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FEELING AS A LINGUISTIC CATEGORY<sup>1</sup>

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To Tadeusz Kobierzycki

It is characteristic that in consideration of the issues related to feeling, one encounters a problem of its definition; it is not only about determining the essence of feeling itself but first it must be explained how we understand and use the word 'feeling'. We could give examples from Polish, German, French, English and Latin as well as Ancient Greek to look into the issue of determining 'feeling' as a language category. Feeling is described by words that are not cognates in these languages; also, the terms function in ways that overlap only partially, so they are only partial counterparts. Does it mean that the very essence of feeling is different or appears as something different to the speakers of the many languages? Or is it that some languages create the word 'feeling' more skillfully than others, some rendering it more aptly than others? Or maybe giving a name to feeling exceeds the capacity of language? Does the lack of the equivalent of the Polish word *uczucie* in the Greek language mean, as is often presupposed, that feeling was beyond the ancient philosophers', psychologists' or poets' perception?

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<sup>1</sup>This is a modified and extended passage – the third chapter of the first part "Introduction to the philosophy of feelings" [Wprowadzenie do filozofii uczuć] – of the PhD dissertation *The Role of Feelings in the pre-Socratic Philosophy*, whose *viva voce* was held on June 17, 1998, at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences [IFiS PAN] and dedicated to Tadeusz Kobierzycki. I have published two excerpts from it: the first one was heavily abbreviated and had several amendments as wished by the editorial board of *Przegląd Filozoficzny* "Rozumienie logos. Presokratycy-Platon" (Zaborowski 1998a); the other concerned the multi-layer quality of feeling "Co to jest uczucie. O wielopoziomowości uczucia" (Zaborowski 1999). The dissertation is available at the library of IFiS PAN, signed D. P. 273. I had my abstract on the role of feeling in the pre-Socratic philosophy "Rola uczuć w filozofii greckiej przed Sokratesem" published in *Heksis* (Zaborowski 1998b).

However the answers to these questions were to be formulated, it is worthwhile in my opinion to show the effects of a free and interchangeable use of categories that describe the world of feelings and to suggest a proposal for solutions in Polish. In order to illustrate the variety and heterogeneity of the word 'feeling' [*uczucie*], let me to put forward several examples. What I mean is to consider the purpose of the setting of the meaning of the word 'feeling' so we can find it easier to address the essence of what the word describes and to avoid a situation where, instead of discussing the nature of the object, a dispute over its name arises.

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The equivalents of a given philosophical category in different languages can be found in Lalande's *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*. The French equivalent of the Polish word *uczucie* is *sentiment*, for which the dictionary gives: German *Gefühl*, English *sentiment, feeling*, Italian *sentimento* (Lalande 1960: 985).<sup>2</sup> One can compare and review philosophical works on feelings and their translations, such as the treatises on feelings by Thomas Aquinas and Descartes, the relevant chapter from Spinoza's *Ethics*, the corresponding passages from Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Rhetoric* as well as writings by German phenomenologists: Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. Here is a comparative selection.

The translator into Polish and commentator of the treatise by Aquinas tells us that "the biggest issue in translation was the vocabulary, not because there are no Polish counterparts but because of an excess of these and the ambiguity of the Latin terms" (Bardan, Bednarski 1967: 6). It can be seen from this example how difficult it is to translate ambiguity by the application of a tool that is overly elaborate. The Latin original is *passio*. Bednarski wonders why Aquinas did not choose a less ambiguous term *affectus* to denote feelings, especially because "he sometimes uses the term to denote what we call *uczucia* in our language," and he answers that "apparently the word *affectus* had an even broader application in Aquinas' days than *passio* as it covered not only all sensation but also some acts of will, temper and touch" (Bednarski 1967: 277). The translator (J. Bardan) and F. Bednarski also inform us that "*passiones* [...] has a very broad meaning. With scholastics, it means [...] all *passive states* and all *sensations* [...]. Some Polish scholastic philosophers translate the word *passio* in the later sense as *namiętność* [passion] while others as *żądza* [strong desire, lust]" (Bardan, Bednarski 1967: 8). Why, then, do they not translate it as *doznanie, odczucie* [sensation] or *namiętność*, but as *uczucie*? They do so after J. Woroniecki who wrote, "On account of its

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<sup>2</sup>That *sentiment* is the equivalent of the Polish *uczucie* follows from the contents of the entry but also from citations, such as the work by T. Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments* (1897).

etymology, the term *uczucie* corresponds to the concept it expresses rather well as it denotes an activity associated with sensing [Pol. *czucie* – L. K.], with a physiological process that we experience, this is that we sense. [...] The only Polish word that, like *pathe* and *passio*, encompasses all the phenomena of the field in question is *uczucie*” (quoted after Bardan, Bednarski 1967: 9). The scope of my paper does not allow me to critically respond to the statement “the term *uczucie* corresponds to [...] an activity associated with sensing, with a physiological process that we experience, this is that we sense” as I am supposed to analyze feeling as a linguistic category.

Another well known treatise on feelings is the third part of *Ethics* by Baruch Spinoza. He used a different word than Aquinas, giving his work the title *De origine & natura affectuum* (Spinoza 1925). He nevertheless also used the word *passiones*. Such as in the note to the proposition XI: *quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus Lætitia & Tristitia*.<sup>3</sup>

The French counterpart of the Latin *passio* is *passion*. In the plural it appears in the title of Descartes’ work *Les passions de l’âme* (Descartes 1988). The Polish translator gave it the title *Namiętności duszy*, but in the index of names and concepts it reads “*namiętności – patrz uczucia*” [for ‘passions/desires’ see ‘feelings’] and for *feeling* we read: “*uczucie, namiętność (passions, passio)*.”<sup>4</sup> It must be an evidence of some liberty of the translator as Descartes uses the term *passion*.<sup>5</sup> A relatively well-known French work on feelings is also the book by T. Ribot. He used a word other than that used by Descartes, giving it the title of *La psychologie des sentiments* (Ribot 1897).<sup>6</sup>

What follows from the comparison of the four works regarding the linguistic

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<sup>3</sup> “[...] et ces passions nous expliquent les sentiments de la Joie et de la Tristesse” (Spinoza 1954); “These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of pleasure and unpleasure” (Spinoza 2004).

<sup>4</sup>For names and concepts see index in Descartes 1986: 206, 208.

<sup>5</sup>Bringing affections down to sensations or desires means to deprive them of autonomy. Also, in Polish, *namiętność* is an etymological opposite of *pamięć* (see Brückner 1970: 393), whereas affections constitute mnemonic dynamics (affective memory) – see S. Wyspiański (“what I felt [pol. *czułem*] I later forged into my art / with feeling only rather than the mind [...]”), “U stóp Wawelu miał ojciec pracownię...,” [1903 (?)] and “Napis na obrazie,” [Feb., 1905] in Wyspiański 1987; W. Heinrich “the issue of affective memory is among the most debatable questions in psychology” (1907: 200; on p. 203 we find “cases of true affective memory” described); H. Elzenberg (“an argument in favor of the affective memory: associating representations where at least one of those is a memory, by way of their mere affective properties. They must have been remembered if the association could occur on the basis of these.”) (1963, a note from August 15, 1918); J. Mazurkiewicz (1950: 199); K. Dąbrowski (1984: 110–112).

<sup>6</sup>Ribot uses the word *émotion* (“émotion est, dans l’ordre affectif, l’équivalent de la perception dans l’ordre intellectuel,” 1897: 12) and *passion* (“passion est dans l’ordre affectif ce que l’idée fixe est dans l’ordre intellectuel,” 1897: 20); see also Ribot 1905.

level of the world of feelings? Aquinas uses the word *passio*, with Spinoza employing *affectus*. Descartes writes about *passion*, whereas Ribot – *sentiment*. Aquinas' *passio* and Descartes' *passion* have been rendered by translators as *uczucia* and *namiętności* respectively, with Aquinas' and Ribot's terminologies having been made uniformed in Polish. Does terminological vagueness belong to texts, translators' craft or the nature of languages? Or, perhaps, did Spinoza mean something else than Aquinas and did Ribot write about something else than Descartes? Had the object of their descriptions changed its name in the course of time that had elapsed in Latin from Aquinas to the time Spinoza wrote his treatises and, for French, between Descartes and Ribot?

Popular French dictionaries corroborate the sway or, as Bardan and Bednarski put it about the Latin *passio*, the ambiguity of the French word *sentiment*. In *Le petit Larousse illustré* it is identified with sensing on the one hand (*sensation, impression*), but, on the other, with emotions and representations (*émotions ou représentations*).<sup>7</sup> This is the case of the philosophical dictionary referred to above. Lalande notes that there are two meanings of the word *feeling*: the activity of feeling and the psychological state felt. Lalande divides those into six particular meanings,<sup>8</sup> that can be combined into two groups. In the first one, the basic thing is the idea of an affective state; in the second, it is the idea of cognition, particularly direct cognition. The last French philosophical dictionary I know mixes up or insufficiently differentiates *sentiment* and *passion*. It reads that "feeling and passion cannot play a foundational role in rationalist ethics and are perceived as obstacles in the exercise of virtue [...]."<sup>9</sup>

The delimitation of meanings is hard and complicated. However, it seems that the French word *sentiment* covers, as remarked by Lalande, both an affective experience (*affection*), emotion (*émotion*)<sup>10</sup> and intuition (*intuition*). It has a

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<sup>7</sup>"1. Connaissance plus ou moins claire donnée d'une manière immédiate, sensation, impression. 2. Etat affectif complexe et durable lié à certaines émotions ou représentations [...]. 3. Manifestation d'une tendance, d'un penchant [...]. 4. Disposition à être facilement ému, touché, émotivité, sensibilité [...]. Litt. Manière de penser, d'apprécier; opinion [...]" (*Le petit Larousse illustre* 2000: 932).

<sup>8</sup>"1. état affectif, ou tendance affective, en général, par opposition à la connaissance; 2. plus spécialement, plaisirs, douleurs, émotions qui ont des causes morales; 3. ensemble d'émotions et d'inclinations altruistes, sympathiques, par opposition à l'égoïsme; 4. conscience [...] claire ou confuse suivant les cas; 5. intuition – connaissance ou savoir donnés d'une manière immédiate; 6. opinion, avis, croyance" (Lalande 1960: 985–986).

<sup>9</sup>"[...] le sentiment et la passion ne peuvent jouer de rôle fondateur dans l'éthique rationaliste et sont pensés comme obstacles à l'exercice de la vertu [...]" (Canto-Sperber 1996: 1379).

<sup>10</sup>I replace a linguistic calque *emocja* with the Polish counterpart *wzruszenie*. The word *wzruszenie* is found in P. Skarga, with the word *emocja* being testified to in Polish as of 1861 (Bańkowski 2000, I: 346), see "*emocja* [...]" (from French) *wzruszenie*

broad range of meaning and is ambiguous. Translated into Polish, it is rendered depending on the context as *odczucie*, *poczucie* and *uczucie*.<sup>11</sup>

As I have already said, Lalande gives *sentiment* and *feeling* as the English counterpart of the French *sentiment*, but whereas French distinguishes between *sentiment* [Pol. *uczucie*] and *sensation* [Pol. *czucie*], the difference in English is harder to render. Lalande indeed makes a distinction between the two categories and gives the French *sensation* the English counterpart *sensation* (Lalande 1960: 976), but in the informal language as well as in some scientific work the authors do otherwise, substituting it with *feeling*.<sup>12</sup> A good example could be M. Arnold's *Emotion and Personality*. That *feeling* has the meaning of *sensation* to the author seems to follow from her statement "Emotion always focuses on the object, while feeling reveals my momentary state of mind" (Arnold 1960: 21).<sup>13</sup> I am not going to analyze the English works concerned with the issue of *emotion* vs. *feeling* not only because the literature is rich<sup>14</sup> but above all because the discussion of the concept of feeling goes beyond the subject matter of this paper. I only want to demonstrate that at the linguistic level, there is a noticeable terminological vagueness in the English literature. This is corroborated by a dictionary of the English language that gives *feeling* the meanings of sensation, emotion, impression, understanding and sensibility.<sup>15</sup> A thesaurus gives a yet more elaborate meaning of feeling.<sup>16</sup>

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[Eng. *emotion, being moved*] (Zdanowicz et al. 1861: 2). It is missing in Linde, whose six-volume dictionary came out in 1854–1860. See also Doroszewski (1967: 466): *doznać emocji, wzruszenia* [Eng. *experience emotion, be moved*].

<sup>11</sup>See "Słowniczek terminów" [glossary] in Bergson 1988: 142.

<sup>12</sup>See "Alle Gefühle" = "All feelings" as well as "vitalen fühlen" = "vital feeling" in Scheler 1973.

<sup>13</sup>See also "[...] emotion as a tendency toward or away from some objects and feelings as the direct awareness of one's state of functioning [...]" (Arnold 1960: 36). Chapter 4 is about "Feeling as reaction to sensory experience" (Arnold 1960: 70–89). See also an extended definition of *emotion* on p. 182. On the other hand, *sentiments* "are enduring tendencies to react emotionally and overly when the opportunity is given [...]. A sentiment is a disposition to react with love or hate, activated by an actual intuitive and reflective appraisal [...]" (Arnold 1960: 199–200).

<sup>14</sup>See among others Reymert 1928 [it includes, among others, E. Claparède, *Feelings and Emotions*, W. McDougall, *Emotion and Feeling Distinguished*]; Harlow, Stagner 1933; Ruckmick 1936; Gardiner, Metcalf, Beebe-Center 1937; Reymert 1950; Beebe-Center 1951; Perkins 1966; Arnold 1968; Arnold 1970 [contains e.g. J. Hillman, *C. G. Jung's Contributions to <<feelings and emotions>>: synopsis and implications*].

<sup>15</sup>"1. power and capacity to feel; 2. psychical or mental awareness: emotion; 3. (pl) emotional side of a person's nature (contrasted with the intellect); 4. sympathy. understanding;. 5. excitement of mind; 6. taste and understanding: sensibility" (Hornby, Cowie 1980: 314–315).

<sup>16</sup>See "consciousness, impression, perception, presentiment, sensation, sense; air, atmosphere, aura, mood; idea, notion, suspicion; consensus, opinion, view, affection,

David Hume is the paramount author among the English philosophers who deliberated upon the issue of feelings. Speaking about feelings, he uses yet another term than *feeling* or *emotion: passion* (Hume 1978, Book II)<sup>17</sup> and, therefore, one can say he draws upon Aquinas and Descartes rather than Spinoza. More contemporarily, it was William James who took up the issue of feelings: devoting a paper to them he used the term *emotion* (James 1884). According to James, *feeling* is a component of *emotion* (James 1884: 189-190). These examples demonstrate that there is a considerable terminological license in English and the concept may have evolved from *passion* in Hume's day to *emotion* in the times of James. If so, one can ask if it has an impact on the way feelings have been understood.

What is it like in Polish? For the Polish reader what may be important is the etymology of the Polish word *uczucie*, made up of the prefix *u-* and the root *czucie*, a deverbal noun from the verb *czuć*. It is more difficult to demonstrate which function of the prefix *u-* is involved in the combination. Does it "influence the alteration of the meaning of verbs," here from *czuć* to *uczucie* as it "signifies the consolidation of effects of the action and bringing it to (or itself reaching) a satisfactory degree or a desirable state" (Karłowicz, Kryński, Niedźwiedzki 1952: 195-196)? Does the prefix *u-* mean the transformation of the external into the internal, or a development, termination or perpetuation? Or does it perhaps combine all these functions?

It is even more difficult to indicate the etymology of the verb *czuć*. Aleksander Brückner derives the verb *czuć* from the root *czu-*, which in Slavonic peoples refers to hearing and the sense of smell, whereas among Germans and Greeks – to vision. The root *czu-* [tshoo] can be found in the Greek *κῦδος* (Polish *cud*, that is, what "falls into *uczucie* [sensing] (hearing)" (Brückner 1970: 67; see also Chantraine 1990: 595-596) as well as in the verb *κοέω* (Brückner: *miarkuję*)<sup>18</sup>. The etymological reconstructions concerning the Polish word *uczucie* indicate that, reduced to its original root (*czucie*, *czuć*), it is related to sensory cognition, vision, smell or hearing, that the ability to feel is a wonderful ability that has to

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fondness, affectivity, warmth; emotion, fervor, passion; compassion, empathy, sympathy, understanding" (Clark 1989: 131; see also p. 516 with 20 more synonyms).

<sup>17</sup>Hume says (II, III, III) that "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason" (Hume 1978: 415).

<sup>18</sup>Brückner 1970: 81. According to Brückner, *κοέω* is close to *ἀκούω*, see *czuję*, that is, *styszę* [I feel, i.e. I hear] (Brückner 1970: 81). Węclewski identifies it with *νοέω* (Węclewski 1929: 407). In the etymology of *κοέω* there is the Sanskrit *kavi-* (sage, poet) (see Chantraine 1990: 551). The verb *κοέω* means *to perceive, understand and hear*, that is, it has meanings that are close to *αἰσθάνομαι* and *νοέω*, which initially (in Homer's epics) means *notice and see*. The deverbal nouns from *αἰσθάνομαι* and *νοέω* (*αἰσθησις* and *νόος* respectively) may mean various levels of feeling in Greek (Zaborowski 1998: 55-185).

do with the cognitive (sage) and creative (poet) dimension.<sup>19</sup>

The meanings of the word *uczucie*, given by the *Słownik języka polskiego* [*Dictionary of the Polish Language*] by Karłowicz, Kryński and Niedźwiedzki (1952: 226), are as follows: "1. moral sentiment, 2. sensing, sensation, impression, 3. physical sensation, sense." The first, the broadest category covers, among others, the feelings of "friendship and love, as well as noble, religious, transcendental, deep, strong and filial feelings." Notably, with reference to affectivity [*uczuciowość*] and affective/sentimental [*uczuciowy*] the dictionary records negative connotations. For instance, the fourth meaning of affectivity is "pathological: the disorder of affectivity [...]," the first two for *affective* being "1. pathological: affectively obsessed, 2. where feeling surpasses the other powers of the soul [...]"<sup>20</sup>

Doroszewski's dictionary describes *uczucie* thus: "a psychic experience [identified with *emocja* [*emotion*]], whose essence is an attitude to stimuli that act or used to act: objects, other people, oneself, one's own actions, etc.;" "love, cordiality, friendship, tenderness, affectionateness, passion, physical sensation [identified with *impression*]" (Doroszewski 1967: 464–465).<sup>21</sup> The entry *uczuc się* provides this: "become aware of one's own physical or psychological condition, one's plight, situation; feel" (Doroszewski 1967: 466).

Apparently, Polish dictionaries tend to mix the words *uczucie* and *emocja*, which is particularly manifest in the entry *uczuciowiec*: "an affective/sentimental person, directed in his actions by emotions rather than reason."<sup>22</sup> Of the Polish philosophical dictionaries, some present this distinction,<sup>23</sup> whereas others make a simplification.<sup>24</sup> I do believe that the use of a word should reflect the multi-layer

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<sup>19</sup>It demonstrates the connections between creative cognition and what is a wonder in man, which Thomas Mann writes about in the following way: "I repeat, that therein lies our duty, our sacred duty to feel [...]. For feeling, young man, is godlike. Man is godlike, in that he feels. He is the feeling of God. God created him in order to feel through him [...]" (Mann 1999: 603). See also Democritus B18 and Plato, *Ion* 534b3–6.

<sup>20</sup>Karłowicz, Kryński, Niedźwiedzki 1952: 226: "1. czucie moralne, 2. czucie, poczucie, wrażenie, 3. uczucie cielesne, czyli zmysł [...] uczucie przyjaźni, miłości, uczucia szlachetne, religijne, nieziemskie, głębokie, silne, synowskie [...] patol.: choroba uczuciowości [...] uczuciowy: 1. Patol.: obłąkanie uczuciowe. 2. w którym uczucie góruje nad innymi władzami duszy [...]"

<sup>21</sup>Szymczak (1992: 578–579) identifies a meaning that is similar to the ones given but in another order.

<sup>22</sup>The entry is identical in both dictionaries: Doroszewski 1967: 465 = Szymczak 1992: 578–579.

<sup>23</sup>"2. psych. [...] Unlike emotions, feelings are a higher order of experience, emotions being ones at the level of senses" (Podsiad, Więckowski 1983: 410).

<sup>24</sup>"Feelings [*uczucia*] (emotions, affections [*emocje*, *afekty*]) – an array of experiences ranging from sensory impressions [...] to psychical states [...] intentional human attitudes [...] to a peculiar (notionless) experience of oneself and the world [...]" (Herbut, Żardecka 1997: 524–525).

content of the phenomenon it describes, though. What follows from the lack of distinction? Is it only negativizing affective phenomena, which is visible in the case of substituting *emocja* for *uczucie*? The phrase "led by emotions" has rather negative connotations, whereas "led by feelings" evokes rather positive associations.

The effects of confusing the levels and of treating separate levels of feelings in homogeneous ways can be seen in David Hume's work. In a bid to reinforce the position of feelings, the Scot philosopher contrasted them with the reason. However, he forwent making a distinction between levels of feelings, covering various affective phenomena with one term: *passion*.<sup>25</sup> In doing so he became an unconscious follower of Aristotle, who also had an *en bloc* take on feelings.<sup>26</sup>

It should be investigated whether the synonymous treatment of the words *emocje* and *uczucie* in Polish is legitimate and whether the replacement of *uczucie* by *emocja* is not a semantic shift. One can order concepts, distinguish *emocja* from *uczucie* and replace the calque *emocja* with the Polish counterpart *wzruszenie*. The solution becomes all the more significant if we consider that there has been an increased interest in the issues of affectivity. However, authors are still for the most part using the term *emocja*.<sup>27</sup> Does it not predetermine the results of their analyses?

Yet another distinction was made by Norbert Fries, according to whom "EMOTIONS [...] need not necessarily correlate with FEELINGS" (Fries 1992: 111). By *emotions* Fries understands "semiotic equivalents of feelings [...] meanings in a semiotic or linguistic model" (Fries 1992: 111), whereas *feelings* are referred to as "states of consciousness available only by introspection, whose function is to signal the meanings of stimuli for the inner needs of the body" (Fries 1992: 119). This is to quote the distinction made by Fries as he gives the linguistically demarcation proposal and the word *emotion* is treated as empty from the psychological standpoint, one that can be filled only by a specific feeling.

It might be a good idea to make an attempt at a historical recapitulation. Above all it needs to be emphasized that in the Ancient Greek a double nature of feeling can be seen: its active aspect (*θυμός*) and its passive one (*πάθος*).<sup>28</sup> The

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<sup>25</sup>Hume also uses terms such as *sensible emotion*, *real passions*, *emotion*, *immediate feeling*, *sensation* (Hume 1972: 692–735).

<sup>26</sup>Hume proved to have weakened the position of feelings in the conception of man, especially because "the opposition of feelings and the mind as two separate and opposite axiological sources, outlined by Hume and still present in philosophy, proves to be [...] spurious." (Buczyńska-Garewicz 1975: 21).

<sup>27</sup>Such as Ekman, Davidson 1994; Goleman 1995; LeDoux 1996; Segal 1997; Goleman 1998; Goleman 2001. Some titles of the French authors include Cosnier 1994; Filliozat 1999; Braconnier 2000; Lelord 2001, and one Polish: Maruszewski, Ścigała 1998. Otherwise Cyrulnik (1993): *Les nourritures affectives*.

<sup>28</sup>The active and passive aspects of feelings were described as early as the earliest

former was particularly appreciated by Plato, who ascribed to *θυμός* an etymology that emphasized its turbulent and agitation nature: "And *θυμός* has its name from the raging (*θύσις*) and boiling of the soul" (trans. Fowler).<sup>29</sup> The passive facet of feelings – their sensational and experiential nature – was particularly appreciated by Aristotle who, in reference to various affective conditions, not only experiences and sensations, but also emotions and feelings, such as courage and friendship, used the word *πάθος*.<sup>30</sup>

What follows is that the divergence between the active and passive meaning of a feeling took place as early as in ancient Greece. It could have been the authority of the Stagirite that caused the word *πάθος* to be spread to cover other levels of affectivity. Subsequently the Latin *passio* (Aquinas), French *passion* (Descartes) and English *passion* (Hume) have by analogy become technical equivalents for the description of feelings at large. It must be noted, though, that this was a decisive factor for the treatment of feelings as passive and thus negative phenomena.<sup>31</sup> It was only when William James introduced the term *emotion*<sup>32</sup> to the philosophical

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extant psychological texts, even within one and the same feeling, see "Dans l'*Illiade* et l'*Odyssée*, tlênai exprime un courage tantôt passif, tantôt actif. Il prend le sens de <<endurer, supporter avec courage, patience>> ou <<oser, avoir le courage de>>" (Smoes 1995: 68).

<sup>29</sup>Plato, *Cratylus* 419c1-2: "«<θυμός>> δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα" This is the etymology favored by Liddell, Scott, Jones 1989.

<sup>30</sup>See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105b21-23: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαράν, φιλίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ζήλον, ἔλεον" and *Eudemian Ethics* 1220b12-13: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν [...]" but on another occasion friendship is referred to as ἀρετή or it is tied to it: "[φιλία] ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a3-4). Some questions arise, the answers to which need to be sought on another occasion. Is the Aristotelian mean (τό μέσον), which is the middle ground between two extreme feelings a category different from them (ἀρετή) or is it a feeling that is dubbed ἀρετή? How does this middle ground arise? Is it negative in nature and arise by negation, evasion and a flight from both poles? Does it arise from the knowledge of the experience of both extremities in their fullest breadth? In the latter case the Aristotelian theory would be non-dogmatic, practical and therapeutic. Notably, in Plato's theory *θυμός* was equated with ἔρωσ, while Aristotle's theory reduced *φιλία* to *πάθος*.

<sup>31</sup>I do not discuss here the fact that "*passio* [...] comes from [...] *pati*, meaning *experience*, and in particular experience what is bad and painful, that is *suffer*. Therefore *passion* also means *suffering*" (Bednarski 1967: 277). See also I. Craemer-Ruegenberg who emphasizes that the terms *πάθος*, *passio*, *Affekt* refer to feelings as passive phenomena (Craemer-Ruegenberg 1981: 10). See also "Les mots *πάθη*, *perturbationes animi* (auctore Cicerone), *affectus*, *affectiones*, *passiones* sont donnés comme synonymes par St Augustin, *De civitate Dei*, IX, 4" (Lalande 1960: 30).

<sup>32</sup>The term *emotion* was also used by James's friend C. S. Peirce "Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its particular emotion, however slight the

language, the active pole of affection was restored to universal consciousness,<sup>33</sup> which in ancient Greece was recorded with the word *θυμός*. The overlap of substance between the English *emotion* and the Greek *θυμός* is written by Snell: "Thymos in Homer is the generator of motion and agitation [...] If we translate *thymos* as 'organ of (e)motion', the matter becomes simple enough" (Snell 1960: 9).

In Polish, there is a double-track quality in terminology: on the one side there are borrowings from West European languages (*afekt, pasja, emocja*),<sup>34</sup> on the other original Polish words (*odczucie, doznanie, wruszenie, uczucie*). Please note that Polish words have proved to contain Greek messages. The words *uczucie* and *przeżycie* [experience, in Germ. *Erlebnis*] have in their etymologies references to this language.<sup>35</sup> This is why it is all the more worthwhile to keep these references and therefore I suggest that *wzruszenie* be restored to the Polish psychological

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emotion may be. This emotion is a sign and a predicate of the thing" (Peirce 1958: 67).

<sup>33</sup>Ribot informs us that the term *émotions* has replaced in contemporary psychology the words *passions, affections de l'âme (passiones, affectus animi)*, used in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. It also has that advantage that it stresses the "élément moteur inclus dans toute émotion (*motus, Gemuthsbewegung*)" (Ribot 1897: 92). Ribot's rendition of emotions is as follows: "J'entends par émotion un choc brusque, souvent violent, intense, avec augmentation ou arrêt des mouvements: la peur, la colère, le coup de foudre en amour, etc. En cela, je me conforme à l'étymologie du mot <<émotion>> qui signifie surtout mouvement" (Ribot 1905: 67).

<sup>34</sup>The word *afekt* has been recorded in Polish since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Linde renders it as "1. any motion or agitation of mind, 2. passion" and quotes P. Skarga, *Żywoty* 11, 390: "Making this look, he was carried away with affection [*afekt*] rather than equity" (Linde 1854-1860, 1: 6). Linde omits the word *pasja*. According to A. Bańkowski, it has been present in Polish since the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Bańkowski 2000, II: 509).

<sup>35</sup>It is an argument in favor of the view that a peripheral culture retains an ancient legacy. Regarding *uczucie*, see *κῶδος* above; regarding [*prze-*]*życie*, see Greek *βέομαι, βίος* (Brückner 1970: 669; Chantraine 1990: 177). The German *fühlen*, too, as well as the English *feel* elude to a direct Latin influence. In the etymology of the English *feel* there is the Greek *παλάμη*, Latin *palma*, Sanskrit *pani*, whereas the German *fühlen* is matched with the Russian *palets*, and as for the English word, the Latin *palma* and the Greek *παλάμη*. See also: "The majority of words for *emotion, feeling* [...] are derived from verbs for *feel*, which are either *perceived by the senses* [...] or else originally denoted *feel* by the sense of touch [...]" (Buck 1949: 1089). The English *emotion* in the sense of "any vehement or excited mental state" has been testified to since 1660, *feeling* in the meaning of "pl. emotions, susceptibilities, sympathies" since 1771 (Simpson, Weiner 1989). On the basic role of the sense of touch, compare "Man's basic and thus main sense is the sense of touch [...] The sense of TASTE [...] is a variety of the sense of touch situated in the mouth [...] THE SENSE OF SMELL is also only a variety of the sense of touch and the sense of taste [...] Another sense based on touch is the sense of SIGHT [...] THE SENSE OF HEARING is the fifth sense based on touch [...] The highest position in the hierarchy is thus reserved for the sense of touch" (Michałowicz 1997).

and philosophical language instead of *emocja*. I also suggest that two meanings of *uczucie* be distinguished between: the first one, which is broader and more common (?), where this word would mean the totality of emotional life, otherwise – affectivity (general dimension); the other more narrow and specialized, where *uczucie* is a specific dimension of affectivity (a particular dimension) – higher than sensation and lower than experience.

If such an ordering is possible, as I believe it is, an effort should be made to perform it, at least in Polish. Further work to be done is to order it in other languages. Otherwise, instead of making the language conform to reality the reality will continue to be deformed in order to correspond to terminology. One who uses a word such as *feeling* without clearly stating what it refers to, will be faced with a vague subject matter of description and the very analysis of phenomena will be more difficult. The objective is to try and avoid a situation where one means feeling but introduces the category of *sensation*, *emotion* or *experience* instead. How one can communicate if someone says *sensation* but means *emotion*, with others saying *emotion* and meaning *emotion*, etc.? It is important to constantly differentiate the meaning of the broader and the narrower senses of the word *uczucie*. In other ways terminological license and the apodictic approach of translators lead to oversimplifications and distortions. To illustrate my point allow me to provide a comparison after a German-Greek dictionary (Schenkl 1873), which is a representative example of a general tendency of an obscuring understanding of feelings in Ancient Greek language nowadays:

German	Greek
Eindruck	[Stimmung] πάθος, πάθημα, διάθεσις [Wahrnehmung, Empfindung] αἴσθησις, αἴσθημα
Empfindung	[Empfinden] αἴσθησις [Empfundene] αἴσθημα [Affekt] πάθος, πάθημα
Affekt, Gefühl	πάθος, ὄρμη, ὄργη, θυμός [Wahrnehmung] αἴσθησις, [Tastsinn] ἄφή, [Stimmung] πάθος, [Erinnerung] μνήμη
Leidenschaft	[Affektion, Gemüthes] πάθος, ὄργη, θυμός
Regung [des Gemüthes]	ὄρμη, πάθος
Affekt, Gemütsbewegung	see above πάθος (τῆς ψυχῆς), ὄργη
Gefühl	see above
Erlebnis	πάθος, πάθημα

The basic question is about the over-occurrence of the word *πάθος*. Is each of the levels in Greek described with this word? Is it really so that the word *πάθος* has such a broad semantic range? Or is the tendency being illustrated a result of

conceptual reductionism, all the more so as there are other words in Greek that refer to feelings than the dictionary in question may make you think?<sup>36</sup>

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I have skipped the issue of what is feeling and how it is understood. I focused on the linguistic level in order to look at the application of the terminology that provides a perspective and in some cases is a silent presupposition that produces psychological and philosophical implications. It is another story to think whether it is language that conditions thinking or whether it is the way we think that channels our linguistic expression. I wanted to point at the difficulties created by the first possibility, if it is in fact occurring, and this is why I am calling for terminological systematization. My proposal for the taxonomy of the categories concerning the world of feelings is this:<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Here is an example of difficulties concerning the translation from Greek into Polish: in her translation of *Nicomachean Ethics* into Polish, D. Gromska translates *πάθος* as *uczucie*, *namiętność*, *afekt*; in *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* W. Wróblewski uses the words *uczucie*, *namiętność*; for *θυμός* Gromska gives *gniew*, *złość*, *wściekłość*, with Wróblewski rendering it as *ochota*, *gniew*. For *uczucie*, Gromska redirects to *namiętność*, where she supplies the counterparts *namiętność*, *uczucie*, *afekt* (*πάθος*), but Wróblewski, on one occasion (*Magna Moralia*) gives *πάθος* where he does not identify *namiętność* but on another occasion (*Eudemian Ethics*) for the entry *uczucie* (*πάθος*) he refers to *namiętność*.

<sup>37</sup>A map of *uczuciowość* (there is a lack of the general word *uczuciowość* in other languages. In French it would be *affectivité*, more than *émotionalité*; *The Oxford English Dictionary* lacks *\*feelingliness*, but it does supply some alternatives: *affectivity* (= *psychol. emotional susceptibility*), *emotionality* (= *emotional character or temperament*) or *feelingness* (= *emotional quality or character*); in German there is no *\*Gefühlkeit/Gefühlheit*, but there are words such as *Gefühlsmäßigkeit*, *Gefühlshedigkeit*, *Gefühlsbetonheit*, *Gefühlsinnigkeit*, *Affektivität*, *Empfindsamkeit*, *Emotionalität* – Scheler used the expression *Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens*, Eng. *stratification of the emotional life*) has been arranged in the following way: the Polish, Greek and French alignment is my proposal; the Latin, German and English are presented after Lalande (1960), except for *vécu*, which was absent from his dictionary.

feelings	Polish <sup>1)</sup>	Greek	French	Latin <sup>2)</sup>	English	German <sup>3)</sup>
[passive]	wrażenie	αἴσθησις	impression	–	impression, feeling	Eindruck
	odczucie	παῖθος	sensation	–	sensation	Empfindung
	doznanie		affection passion	affectus, affectio	affection passion	Affektion, Gefühl Leidenschaft
[active]	wzruszenie	θυμός, φρίην	émotion	–	emotion <sup>4)</sup> (broader than in French)	<sup>5)</sup> Affekt <sup>6)</sup> , Gemutsbewe- gung
	uczucie	θυμός, νόος	sentiment <sup>7)</sup>	–	sentiment, feeling	Gefühl
	przeżycie	λόγος	vécū (experience vécū)	–	–	Erlebnis <sup>8)</sup>

#### REMARKS

1. Other Polish words are: *popęd*, *odruch*, *pęd*, *poczucie*, *namiętność* (a mode of emotion), *przecucie*, *zaczucie* (Slovak: *zaczarowanie wola*) as well as *sympatia* (*współczucie*) and *empatia* (*wczucie*).
2. From Mr. Lech Bobiatyński, Inst. of Classics' library, Univ. of Warsaw I have received the following list for Latin: *impressio*, *sensus* (impression), *sensatio* (sensation), *affectio*, *affectus*, *sensus* (affection, passion), *motus animi* (emotion), *affectio*, *affectus*, *sensus* (feeling), *experiri* (to experience).
3. Compare the model, elaborated by Scheler, of *vier wohlcharaktiersierten Stufen des Gefühls* (*four well-delineated levels of feeling*): (1) *Sinnliche Gefühle oder "Empfindungsgefühle"* (sensible feelings, or "feelings of sensation"), (2) *Leibgefühle (als Zustände) und Lebensgefühle (als Funktionen)* (feelings of the lived body (*as states*) and feelings of life (*as functions*), also called *vital feelings* (Scheler 1973: 338)), (3) *rein seelische Gefühle (reine Ichgefühle)* (pure psychic feelings (*pure feelings of the ego*)), (4) *geistige Gefühle (Personlichgefühle)* (spiritual feelings (*feelings of the personality*)) (Scheler 1927: 344f = Scheler 1973: 332f). Otherwise in James (1884: 205), who used the expression *pure psychic emotion*.
4. Another thesaurus, for the entry *Emotion, Feeling* gives: Gr. *πάθος*, *πάθημα*, Lat. *motus animi*, *sensus*, It. *sentimento*, *emozione*, Fr. *sentiment*, *émotion*, Ger. *Gefühl*, Pol. (*u*)*czucie*, Sanskr. *bhava-*, and for *Passion* (= *violent*

*emotion*): Gr. *πάθος, πάθημα*, Lat. *perturbatio*, It. *passione*, Fr. *passion*, Ger. *Leidenschaft*, Pol. *namiętność*, Sanskr. *bhava-* (Buck 1949: 1089–1090, as well as the comments appended, to the lists of synonyms, 1089–1091).

5. A. Lalande does not supply under *émotion* either *Regung* or *Emotion*. I give the former after the thesaurus *Bedeutungswörterbuch* (Müller 1985: 283).
6. Concerning the usage of the word *Affekt* in German, Lalande refers to the works of Wundt (Lalande 1960: 29 (under *affection*)).
7. Compare the arrangement in A. Lalande 1960: 30 = 279:

<i>sentiments</i>	{	<i>affections</i>	{ <i>plaisirs et douleurs</i>
			{ <i>émotions</i>
		<i>tendances affectives</i>	{ <i>inclinations</i>
			{ <i>passions</i>

8. The words *przeżycie* and *Erlebnis* depict the difficulties inherent in translating and understanding concepts even more than *uczucie*. One can find their equivalent in French, albeit not without qualifications. The word *vécu* is not common in its nominal meaning and functions as a participle. A. Lalande’s dictionary (1960) leaves it out. However, it features in *Le petit Larousse illustré*: “*vécu*: *expérience réellement vécue; ensemble des faits, des événements de la vie réelle*” (2000: 1057). Using it, P. Ricœur renders *Erlebnis* in his translation of *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie* by E. Husserl (1950; see also *Glossaire: Erlebnis, erleben, Erlebnisstrom = le vécu, vivre, flux du vécu*). It was adopted by other French phenomenologists, too (e.g. Lyotard 1954: 10f). The translation seems even more difficult into English. In his translation of Husserl’s work, W. R. Boyce Gibson translates *Erlebnis* with *experience* (Husserl 1931). This is a solution adopted throughout the work and one needs to look in the *Analytical Index* (437), to make sure that the English word *experience* covers two meanings: both (i) *empirical (Erfahrung)* and (ii) *experiential (Erlebnis)*. So, too, did the translators of M. Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics...* (1973); e.g. *positives Erlebnis = positive experience; psychische Erlebnisse = psychic experiences*, etc.

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