as image₂. Image₂ is thus defined by Ossowski: "An object is an image if someone takes a semantic attitude towards it, where this other object onto which the observer's thought is redirected is determined by the similarity of appearances" (Ossowski 1966: 81).

This definition can possibly be expressed this way:

(Def.image₂.Ossowski) $\forall x \forall y \forall O [x \text{ is an image}_2 \text{ of } y \text{ for } O \equiv (O \text{ interprets } x \text{ semantically} \wedge O \text{ transfers thought onto } y \wedge y \text{ is similar in terms of appearance to } x)]$.

The definition quoted after Ossowski may be speaking about a semantic attitude, but on account of the ambiguity of the term, I suggest speaking of a semantic interpretation.

In the chapter where the last quote comes from there is no mention of an image being something material, which causes a great deal of interpretative difficulty. It is a problem to determine between which objects found therein obtain the relation of the similarity of appearance. Take the very realistic portrait of Józio Feldman by Wyspiański: is it about the similarity of the appearance of the set of particles of pastels and the appearance of the living boy or the similarity between the appearance of the particles of paint and the appearance of the boy "in" the portrait or, perhaps, the similarity between the appearance of the boy "in" the painting and the real living boy? Some light is shed on the issue by Ossowski's remarks on semantic interpretation. Ossowski asserts that "we interpret objects in semantic terms if we assume towards it such an attitude where the object being perceived is not an object of our presentation but where it represents some other object or situation that we represent through the object being interpreted but without thinking of it" (Ossowski 1966: 19). According to Ossowski, we semantically interpret the signs of speech when we understand what they signify; we semantically interpret spots on canvas when we see the 1410 Battle of Tannenberg in it; we semantically interpret a chunk of marble when we see the personage of Adam Mickiewicz in it (Ossowski 1966: 19). In Ossowski's opinion then, it looks as if someone is experiencing sensory data caused by some specific colour spots on Jan Matejko's painting *The Battle of Tannenberg*, they are interpreting the data semantically when these spots represent the Battle of Tannenberg and the interpreter is presenting the battle to themselves, but the battle is "in" the image — it is not the real battle fought in 1410. So, most probably, when Ossowski writes about the similarity of appearance, he means the similarity of the appearances of the colour dots on the canvas and the object that is "in" the image.

In *U podstaw estetyki* he writes: "A reproductive object is an image if the determination of the object being reproduced is about an objective relation of similarity. [...] It is solely about the similarity of appearance (in

images of music — about some phonic similarity), though, rather than any other similarity” (Ossowski 1966: 80). The passage quoted mentions the reproductive and reproduced objects, and it is the notion of reproducing rather than presentation, as was the case in *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, which is the notion Ossowski uses to define image₃. Unlike representation, reproduction is a three- rather than two-member relation. The first member of the relation is an image, understood as the set of spots on canvass or a description seen as a set of inscriptions; the second member is the represented object, the third one being the designation, which can either be a fragment of reality or a fictitious object. Notably, the words ”reproduction” and ”presentation” are used by Ossowski in the same meaning.

The three-membered quality of reproduction appears in Ossowski’s writings as a result of the analysis of the phrase ”that which is reproduced.” The author notes that the phrase ”that which is reproduced” and its synonyms – ”reproduced object” and ”presented object” — are ambiguous: ”Speaking of ”that which is reproduced,” we either mean the content of presentations imposed by a description or painting, a real or fictitious fragment of reality to which those presentations are supposed to refer” (Ossowski 1966: 104). It is worth reminding ourselves that the ambiguity of the phrase ”presented object” was previously demonstrated by Twardowski in the tract *O treści i przemiocie przedstawień* [On the content and object of presentation] from 1894 (Twardowski 1965b: 13), that is, 39 years before the publication of Ossowski’s *U podstaw estetyki*. Ossowski discusses the distinction in the following example: that which is reproduced in the painting *Rejtan* by Matejko is either the scene presented in the picture or the scene that actually took place in the town of Grodno in 1772. Therefore the author suggests that ”in order to avoid misunderstanding, we shall establish the following terminological conventions: that which is the object of our presentations — when we are semantically interpreting the reproducing object — will be called the presented object. And only this. The other object, whose representative the presented object is supposed to be, will be the designation of a painting or a description” (Ossowski 1966: 105). Note again that in the terminological grid that was proposed alongside the discussion of Witwicki’s ideas, what Ossowski calls ”presented object” was called the representative agent and what he calls the designation of the image — the represented.

The conception of three-member reproduction (and thus of presentation, too), which Ossowski promoted, seemingly diverts from casual intuition. We say that ”something reproduces something else” and the word ”reproduces” is treated as a sentence-making functor from two name arguments.

But regardless of whether rendition be treated as a relation of two or three members, questions arise about what can be substituted for the variables x , y in the formula "x reproduces y" or for the variables x , y , z in the formula "x reproduces y by means of z." Apparently, one can assume one of the two assumptions:

1. in the relation: x reproduces (presents) object y by means of object z : x is the representer, y — the represented, z — the representative agent.
2. in the relation: object x reproduces (presents) object y by means of object z : x is the representative agent, y — the represented and z — the representer.

In the following charts I give examples of the possible members of the relations: x reproduces (presents) y by means of z with the first and the other assumption separately (I discuss three Polish paintings: the *Portrait of Helenka* by Stanisław Wyspiański, the *Battle of Tannenberg* by Jan Matejko and *Satan* by Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (Witkacy)):

x	y	z
Set of spots or particles of paint on canvass (the representer)	Designation (the represented)	A scene (the representative agent)
(a) Wyspiański's <i>Portrait of Helenka</i>	(a) a living girl – Helenka	(a) a girl „in” the painting
(b) Matejko's <i>Battle of Tannenberg</i>	(b) a real battle near Grunwald/Tannenberg in 1410 (b') a representation of the real battle of Tannenberg that Matejko had in mind.	(b) the scene of the battle of Tannenberg “in” the painting
(c) Witkacy's <i>Satan</i>	(c) a fictitious object – Satan (c') the representation of Satan in Witkacy's mind (c'') a "true" Satan	(c) Satan “in” the painting

Fig. 1. Examples of the possible members of the relation: x reproduces (presents) y by means of z , assuming that x is the representer, y — the represented, z — the representative agent.

x	y	z
A scene (the representative agent)	Designation (the represented)	Set of spots or particles of paint on canvass (the representer)
(a) a girl „in” the painting	(a) a living girl – Helenka	(a) Wyspiański's <i>Portrait of Helanka</i>
(b) the scene of the battle of Tannenberg “in” the painting	(b) a real battle near Grunwald/Tannenberg in 1410 (b') a representation of the real battle of Tannenberg that Matejko had in mind.	(b) Matejko's <i>Battle of Tannenberg</i>
(c) Satan “in” the painting	(c) a fictitious object – Satan (c') the representation of Satan in Witkacy's mind (c'') a “true” Satan	(c) Witkacy's <i>Satan</i>

Fig. 2. Examples of the possible members of the relation: x reproduces (presents) y by means of z , assuming that z is the representer, y — the represented, x — the representative agent

Apparently, Ossowski would accept the first assumption while rejecting the other, that is, he would recognize that the canvas with particles of paint reproduces (presents) a living girl, Helenka, by means of a girl “in” the painting, etc. In Ossowski’s opinion a canvas covered with paint (the representer) is the first member of the relation of reproduction. As regards the *Battle of Tannenberg* by Matejko, Ossowski would say that its designation is the real battle, even if Matejko painted a group of models. Concerning *Satan* by Witkacy, he would most probably recognize that the painting’s designation is a fictitious object — Satan — rather than the presentation of Satan Witkacy had in his mind when painting the picture. The following words by Ossowski would suggest that option: “The designation of an image [...] cannot be some fragment of reality: it can also be a fictitious object which we treat as if it were part of reality that once existed somewhere” (Ossowski 1966: 106). It is intriguing that Ossowski writes of images presenting fictitious objects that “if the only basis for imagining such a designation (i.e. a fictitious object; A. H.) is a represented object, that is, if the designation is in no way shown, the distinction between a designation and a represented object is a mere matter of words.” In this case, in Ossowski’s opinion, there is no way of comparing the designation and the presented object. However, it seems that even in this situation we are still dealing with two different objects. Ossowski writes that in the case of painted pictures, all three members of the relation of reproduction appear very clear cut and it is hard to confuse (in my terminology) the represented with the representative agent because the representative agent is posited directly in the picture, whereas the represented (designation) is elsewhere. As regards 3-D images (Ossowski most probably means sculptures, theatrical performances, etc.),

the differences between the represented and the representative agent become blurred, which, however, does not mean that we are dealing with two rather than three members of the relation of reproduction (Ossowski 1966: 106).

The reproductive object (i.e. the representer, the first member of the relation of reproduction) is, in Ossowski's opinion, a painting or a description. Note that the notion of reproduction in Ossowski's conception does not suffice to define an image since the reproductive objects, on top of images, are verbally reproductive objects, that is, descriptions. Therefore, in the determination of image, the author refers to the similarity of appearance.

A question arises: between which objects — members of the relation of reproduction — there obtains the relationship of similarity of appearance: is it between the representer and the represented or between the representative agent and the represented? Ossowski gives the following examples: "The image of crushing waves at sea can be hung without the fear of flooding the room," "if we say that Chelmoński greatly reproduced partridges on the snow or four galloping horses, it is because a set of sensory impressions we experience when we look at his pictures, seems similar to the set of psychical experiences we would otherwise experience if we looked at a real-time partridge or four horses live" (Ossowski 1966: 80, 81). The first example does not explain much as the word "image" is a rather ambiguous one: the image of the rough waves is the represented; the picture, which we can put into a closet, is the representer. The other example would support the idea that the similarity of appearances, in Ossowski's opinion, obtains between the representative agent and the represented.

We might ask in which sense of the word Ossowski uses the term "appearance." The author devoted a paragraph in the first edition of *U podstaw estetyki* to this term (in the 1966 edition this paragraph was skipped). It reads that the word "appearance" is ambiguous, but Ossowski does not make it clear what meanings it has. We can guess, however, that Ossowski means appearance as a set of visual elements and appearance as a set of sensory data that is interpreted in object terms. Ossowski writes: "In his *Psychologia [Psychology]*, prof. Witwicki speaks of a "view" and "appearance" of objects, but this terminology has serious shortcomings: the term "view" too strongly upholds a wrong suggestion as though the whole distinction only concerned visual perceptions" (Ossowski 1933: 9-10).

Władysław Witwicki indeed distinguishes between a view and an appearance. In his opinion, "view" is the same as "perceptual presentation," whereas "appearance" is "something more than a view:" it is "a view, that is, perceptual presentation of an object, "tinged," marked by the presentations

of other objects and situations as well as thoughts” (Witwicki 1962: 211). The appearance of an apple is made up of the view of an apple but also the presentation of its taste, the presentation of the crunch that accompanies its halving and the like. Witwicki believes that an apple that has just been picked and an apple made of wax or china have differing appearances but someone may have the same views of these two objects (Witwicki 1962: 210).

Ossowski does not accept the distinction made by Władysław Witwicki. He wants to speak of a perfect wax imitation of an apple having the same appearance as an apple that has just been picked from a tree, so he wants to speak of a similarity of appearances rather than views. In Ossowski’s opinion one can speak of appearances of perceptible things not only by the sense of sight but also the senses of touch and hearing. Hence his decision to use “descriptive expressions” rather than “appearances” to avoid misunderstandings (Ossowski 1966: 10). In the book *U podstaw estetyki*, Ossowski uses these particular phrases in this role: “directly perceptible physical traits” (Ossowski 1966: 18), “a set of acoustic and optical elements” (Ossowski 1966: 18), “a set of visual elements” (Ossowski 1966: 22), “sensory form of the object” (Ossowski 1966: 22, 69), “an arrangement of visual or auditory elements” (Ossowski 1966: 22-23), “a set of sensory elements” (Ossowski 1966: 29) and “arrangement of sensory qualities” (Ossowski 1966: 69). All these terms indicate that the appearance of an object, in Ossowski’s opinion, is a set of sensory qualities, traits that are sensorily perceptible that determine objects. The understanding of “appearance” is close to the casual sense of the word here, such as this which is recorded in the *Dictionary of the Polish Language*: it reads that “appearance” is the same as “an external form of something, a set of traits that makes up someone’s face value” (Szymczak 1978: 779).

It appears that the notion of appearance which is used by Ossowski is not the same as the same notion as used by Witwicki and apparently has nothing in common with his idea of view. A view or appearance are for Witwicki psychical phenomena: the basis of their construction are not qualities that determine objects but they are sensory impressions. This is why Witwicki’s terminology is unacceptable to Ossowski. Witwicki investigates psychical phenomena, psychical experiences, sets of impressions, presentations and, being a psychologist, he is not concerned with whether there are some objects other than cognitive subjects.² Ossowski stands on

²See Witwicki 1962: 226: “Psychology is not interested in whether people, things, qualities really exist, whether this structure of our impressional systems corresponds to something real or whether it is just our own system of describing the reality. A

the grounds of philosophical realism: he assumes that there are indeed some objects whose appearances we do not experience.

According to Ossowski, the similarity between appearances in the case of a presented object (the representative agent) and the designation (the represented) is achieved by "some analogy of the arrangement of the elements of image and the elements of the projection of the reproduced reality on a plane" (projection does not have to have a perspective), "the analogy of colour relations or at least the relation of the elements of light between the elements in the two systems," as well as "the similarity of the colours of the elements of image and the corresponding elements of the presented object" (Ossowski 1966: 83). Likeness in painting thus encompasses the similarity of the respective qualities (such as colour), the similarity of the characteristics of these qualities (the intensity of paint) as well as the similarity of system — such as spatial arrangement (spatial relations: something is behind/next to something else).

Therefore, the following difficulty arises: can we speak of a similarity between the image of Satan from Witkacy's *Satan* painting and the "true" Devil or between the presented brownie *Koszalek Opalek* and the "true" benevolent dwarf? Can we project a Devil — or any other fictitious object — onto a plane? The difficulty is apparently insurmountable if we assume that the represented of the picture Satan is a "true" Satan. It ought to be accepted that the represented is the image of Satan which Witkacy had in mind. The problem also surfaces in the case of Matejko's *Battle of Tannenberg*. Can it be said that the artist was really projecting the real battle at Tannenberg? We know that what he was really doing was copying a group of models he had placed in front of him. If we admit that the represented can be someone's representation (such as the representation of Satan in Witkacy's mind), then the relation of similarity will need to be searched for between the content of the artist's representation and the representative agent. Obviously, the recipient has access to the represented thus conceived only thanks to the representative agent, so the similarity of appearances between the two objects can only be judged by the its creator.

Apparently, Ossowski is not really fully consistent when he writes (to quote him again) "If we say that Chełmoński greatly reproduced partridges in the snow or four galloping horses, it is because the set of sensory impressions we experience when looking at his paintings seems similar to the set of impressions we would experience by looking at real partridges or at four

psychologist just needs to state that the impressions that we experience is not chaos, that they make a whole."

galloping horses” (Ossowski 1966: 81). Ossowski here probably speaks of the similarity of appearances, but the ”appearance” is something other than ”qualities inherent in external objects;” it is ”sets of sensory experiences.” The charge of inconsistency could be rescinded, though as the contents of presentations are largely determined by an ”external” object, and so if ”external” objects are similar, then the corresponding contents of the representations will be similar, as well. If some quality arrangements of the representative agent correspond to the quality arrangements of the represented, then some perceptions of the qualities (quality arrangements) of the representative agent will correspond to some quality perceptions (quality arrangements) of the represented.

In Ossowski’s writings, appearance is not constrained to the qualities of the qualities perceived visually or a set of visual impressions. Hence his concept of image includes some works of sculpture too: ”In sculpture we deal with a similarity between not just one appearance but a whole range of appearances: the work and the object reproduced can be compared from a number of points in space” (Ossowski 1966: 84). Here the author suggests that appearance is not a set of all qualities that inhere in the object but it is a selection of qualities — a set of qualities that are sensorily perceptible by a certain subject from some viewpoint. Thus appearance is relativized to the place where the observer is positioned. As there are an infinite number of points where an object can be watched from, there are unlimited appearances. Ossowski seems to believe that in the case of painting, we speak the similarity of just one appearance to another. This is backed by a conviction that, in the art of painting, there is one suitable point from which the observer perceives the representative agent. In reality, though, one can approximate a painting and get further away from it: then the point of observation changes and so does the appearance of the work of art. So, a painting would thus have a number of appearances.

ICONIC SIGN IN THE CONCEPTION BY MIECZYŚLAW WALLIS

Wallis’s semiotic terminology is not uniform. In his writings from 1934, he uses a phrase ”a directly presenting sign;” in his writings from 1937 it was called ”image-likeness” and, finally, as of 1939 he used the term ”iconic sign.” In Wallis’s writings a definition of ”iconic sign” can be found. According to the first one from *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki*, coming from 1934, whether an object is an iconic sign depends on the intention of the creator of the object rather than the recipient. Along with the other definition, found in the essays *O pewnych trudnościach*

związanych z pojęciem znaku [*On some difficulties concerning concept of sign*], from 1967, and *O znakach ikonicznych* [*On iconic signs*], from 1969, whether an object is an iconic sign is dependent on the observer as well as the maker.

In the tract *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki*, Wallis undertakes an attempt to define a directly presenting object. The rendition of the definition is somewhat difficult. On the one hand, Wallis speaks of presenting objects (presenting directly, indirectly, symbolically), that is — as we might presume — objects that present, but on the other hand he believes that presentation is a psychophysical activity of a certain subject and there is no point in saying that object x presents object y . In order to avoid contradiction, we might just as well recognize that the presenting object (i.e. an object that presents) is the third member of the relation of presenting: T presents y by means of x .

Let us reconstruct Wallis's definition of presenting. Twardowski treats the relation of presenting something to oneself as a three-member relation, with the relation of something presenting something being a two-member. Ossowski believes that the relation of something presenting something is a three-member one. Like Twardowski, Wallis, tries to clearly distinguish between presenting things to oneself and things presenting things, but he does it in a different manner than Twardowski. He believes that the term "present" means some psychophysical activity, with the term "present to oneself" being about a psychical activity. More specifically "Presentation is about the creator T creating a sensorily perceptible, physical object a with the intention that the object a causing in the subject O a presentation — an intuitive presentation or a notion — of object A that is different from object a , thanks to there being a relation of representation between object a and object A " (Wallis 1968a: 88). Further: "Instead of saying "creator T presents object A by means of object a ," we often say that "object a presents object A " [...]. However, it is a shortcut, a metaphor, which becomes nonsensical if taken literally: a physical object a cannot "present" that is do some psychophysical activity" (Wallis 1968a: 89). According to Twardowski a sentence such as "Object x presents object y " is a meaningful sentence while in Wallis's opinion it is nonsensical because he understands "presentation" as a "psychophysical activity." I suggest the following rendition of the definition of the presentation relation:

(Def.W.rendition.Wallis) $\forall T \forall x \forall y [T \text{ presents } x \text{ by means of } y \equiv \exists O (T \text{ creates } y \wedge y \text{ is sensorily perceivable} \wedge y \text{ is a physical object} \wedge T \text{ wants } y$

to evoke in O the presentation of $x \wedge x \neq y \wedge y$ represents x]).

In the above definition the concept of representation needs explaining. To Wallis, representation is about "some sensorily perceptible object replacing some other object, whether sensorily perceptible for me or not, in some terms" (Wallis 1968a: 85) and so it consists in replacing some object for somebody with another object: someone, having perceived an object, thinks of another object — they present it to themselves. Wallis does not define representation in conventional terms but, first, he gives *genus proximum* of representation — this representation is a relation, a *sui generis* replacement. Second, he characterizes the formal qualities of the relation: representation is, arguably, a three-member relation (x substitutes y for O), it is a relation between objects rather than a psychical or psychophysical activity (thanks to the existence of the relation of substitution a number of psychical and psychophysical activities are possible). Representation is an asymmetrical and counter-reflexive relation. Third, it imposes the conditions on the members of the relation: the first member is one that is sensorily perceptible, the second one — a perceivable or non-perceivable object — with the third being the subject.

Wallis distinguishes between three kinds of representation: direct, indirect and symbolic. This is how he describes direct representation: "A sensorily perceivable object a represents a sensorily perceivable object A thanks to there being a similarity of appearances between objects a and A " (Wallis 1968a: 85). Kinds of representation correspond to different kinds of presentation: direct, indirect and symbolic.

Wallis gives examples of representation: a drawing of a horse and the word "horse" represent a horse for someone; the image of a lion in a painting — pride, and the national flag of Poland — Poland. Wallis's writings on representation bring up one difficulty. Note that in the section on iconic sign in Ossowski's works a distinction into the representer, the represented and the representative agent was introduced. In the case of Wallis's conception one cannot be sure about the objects the relation of representation holds: the representer and the represented or between the representative agent (the interpreted representer) and the represented. The definition of representation Wallis provides implies that the members of the representation include the representer and the represented, but Wallis gives the representer (such as the word "horse") as an example of the members on one occasion but, on others, the representative agent (a lion on a medieval painting; a drawing of a horse).

Eventually, the first definition of iconic sign in Wallis's conception

(seen as an object that presents directly) can be reconstructed as made up of two sentences in the following manner:

(Def.iconic.sign.Wallis.1)

1. Iconic sign is the third member of the relation of direct presentation:
 T directly presents x by means of y :

$\forall y [y \text{ is an iconic sign} \equiv \exists T \exists x (T \text{ directly presents } x \text{ by means of } y)]$.

2. Person T directly presents x by means of y , where T creates a sensorily perceptible, physical object y so that it will evoke in observer O a presentation of object x being other than object y , thanks to there being a relation of representation between object x and object y that is based on the similarity of appearance:

$\forall T \forall x \forall y$

$[T \text{ directly presents } x \text{ by means of } y \equiv \exists O (T \text{ creates } y \wedge y \text{ is sensorily perceivable} \wedge y \text{ is a physical object} \wedge T \text{ wants } y \text{ to evoke in } O \text{ the presentation of } x \wedge x \neq y \wedge y \text{ represents } x \wedge x \text{ is similar to } y \text{ in terms of appearance})]$.

In short, we can say that object y directly presenting another object x (that is, object y being an iconic sign of x) is a physical, sensorily perceivable object, created by person T in order to evoke in person O a presentation of x thanks to there being the similarity of appearance between x and y .

Wallis's definition of iconic sign speaks of the similarity of appearance between an iconic sign (the representer) and its designation (the represented). However, he does not devote much attention to it. He merely states that "the similarity is about the similarity between the arrangement of elements – lines, colour spots, chunks, tones — and sometimes also about the similarity of the elements themselves (such as the similarity of eye colour in a painted portrait)" (Wallis 1968a: 44), and he declares that he uses the word "appearance" in the sense which Witwicki imparts on the word "view." Therefore, "appearance" in Wallis's conception means as much as "perceptual presentation of an object."

It is intriguing what Wallis means when he writes that an object x is similar to some other object y in terms of appearance. Traditionally, it is believed that the similarity between two objects in terms of a certain trait P is about the trait P being inherent in both. We will say that one person's eyes are similar in terms of colour if there is some colour that is inherent in

the eyes of both the one person and the other. Such an understanding of similarity assumes the existence of the so-called general properties, inherent in more than one object. With such an interpretation of likeness, where we say that one object is like another in terms of appearance we mean that there is some appearance that is identical in one and the other object, so there is a perceptual presentation that is identical for both. Is it about such a similarity, though, when we talk about the similarity of objects in terms of appearance? Apparently the condition of perceptual presentations being identical is "too strong" and cannot be fulfilled as presentations are numerically different.

When we speak of a similarity between two objects in terms of appearance, we mean the similarity of appearance — perceptual presentations — rather than identical appearances, being perceptual presentations that these objects provide the observer with. When we say that two objects look identical, it is not about identical intuitive presentations that we have when we perceive the objects as these are always numerically different, but it is about the contents of these presentations being identical. The contents of presentations are not just qualities but presented qualities, and there apparently should be a distinction between general and individual qualities. Therefore, the similarity of appearances between the representer and the represented in the conception by Wallis is in actuality the similarity between the presentation of the representer and the presentation of the represented, and hence, arguably, between the representative agent and the presentation of the represented. Similarity between physical objects is brought down to the similarity between the presentations of these objects.

Like for Ossowski, for Wallis, too, appearance is not limited to the qualities that can be perceived visually (Wallis 1983b: 22; Wallis 1983c: 31) or to a set of visual impressions. Hence in Wallis's conception the notion of a directly presenting object (iconic sign) includes some works of sculpture, music, theatre and film, as well as the component parts of these: actors' bodies and apparel, their mimics and movement, gestures imitating actions, and also decorations, dance, mimetic play, onomatopoeic words and expressions.

Note that in Wallis's conception all iconic signs (all signs at all) are objects generated by some conscious being, and hence the reflection of the isle of Gilma, on Lake Dobskie, in the waters of the lake cannot be considered the iconic sign of the island.

In the tract *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki*, Wallis gives a taxonomy of signs. A question arises where iconic signs

belong in this taxonomy. In the tract mentioned, Wallis divides signs into presenting and non-presenting: he considers a "presenting sign" to be "a physical object ZP , created by the creator T with an intention to create in the recipient O some specific thought concerning an object other than ZP " (Wallis 1968b: 82), while a "non-presenting sign" — "a physical object ZN , created by creator T with an intention other than creating in recipient O some specific thought concerning an object other than ZN , but with an intention that the object, together with other objects, should create, within some convention, a new physical object ZP creating in recipient O some specific thought concerning an object other than ZP " (Wallis 1968b: 83). As we can see, the definition of a non-presenting sign is based on the notion of a presenting sign. In this definition it is assumed that a presenting sign can be a compound one, made up, among other things, of non-presenting signs.

The above definitions can be expressed in the following manner:

(Def.presenting sign.Wallis) $\forall x[x \text{ is a presenting sign} \equiv \exists T \exists O \exists y (T \text{ creates } x \wedge x \text{ is a physical object} \wedge T \text{ wants to evoke in } O \text{ thought } m \wedge \text{thought } m \text{ concerns } y \wedge y \neq x)]$.

(Def.non-presenting sign.Wallis) $\forall x[x \text{ is a non-presenting sign} \equiv \exists T \exists O \exists y \exists z (T \text{ creates } x \wedge x \text{ is a physical object} \wedge y \text{ is a presenting sign})]$.

Wallis counts directly presenting signs (i.e. iconic signs) among presenting signs. A question arises, however, whether non-presenting signs can be part of iconic signs. Wallis does not answer this question even though he discusses the issue of the relations between presenting and non-presenting signs in an example of indirectly presenting signs.³

In the articles *O pewnych trudnościach związanych z pojęciem znaku*, from 1967, and *O znakach ikonicznych*, from 1969, Wallis presents a modified version of the definition coming from *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki* and builds a whole theory of iconic signs, formulating additional propositions. The other definition of iconic sign can be reconstructed as follows: an iconic sign is an anthropogenic object, sensorily perceivable, which — thanks to the similarity of appearance — can cause

³Wallis claims that non-presentative signs are all prepositions, conjunctions, letters and, possibly, some parts of words, that is, sequences of letters. A dot above an "i" is not a sign because there is no convention concerning it, but the letter "i" is a sign which, upon a convention, serves the purpose of the construction of new signs in conjunction with other signs.

a presentation of an object other than itself in a recipient who assumes an appropriate attitude (Wallis 1983b: 21). Whereas in the first definition of iconic sign Wallis emphasizes the intention of the creator of the sign, and it is the intention of the creator that in fact decides whether an object is an iconic sign, in Wallis's other definition of iconic sign the emphasis is placed on a possibility that an object arouses some thoughts in the recipient. One could say — which Wallis does not do — that according to the other definition, an iconic sign has a potential, available property which manifests in favourable circumstances and that one can distinguish between potential iconic signs (that is, those which can arouse intuitive presentations of other objects but are not causing any at the moment) and actual iconic signs (such that can cause intuitive presentations of other objects and are causing ones at the moment). In order that a potential iconic sign should turn actual, some conditions need to hold about the subject and the object. The object needs to be similar to one whose presentation it is to evoke, while the observer needs to be able to assume an appropriate semantic attitude and they need to actually assume it; apparently, they also need to possess some not necessarily verbalized knowledge regarding the interpretation rules of the object.

In Wallis's works from the 1960s, Wallis devotes more attention to the other member of representation, characteristic of iconic signs. He claims that in the case of iconic signs, the other member of the relation of representation is a sensorily perceivable object (Wallis 1983c: 37) and originally it is always a unitary object even though in secondary terms it can be any representative of a class of objects (Wallis 1983c: 37). The iconic sign of a horse primarily represents a single horse of a certain breed, colour and size, but thanks to some consensus or custom, it can represent any representative of some class of horses, of race, colour, etc. By analogy to linguistic expressions, we could speak of a supposition of an iconic sign, but Wallis does not use the term "supposition" about iconic signs. Just as the word "horse" may be used in various normal suppositions, such as a personal supposition where it designates one specific horse (such as in a statement "the horse ate from Mike's hand"), in a universal supposition where it designates any representative of a class of horses (such as in the utterance "a horse is an artiodactyl animal"), the iconic sign of a horse can occur in various suppositions: personal, when it represents one specific horse, and universal, when it designates any representative of a class of horses.

In *O znakach ikonicznych*, Wallis often sees an analogy between iconic and linguistic signs, and he uses terminology used to describe language ex-

pressions for the description of iconic signs as well. He analyses such things as ambiguity in the domain of iconic signs (Wallis 1983c: 41-42). In defining an ambiguous iconic sign, he refers to the observer's interpretation. He deems an iconic sign ambiguous when — in a situation when somebody assumes a semantic attitude to it — it can be interpreted as either P_1 or P_2 , other than P_1 . A definition of an ambiguous iconic sign can be reconstructed as follows:

(Def.1.ambiguous.iconic.sign.Wallis) $\forall x \forall O [(x \text{ is an iconic sign} \wedge O \text{ assumes a semantic attitude towards } x) \Rightarrow [x \text{ is ambiguous} \equiv \exists t_1 \exists t_2 \exists P_1 \exists P_2 (t_1 \neq t_2 \wedge P_1 \neq P_2 \wedge O \text{ in } t_1 \text{ interprets } x \text{ as } P_1 \wedge O \text{ in } t_2 \text{ interprets } x \text{ as } P_2)]]$.

Apparently, the phrase " O in t_1 interprets x as P_1 " may well be replaced by " x is an iconic sign of P_1 for O in t_1 ."

We thus get the following definition:

(Def.2.ambiguous.iconic.sign.Wallis) $\forall x \forall O [(x \text{ is an iconic sign} \wedge O \text{ assumes a semantic attitude towards } x) \Rightarrow [x \text{ is ambiguous} \equiv \exists t_1 \exists t_2 \exists P_1 \exists P_2 (t_1 \neq t_2 \wedge P_1 \neq P_2 \wedge x \text{ is an iconic sign of } P_1 \text{ for } O \text{ in } t_1 \wedge x \text{ is an iconic sign of } P_2 \text{ for } O \text{ in } t_2)]]$.

Wallis believes that iconic signs can be rich in detail or scarce in detail. The signs that are scarce in detail are called by him "outline," with those rich in detail — "*pleromata*." Outline can be exemplified by a roadside sign of a swerve; *pleromata* can be a photo of someone or a naturalistic painting. Wallis believes that between outline and *pleromata* there is "an infinite diversity of intermediate stages – ordinary iconic signs" (Wallis 1983c: 39).




Fig. 3. The functions of a sign, according to Wallis

In the tract *O znakach ikonicznych* there are three functions of an iconic sign clearly mentioned, which are performed by any representational sign: "A representational sign performs a three-fold function: (1) represents an object (representational function), (2) expresses the sign's creator's thought about the object (expressive function), (3) evokes in the recipient of the sign a thought of their object (evocative function)" (Wallis 1983c: 33). Arguably, Wallis means the functions performed by an actual sign (an actual iconic sign, in particular) rather than a potential one. Note that the concept of expressing is narrower for Wallis than it is for Twardowski. One can say that expressing in Twardowski's concept encompasses Wallis's conception of expressing alongside with evocation, that is, together with the expressive and evocative function as envisaged by Wallis. For the general structure, along with the function of iconic sign in Wallis, see Fig. 3.

Both in *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki* as well as in *O znakach ikonicznych*, Wallis juxtaposes iconic signs (directly representing objects) with conventional signs (indirectly representing signs). A question arises whether there are mixed signs that were both iconic signs (representing another object thanks to the similarity of appearances) and conventional ones, that is, representing thanks to their conventional attribution to other objects. This is a question of a separability of sign division members in Wallis's conception. Wallis does not answer the above directly, but one can infer on the basis of his works that he would probably have said no when asked: no sign can at the same time represent directly (be an iconic sign) and indirectly — by convention — and thus be a conventional sign. Wallis does allow for the existence of direct-indirect mixed representation, but he comes up with a map as an example of an object that represents in this manner; it is made up of two kinds of signs — some signs represent some objects thanks to the similarity of appearance (such as lines that directly represent rivers, bays and seas) with others representing indirectly, by convention (such as dots standing for cities). Mixed representation, then, is not about one object representing another object both directly and indirectly, but the object being made up of parts of which some are only directly representing while others are only indirectly representing. Alas, concerning onomatopoeic words and phrases, some only represent in a direct manner, while others only in indirect ways: "bang," "boom," "bow wow" and the like are uninflected, simple iconic signs, whereas such ones as "cuckoo" are inflected, conventional signs that have been formed from iconic signs (such as the coo-cooing sound produced by cuckoos) (Wallis 1983c: 36). Wallis notes that expressions made up of several words can be iconic, too;

so can be whole passages of literature.

Should it be admitted, then, that in some special case a literary passage represents both thanks to the similarity of appearance and upon a convention? Wallis does not speak on this, but, seemingly, he would have been inclined to recognize that such a passage has two part-aspects, of which one (the layer of inscription) represents upon a convention, with the other (the layer of sound) upon a similarity of appearances. A passage from a literary work of art as a whole would thus represent/substitute in a mixed manner: directly and indirectly. Other examples Wallis supplies as objects that represent in a mixed fashion include a text with depictions and a medieval painting with inscriptions.

In the tract *O znakach ikonicznych* we find a passage where the author states that "upon a convention or consensus, iconic signs — outline in particular — can function in some contexts as conventional signs. They then constitute shortcut substitutes of some expressions or sentences. So, "a simplified drawing of a bed in a railway timetable stands for the phrase "sleeping car." [...] An image of a small tower in the hand of a female character in a medieval painting replaces the sentence "This person is Saint Barbara" (Wallis 1983c: 39-40). So, it appears that Wallis accepts a possibility of an iconic sign performing the function of a conventional sign. A simplified drawing of a bed represents a bed upon the similarity of appearances, while by convention it symbolizes a sleeping car. So, we have a situation where one and the same object represents two different objects in two ways. Still, it does not appear that in Wallis's conception one and the same object can both directly and indirectly represent one and the same object. Note that on the basis of the statements in Wallis's paper *Uwagi o symbolach* [*Remarks on symbols*], published eight years after the essay *O znakach ikonicznych*, one can reach a conclusion that a simplified drawing of a bed does represent a bed upon a similarity of appearance, but it does not represent a sleeping car by convention: a sleeping car is symbolized by a physical object — the bed itself. In this case an iconic sign, i.e. a simplified drawing of a bed, represents, in just one manner — directly — another object — a bed.

Wallis believes that, on one hand, iconic signs, like all signs, can undergo the process of desemantization. This happens when an iconic sign loses its iconic character and becomes an asemantic sign (one can speak of desemantization-deiconization). On the other hand, an asemantic object may undergo the process of semantization-iconization, that is, turn into a sign — an iconic sign. In *O znakach ikonicznych* we read that "This process

(desemantization, A.H.) is often encountered in ornamental art. Images of people, animals and birds on vases from metal or on rugs become ever more simplified and are in the end transformed into purely geometrical ornaments” (Wallis 1983c: 40). It is uncertain what the processes mentioned by Wallis are about. One of the possible interpretations has it that the desemantization of iconic signs concerns many objects that are systematized along a principle (say, each next object is poorer in detail from the preceding one) rather than one specific physical object. So even though the first and the second object in a three-element sequence are iconic signs (were made so they would cause a representation of an object and can cause it), the last object in the series is not an iconic sign (it was not created to evoke imaginings about another object and cannot form representations of another object). With another interpretation we will say that desemantization concerns one specific object, rather than a series of systematized ones; in the first phase of its existence it is a potential iconic sign: it can cause a representation of another object but, with time, as a result of a change in conditions, say, of the subject, this potential property cannot be actualized any longer (something that is initially a schematic image of a house, with time, does not cause any representation in any subject).

On the basis of the studies of the terms used by the representatives of this School, carried out here, it can be said that the terms Wallis used — “directly representing object,” “sign-likeness,” “iconic sign” are interchangeable with Ossowski’s term “image,” as used in *U podstaw estetyki*, and are at the same time independent from Witwicki’s understanding of “image:” in Wallis’s opinion, models are iconic signs, but to Witwicki, they are not images; a reflection of somebody’s face in water is an image in Witwicki’s conception, but is not an iconic sign as understood by Wallis; Wyspiański’s drawing *Helenka* is considered an image by Witwicki and as an iconic sign by Wallis.

Wallis’s writings abound in the word “image,” too. Wallis uses the word “image” in three ways. The first one is that “image” is the same as “a kind of iconic sign” — this notion of “image” conforms to a casual use. In the second meaning, “image” (we will speak of image₂) is “something in between an iconic sign and a symbol” (Wallis 1983f: 77). In the third meaning, an image (image₃) is a typical iconic sign of a kind.

The notion of image₂, that is, something intermediate between an iconic sign and a symbol, appears in Wallis’s article of 1961 *Świat sztuk i świat znaków* [*The world of arts and the world of signs*]. The author does not make specific the notion of image₂ and this makes it hard to understand

exactly what he means. He only gives examples of objects that are images: in many ages, temples and churches "were more than the arrangements of chunks that organized space and were used for some practical purposes [...] but they were also 'iconic signs', 'likeness', 'images', [...] 'symbols', and the like, of objects other than themselves — of the universe, of heaven, perceived as the dwellings of gods or God, of God himself, of the congregation of the faithful, etc." Some tips on how to understand image₂ can be found in Wallis's later enunciations on symbols and their relation with iconic signs. If, still in a paper from 1934 *O rozumieniu pierwiastków przedstawiających w dziełach sztuki* Wallis does not explicitly make it clear whether symbols are signs of sorts or not, in his later works (Wallis 1977: 36) he clearly notes that a symbol need not be a sign, and in the work *Uwagi o symbolach*, coming from 1977, he decisively excludes all symbols from the domain of signs (Wallis 1977: 93). Apparently, the notion of image₂, which appears in the work from 1961 is identical with the notion of symbolic sign, elaborated on in 1977: "A symbol can be represented by an iconic sign or a conventional sign. Such an iconic sign, representing a symbol, is called a symbolic sign. A dog, carved from stone at the foot of the statue of one's wife. The sculpture — an iconic sign — shows a dog and the dog symbolizes fidelity" (Wallis 1977: 94). Apparently, then, image₂ is an iconic sign which represents a symbol, and hence is an iconic sign, which directly represents another object, which, in turn, symbolizes something, such as the projection of a temple on a circular plane is the iconic sign of a circle, but at the same time the circle is a symbol of Heaven or a community (the circle of believers).

The third notion of image comes from the tract *Dzieje sztuki jako dzieje struktur semantycznych* [*The history of art as a history of semantic structures*] from 1968. Image₃ is a "typical iconic sign or a set of iconic signs, recurring in various ages and artistic circles that is highly marked by emotions" (Wallis 1983f: 54-55), such as the likeness of a mother with a child or a horseman killing a monster or a beast.

ICONIC SIGN IN THE CONCEPTION BY LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN

Leopold Blaustein does not use the term "iconic sign" because he limits the set of signs to the set of language creations. He does investigate some objects — reproductive objects — which would have been considered iconic signs by a number of scholars coming from the Lvov-Warsaw School. Notably, although Blaustein does not consider reproductive objects to be iconic signs, he does say that "to a degree, the relation between a reproductive and imaginary or reproduced object is like one that holds between a schema

and an outlined object, a symbol and a symbolized object and between the sign and the designated. Due to their genetic likeness, these relation can be called the relation of representations” (Blaustein 2005e: 75). Remarkably, on account of the similarity of the relation holding between the objects Blaustein mentions, a number of representatives of the School count reproductive objects, symbols and outline, as well as signs-expressions as part of a set of signs in a broad sense of the word. Let us term Blaustein’s reproductive objects, outline, symbols and signs as ”semiotic objects.” We will say that Blaustein uses the term ”sign” in a narrow sense: he only calls signs semiotic objects of a kind.

Blaustein believes that in the case of objects such as a painting or sculpture we are dealing with three objects: a reproductive object, a reproduced object and an imaginary object. A reproductive object is a spatial and temporal physical object, an element of the real world, such as an actor, a canvas covered by colour, a screen along with the phantoms that cover it, a figure from marble, etc. (Blaustein 2005c: 11). The reproductive object corresponds to what I called the representer. The reproduced object is what other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School call the ”designator” or ”denoter” of an iconic sign, and I have used the term ”the representative agent” for it. A reproduced object can be an element of the real world but does not have to be. An imaginary object is what we see ”in” the picture or sculpture or on stage. An imaginary object is not an element of the real world of time and space and cannot be one, but its component parts can enter *quasi*-spatial relations (”in” the picture, a tree can be in front of the house, while a cloud can hover above it), *quasi*-temporal and even *quasi*-cause-and-effect relationships. Imaginary objects, Blaustein writes, are not ideas — they are *quasi*-real.⁴ In the case of Stanisław Wyspiański’s drawing *Helenka*, the reproductive object is paper covered by particles of pastels, the reproduced object is a living girl, Wyspiański’s daughter — Helenka — and the imaginary object is the face of a child that we see ”in” the portrait. Blaustein believes that the reproductive, imaginary and reproduced objects

⁴See Blaustein 2005d: 54. Notably, the ideas on imaginary objects presented here by Blaustein converge with the ideas by Roman Ingarden on intentional objects. However, the treatise by Blaustein *Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki* (1930) (1930) was published a year before Ingarden’s *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931). Blaustein overtly draws upon Ingarden’s *Das literarische Kunstwerk* and *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* (1937) [*The cognition of literary work of art*] only in the tract *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* (1938). It is possible, though, that in 1930, Blaustein knew early ideas by Ingarden on the nature of intentional objects and he may have borrowed from these.

are members of a natural representation relation.

In reference to Blaustein's conception, a question arises about the nature of the imaginary object. In the tract *O ujmowaniu przedmiotów estetycznych* [*On depiction of aesthetic objects*], where Blaustein openly draws upon Ingarden's ideas, expressed in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*: "When I watch 10 photos of a person I know, there are 10 reproductive objects, and with the help of these I can express 10 imaginary objects, but only one reproduced object" (Blaustein 2005f: 10). In the work *Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki*, we read: "We distinguish between a phantom and its appearance because one and the same phantom, such as the shadow of a tree, can be seen by a number of people" (Blaustein 2005f: 61). Blaustein recalls the distinction between four layers of a literary work of art made by Ingarden: (1) the layer of word-sound, (2) the semantic layer made up of sentential significations, (3) the layer of presented objects, and (4) the layer of outlined appearances where objects presented in the work become manifest (Blaustein 2005c: 13). He also mentions concretization of a piece of literature, which Ingarden talks about. A question comes up whether the imaginary object which Blaustein writes about is a counterpart of any of the elements described by Ingarden (any of the layers or concretizations he distinguishes) or not. Note that the terms "representer," "represented" and "representative agent" that have been used here to describe the structure of an iconic sign (such as a painted picture) are insufficient. It is necessary to distinguish between a potential representative agent (representative agent_{potential}) — a counterpart of the third and fourth layer of the work, or the third and fourth taken together — and an actual representative agent (representative agent_{actual}) — as the counterpart of Ingarden's concretization. On the one hand, arguably, in writing that thanks to 10 photos he can express 10 imaginary objects, Blaustein means the imaginary object as the third layer of the piece (the layer of presented objects) and at the same time representative agent_{potential}. This assertion seems supported by the fact that Ingarden wrote about the depiction of a work of art rather than the depiction of concretization (we can say that concretizations are some products of the act of the depiction of a work of art). On the other hand, in Blaustein's opinion, there are as many appearances of the reproductive object as there are presenting contents, with each presenting content being tied to some perceptual presentation. Blaustein thinks that "appearance unambiguously marks an imaginary or reproduced object for me [...]. The intentional object of imaginary presentation is thus unambiguously marked for me by its appearance and is unique" (Blaustein

2005d: 65). Note that the above quotes do not speak of an imaginary object being marked by means of appearance but of marking an imaginary object for somebody. If, however, we have to do with relativization to the recipient, a presumption arises that, for Blaustein, an imaginary object is not that much a counterpart of some potential layer of the work of art, but an equivalent of Ingarden's concretization of a work of art. And possibly the object of this concretization (representative object_{actual}). Importantly, on the grounds of Blaustein's conception, it is possible that the representative agent corresponds to Ingarden's fourth layer — the layer of appearances. Then, the imaginary object would not be identical with the representative agent but would be a counterpart of what is presented; then two kinds of the represented would be distinguished: real and imaginary.

By asserting that each reproductive object is tied to exactly one imaginary object, Blaustein does not determine whether he means the representative agent_{potential} or the representative agent_{actual}. Another problem is whether indeed each reproductive object is tied to exactly one imaginary object. As Wallis notes, some reproductive objects are ambiguous, that is, can be interpreted in more than one way. In Blaustein's terminology, we would say that given one appearance, such as the appearance of a set of strokes, we can intend to mean either object, such as when we perceive Fig. 4:




Fig. 4. A pyramid

We can intend to mean either a pyramid that is pointing at us or one with its base directed at us, and so the appearance in this case does not unambiguously mark the imaginary object for us. It is a fact, though, that at a given moment we can intend to mean only one object, and therefore an assertion still holds that is weaker than Blaustein: the appearance unambiguously determines the imaginary object (or the reproduced one) at a given moment (that is, a given moment can evoke precisely one concretization, and possibly express the object of exactly one concretization).

A key term that is used by Blaustein to describe objects such as a painting or sculpture is the notion of presenting contents. The presenting

contents of the presentation of an object presents the object of this presentation. When we are looking at a board we have a perceptual presentation of the board. The presenting content of the board presents a real board. This content makes up the appearance (view) of a real board. Therefore the appearance of an object presents this object. It would appear that one appearance, that is, the presenting content of the presentation of an object, always presents exactly one object. In fact, that is not so. Blaustein believes that in the case of reproductive objects one presenting content presents two objects: one physical object (such as paper covered by particles of pastels) and an imaginary content (such as the face of Wyspiański's daughter Helena "in" the picture). Which object is actually presented by the presenting content depends on the intention of the subject. Blaustein describes it this way:

The same presenting content fulfills [...] a dual role: the appearance of a screen and the appearances of the landscapes, homes, people and animals that appear on the screen, with these landscapes, homes, people and animals being further objects of the presenting content, and the screen, covered by phantoms, being its closest proper object. That the presenting content plays the part of the appearance of these further objects, too, is evidenced by the viewer — gazing without psychological reflection at the people and things that appear on the screen — sees these people and things directly and does not think about their being not identical with the sets of colour spots that he actually sees. The duality of the presenting content and the imaginary object will be easily realized by the viewer, though, once his attention to the imaginary world is transformed into the attention to the world of the reproductive objects (Blaustein 2005b: 26-27).

Blaustein's conception causes some doubt. A question arises concerning the range of the name "reproductive object." Reproductive objects analysed by Blaustein are above all human artefacts. One object that is not, and which is considered as reproductive by Blaustein, is the surface of a mirror that reflects someone's face. Blaustein would probably consider that the reproductive object is also the surface of a lake reflecting the forest that grows around it. When we look at the surface of water we see the forest "in" it. The forest as reflected in water is an image of the forest. However, man also has an ability to personify that is to see human or animal silhouettes in clouds or rocks, say, rocky mushrooms — mushroom-shaped rocks that can be found in the Góry Stołowe mountains, or a crass formation in the Ojców National Park near Pieskowa Skała that looks like a mace, called Hercules' Bludgeon. As we look at these rocks we see "in" them some imaginary objects

and intend to some imaginary objects. However, can we call these rocks reproductive objects? Can we acknowledge that here is a relation of natural representation between these rocks, mushrooms or a mace? The answer to both questions seems to be negative. Apparently, then, we can intend to see imaginary objects also when perceiving such objects which do not represent these imaginary objects.

Indeed, Blaustein distinguishes between several kinds of — as I put it — semiotic objects, such as reproductive objects and outlines. Outlines are exemplified by Blaustein in a map of terrain, a globe that represents the world, a drawing that represents the inside of a home with a section. No outline, and thus none of the objects mentioned above, is in Blaustein's conception a reproductive object. A question arises then what the basis for the distinction between outlines and reproductive objects is. Note that for some representatives of the Lvov-Waraw School, such as Wallis, a map is a kind of mixed object – iconic-conventional — and some architectural drawings that represent buildings are iconic signs. At closer scrutiny when comparing the sets of Blaustein's reproductive objects and Wallis's set of iconic signs, one can conclude that these sets cross. Wallis considers a map of terrain as an iconic sign but Blaustein thinks that such a map is not a reproductive object but an outline. Regarding a mirror, reflecting someone's silhouette is, according to Blaustein, a reproductive object, but it is not an iconic sign according to Wallis. The drawing by Wyspiański, *Helenka*, is an iconic sign in Wallis's conception and a reproductive object in Blaustein's terms.

The key concept used by Blaustein to distinguish between objects and both outlines and symbols is the notion of phenomenon. According to Blaustein all imaginary presentations are phenomenal, but schematic and symbolic ones are not phenomenal because the presenting content of outlines and symbols does not play a part in the appearance of their intentional objects (Blaustein 2005b: 30) so, in the case of outlines "we see the spherical quality of the globe, some parts of Poland being higher or lower on the plasticine map, but the appearance of a specific [...] globe or a plasticine map does not claim to be [...] the planet or Poland" (Blaustein 2005b: 30); in the case of a map "the presenting content does play a role of appearance but it is the appearance of an outline (map) rather than an object outlined by a map" (Blaustein 2005b: 30).

Blaustein's tract *O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień* reads: "Presentation is phenomenal if a complex of the sensory contents that accompany it presents the intentional object of the presentation, and

thus performs in the capacity of its appearance. The conditions for the presenting content having the quality of appearance include its adequacy vis-a-vis the object, independence of the whole made up of those contents of the presenting content that correspond to something in the object and the congruence of the properties — whether fulfilled or unfulfilled in appearance — that are attributed to the object of presentation” (Blaustein 2005b: 35). In the passage above, Blaustein provides the necessary condition for a presentation to be phenomenal:

(1) The presenting content of the presentation of a representing object must fulfill the role of the appearance of the represented (intentional) object.

The condition proves to be equivalent with the conjunction of three other conditions (in reference to each of the conditions an example of an object is given that does not fulfill this condition, along with an explanation of why it does not comply with the condition):

(1a) The presenting content must be adequate to the represented (intentional) object.

Example: Suppose we have to do with a representer that is a sculpture that presents the Slavonic Svetovid deity, which has four faces looking to the four parts of the world (in this way they sought to render the omniscience of the god). In this case, the presenting content of the presentation of the representer (having four faces) is inadequate of Svetovid, as Svetovid has never been believed to have four faces looking in the four directions even though he was believed to be omniscient. The content of the presentation of the four faces looking in the four directions of the world does not constitute the appearance of omniscience, so omniscience is not phenomenally presented by having four faces looking in four directions. The representer presenting Svetovid is not the reproductive object of Svetovid, but it is a symbol of Svetovid.

(1b) The whole made up of the components of the presenting content, corresponding to something in the object, must be independent, that is, the whole can be phenomenally given at the change of disposition the subject takes towards the world of phenomena.

Example: Suppose we are dealing with a map of Europe, where only country boundaries have been outlined. The elements that make up the presenting content of the presentation of the map are not independent whole because the outline of boundaries is not given to us, say, when we are flying and looking down at particular parts of Europe. This map is therefore a schematic object rather than reproductive.

(1c) The properties phenomenally fulfilled in an appearance must

conform to phenomenally unfulfilled properties, that is, there must be agreement between the properties attributed to an intentional object on the basis of appearance and some other properties that are ascribed to it, but ones that are not attributed on the basis of appearance.

Example: Suppose that we have an object that represents an angel — a human silhouette with wings. There is inconsistency between the properties of the intentional object (angel) that are attributed to it on the basis of the representer's appearance — spatiality and physicality — and the properties ascribed to it on grounds other than the properties of the representer — non-spatiality and non-physicality (spiritual being). Therefore, the representer presenting a human figure with wings is not an object that reproduces an angel, it is not an image of an angel, but it is a symbol of an angel.

As we can see, the picture that presents an angel is in Blaustein's conception an object that reproduces an angel, but it is a symbol of an angel. Also, the map of terrain is not an object that reproduces the terrain — it is only an outline of the terrain. Please note that whether an object is a symbol or a reproductive object depends on which object the person that perceives the representer intends to be. Blaustein does not write that explicitly but, arguably, this interpretation seems acceptable on the grounds of his conception. Take the representer R as presenting a figure with wings. If, upon perceiving representer R , someone intends to the imaginary object — a figure with wings — the representer is an object that reproduces a figure with wings. However, if the person that perceives the figure intends to the kind of angel the Bible speaks about, then representer R is a symbol of this angel. Therefore, one and the same object — representer R — will be an object reproducing object P_1 on one occasion and a symbol of another object P_2 on another.

Despite Blaustein's explanations, making a distinction between outlines and reproductive objects remains fraught with problems. As Wallis points out, the passage between *pleromata* and *schemata* is gradual: *pleromata* are obtained from *schemata* in the process of "enrichment" — "addition" of properties, while *schemata* are obtained by means of "impoverishment" — a "subtraction" of properties. However, in Wallis's conception, *schemata* and *pleromata* are signs of the same kind — iconic signs. In Blaustein's conception, even if a *pleromatus* is a reproductive object, the outline it generates by properties being subtracted belongs to a different class of objects — it is not a reproductive object; it is an outline. In Blaustein's conception, as long as imaginary presentations (which we have thanks to reproductive objects) are phenomenal, schematic representations are not phenomenal. Phenomena

are graded, but it is difficult to determine where the boundary lies between imaginary and schematic presentation.

SUMMARY

The semiotic terminology by the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School is not uniform. The term "image" is used by Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Witwicki and Stanisław Ossowski. Whereas the term "iconic sign" is used by Mieczysław Wallis as of 1939, after 1934 he uses the term "directly presenting sign" to denote iconic signs and following 1937 — the term "sign-likeness." Leopold Blaustein uses the term "reproductive object." On top of this, one can find the term "image" in Wallis's writings, but it has a meaning that is completely different from the same term as used by Twardowski, Witwicki and Ossowski. Importantly, those using the term "image" do not constrain it to the object given to the sense of sight, but they use it to denote the other senses too (hearing, smell, touch, taste).

The representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School — Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Witwicki, Stanisław Ossowski, Mieczysław Wallis and Leopold Blaustein — do not agree on what the set of iconic signs is and what the essential properties of iconic signs are, but they all place iconic signs in opposition to conventional signs. Also, they believe that a set of essential properties of iconic signs can be identified, and, for the most part, they demonstrate it explicitly. In his works, Kazimierz Twardowski does not provide any definition of iconic sign, but this definition can be constructed on the basis of his theory of sign. None of the representatives of the School negates a possibility of creating a normal definition of iconic sign, assuming that the notion of iconic sign is one that has a family of meanings (in Pawłowski's sense of the term; Pawłowski 1986).

All those mentioned above agree that an iconic sign is a member of a relation. What they do not agree on is neither what relation it forms a part of nor which member of the relation an iconic sign is. The following elements have been proposed here: the representer is a physical object, such as a canvas covered by particles of paint, a chunk of marble of a certain shape, a theatrical performance; the representative agent is what we see "in" a painting, sculpture or a theatrical performance; the represented is the designation of a painting, sculpture or a theatrical performance respectively. These elements facilitate for us an analysis of the views held by the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School on the nature of iconic signs. Having made a distinction between the content and object of a presentation — two members of a relation of presenting to oneself — Kazimierz Twardowski

writes that in the case of the "external" relation of presentation we have to do with the same kind of members: the content of the presentation is a picture while the object is a landscape. On the basis of Twardowski's statements we can infer that the content of the picture is the representer (a physical object — the surface of canvas transformed by the painter by placing particles of colourful paint on it), while the presented object is the designation of the picture, the represented. The picture is thus the third member of an "external" relation: person T presents y by means of x . An image, thus understood, is not a sign in Twardowski's conception, though, because in this conception, as long as a sign is a permanent (in vague terms) psychophysical creation, it is an object that expresses (and thus one that has its designation) some psychical creation of its creator, some imagination of the creator of the object. According to Tadeusz Witwicki, every image is the first part of a relation of psychological representation: x represents y for O , where x is the representer and y — the represented. Representation is about the representer being spuriously taken for the represented. In *Analiza pojęcia znaku*, Ossowski states that an image is the first part of a three-member subjective relation of presentation: x presents y for O . The relation of presentation that associates the image (the representer) with the designation (the represented) is in Ossowski's opinion a collation of a symmetrical objective relation of similarity which is about the correspondence of the elements of image₁ and the represented object and some asymmetrical subjective relation that is, arguably, about a subject having an intention of associating one object with the other. In *U podstaw estetyki*, Ossowski notices that in the case of an image, it has something to do with not only some physical object (the representer) but also with what we see in the physical object, that is, the representative agent. In this formulation, an image is the first part of a three-member relation of presentation, that is, reproduction, and we are left to believe (Ossowski does not state it explicitly) that the relation is: x presents y by means of z , where x is the representer, y — the represented and z — the representative agent. Ossowski does not mention that the creator of the image was a member. Like Twardowski, Wallis distinguishes between two relations: presentation and presentation to oneself, but he does it in a different way than Twardowski. He does believe that the term "present" is about a psychophysical activity and "present to oneself" is about a psychical activity, but he states that "Presentation is about creator T forming a sensorily perceivable physical object a with an intention that object a should evoke in the recipient O 's mind a presentation — an imagining or notion — of object A that is different from object a thanks

to there being a relation of representation between a and A " (Wallis 1968a: 88). Apparently, the relation of presentation is a four-member one for Wallis – creator T presents y , thanks to x , for recipient O , where x is the representer and y — the represented. Wallis believes that the kind of representation that is characteristic for directly presenting signs is the relation: x directly represents y for person O , where x is the representer and y — the represented. This representation is a three-member relation – asymmetrical and counter-reflexive; x is sensorily perceivable and y perceivable or non-perceivable by senses. The directly presenting object is, in Wallis's conception, the second part of a four-member relation of presentation and the first part of a three-member relation of direct representation. The examples Wallis gives of directly representing objects question the proposition that, in the case of the relation of representation, x is the representer. The following assertion seems a plausible interpretation: the x in " x represents y directly for O " is the representative agent. Like Ossowski in his *U podstaw estetyki*, Blaustein believes that in the case of objects such as a painting or sculpture, it has something to do with three objects: the reproductive object, the reproduced object and the imaginary object. The reproductive object is that which was called the representer here: a physical object in time and space; the reproduced object is the designation of the representer, that is, the represented, and the imaginary object is that which we see "in" a painting, "in" a sculpture, on a theatrical stage — the representative agent. Image, in Blaustein's conception, is the first part of the three-member relation of natural representation, which, arguably, may be demonstrated as: x naturally represents y by means of z , where x is the representer, y — the represented and z — the representative agent.

The representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School are not in agreement on the ontic category of the iconic sign. According to a reconstructed conception by Twardowski, an iconic sign is a persistent psychical product in a vague sense, that is, a thing. For Witwicki, an image is a material, physical object, such as a set of strokes and spots in painted pictures. In Ossowski's opinion, an image is a material object that can be perceived by different senses. On the foundation of this conception an image cannot be equated with a thing as Ossowski counts phonic phenomena as images. Therefore, in Ossowski's conception, the term "material object" has the same range as the phrase "physical object." Material objects would thus include pictures and sculptures but also music, dance, pantomime and the like. According to Wallis, an iconic sign is a physical object that is perceivable by senses. Blaustein sees the reproductive object as a temporal and spatial physical

object, which is part of a real world: an actor, canvass covered by paint, a screen with the phantoms that cover it, a statue made of marble, etc.

Likeness is mentioned in all the conceptions of iconic sign. However, the representatives of the School do not agree on which members it is where this similarity occurs. For most of them, it is between the representer and the represented. In the earlier conception by Ossowski (outlined in *Analiza pojęcia znaku*) the similarity is believed to hold in some sense between the representer and the represented, but it is not limited to appearance. Similarity as limited to the similarity of appearance is discussed by Witwicki, in a later conception by Ossowski (*U podstaw estetyki*) and in the theories by Wallis and Blaustein. Having acknowledged the similarity, Witwicki seeks to explain how it happens that in the case of a painted picture the arrangement of spots and strokes is similar to a three-dimensional object. He provides an explanation of this fact by making a distinction between suggestive characteristics and essential ones as well as fake properties.

The scholars do not agree as far as what appearance is concerned. According to Ossowski, the appearance of an object is a set of sensory qualities, characteristics that can be perceived by senses, which inhere in objects, and to Wallis it is a perceptual presentation of an object. The notion of appearance is most in-depth analysed by Leopold Blaustein, who goes so far as to provide the conditions of the presenting content having the quality of appearance. Note that the notions of the iconic sign, where the similarity between the representer and the represented is not limited to appearance, are broader than the concepts of the iconic sign where similarity is restricted to appearance: an architectural work of art can be considered an iconic sign of a piece of music of the same rhythm, when we consider the similarity of structure. If, however, we consider the similarity of appearance no edifice will be a sign of any piece of music as the appearances of these objects belong to different domains (visual and auditory).

On the basis of the research into the terminology of selected representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, upon an assumption that in each conception the iconic sign is the representer (arguably, this assumption holds in all the conceptions analyzed here), we can formulate the following conclusions:

1. The terms "image" in Ossowski's *U podstaw estetyki* ("image_{Ossowski}") and Wallis's "iconic sign," "directly presenting object," "image-likeness" ("iconic sign_{Wallis}") are interchangeable.
2. The term "image" for Witwicki ("image_{Witwicki}") is interchangeable

with the term "iconic object" used by Blaustein ("iconic object_{Blaustein}").

3. The term "iconic object_{Witwicki}" is independent from the terms "image_{Ossowski2}" and "iconic sign_{Wallis}".
4. The broadest in range is Ossowski's term "image" from *Analiza pojęcia znaku* (image_{Ossowski1}). All other terms are subordinate to it.
5. The relation between the denotations of the respective terms are presented in Fig. 5.




Fig. 5. Relations between the denotations of the terms: "image_{Witwicki}", "image_{Ossowski1}", "image_{Ossowski2}", "iconic sign_{Wallis}" and "iconic object_{Blaustein}" drawing image_{Ossowski2}

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