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**ON AJDUKIEWICZ'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE**

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(Some remarks connected with the problem of intentionalist language and idealism.  
Marginally on "On the notion of existence" by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz)

I. Introduction. Four research trends concerning existence

The present paper<sup>1</sup> draws on the article "On the notion of existence. Some remarks connected with the problem of intentionalist language and idealism" by K. Ajdukiewicz (1951, reprinted in Giedymin 1978: 209-221) and to a great extent constitutes its corrective analysis (see below: part III). In this analysis the article by Ajdukiewicz is discussed in a broader context — against the background of some other texts by Ajdukiewicz (part IV) and four research traditions concerning existence (parts I and II). For it turns out that "On the notion of existence" is not only a representative sample of Ajdukiewicz's work, but also a text which allows us to show relationships between problems (and their solutions) within different philosophical traditions.

It is possible to differentiate the following four research trends concerning the issue of existence in the history of philosophy:

1. The first trend (the oldest, originating from ancient times and medieval Arabic thought) is clearly apparent in the theory of being of St. Thomas Aquinas and some of his contemporary interpreters (especially of the so called existential Thomists). According to this theory, existence-*esse* is the most important factor constituting every being. *Esse* is the first act of being, the act thanks to which

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<sup>1</sup>This text is an elaborated version of a paper delivered on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1996 in the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz auditorium of the University of Warsaw as a part of semiotic seminar run by Professor Jerzy Pelc (Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne [Polish Semiotic Society], program Znak – Język – Rzeczywistość [project Sign–Language–Reality]).

being is at all (some will say: exists in reality) and, by the same, radically differs from nothing (non-existence: that it does not exist). Such a conception of being relates to the approach of extreme metaphysical and epistemological realism.

2. The second trend, clearly present in modern philosophy (though not devoid of precursors), relates to the question: is there anything outside cognitive consciousness (the mind, the sphere of *cogito*, etc.)?, and if there is, then what is its relation to consciousness? Posing this problem questions the irrefutability of a realistic approach, and results sometimes in formulating various variant of idealistic theories (such as, for example — to use Ajdukiewicz's terminology — immanent or subjective/psychological idealism of G. Berkeley, objective/logical idealism of G. W. F. Hegel and transcendental idealism of I. Kant or E. Husserl).

3. The third trend occurs in the tradition originated by F. Brentano, whose students (e.g. K. Twardowski and A. Meinong) created a theory of object. This theory assumed the so called intentionality principle (for every mental act, there is such an object that the act refers to), and involved the necessity to classify objects and differentiate the members of this classification, among others, into existing and non-existing objects. Theses of this theory can be interpreted idealistically: all types of objects are ONLY objects of cognition or (re)presentation, thus they somehow depend on consciousness. However, these theses can also be interpreted as a consequence of a special form of realism – extensive realism (if the term can be introduced in want of a name): what really (in an irreducible way to anything else) IS (as being) is not only conscious subjects (idealism), and what exists independently of them (realism, e.g. Thomistic realism), but also what does not exist at all (but, for example, subsists or quasi-exists). In both interpretations, the notion of non-existing object requires a detailed explication. Anyway, discussing non-existing objects leads to stylistic, logical and ontological difficulties. The theory of objects (including non-existing objects) turned out, however, to be inspiring. On the one hand, it can be claimed that the theory of R. Ingarden (who belongs, in the broad sense, to the Brentanian tradition and thus to the third trend) of various kinds or ways (or modes) of existence (instead of the theory of existing and non-existing objects) is a better solution to the issues discussed by Twardowski and Meinong. On the other hand, Meinong's views were challenged by B. Russell (and, as will be shown later, Twardowski's views were challenged by Ajdukiewicz), which resulted in important achievements in the fourth trend concerning research on existence.

4. This fourth trend, abundant in professional literature, is developing within the contemporary analytic philosophy of language and logic as well as related to the latter ontology. In this trend, it is possible to differentiate a more linguistics-based approach (e.g. Ch. H. Kahn),<sup>2</sup> and a more logic-based approach (originated

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<sup>2</sup>See e.g. Kahn (1973) as an example of broader research on the verb *be* and its synonyms in various languages.

by G. Frege). The aim of the former is to collect and systematize various usages (or ways of usage) of the verb *be* and related expressions (e.g. according to a criterion of being a derivative or a criterion of reducibility), and to find existential usages among them. The aim of the latter, however, is to define or specify the logical status of existential expressions by means of such terms as: identity, second order predicate, property of concepts (Frege); non-emptiness of sets, property of propositional function, logical proper name — definite description (Russell); existential quantification, value of a variable (W. V. O. Quine); presupposition (P. F. Strawson), etc.<sup>3</sup>

## II. Research trends concerning existence and Ajdukiewicz's article

The previously mentioned article by Ajdukiewicz belongs to this fourth and logic-based approach. In his article, Ajdukiewicz adopts the definition of the expression "exists" (and actually, the definitions of a few functors of existence or existential functors) from S. Leśniewski's ontology. These definitions contain only name variables  $x, y...$  (which can be substituted by any names:  $a, b...$ ), quantifiers (here: '(x)' and '(E x)') and the only primitive term: constant epsilon (here: 'est' — 'is'), as well as symbols of the classical propositional calculus, such as conjunction (here: '·') and logical consequence (here: '<'). Here follows the definitions (here: Leśniewski's existential definitions — LED) in one of their notations:<sup>4</sup>

LED1.:  $ex a$  [at least one  $a$  exists, there exist  $a$ 's]  $\equiv (E x) (x est a)$  [something is an  $a$ ];

LED2.:  $sol a$  [at the most one  $a$  exists, there exists at the most one  $a$ ]  $\equiv (x, y) (x est a \cdot y est a < x est y)$ ;

LED3.:  $ob a$  [ $a$  is an object]  $\equiv (E x) (a est x)$  [ $a$  is something at all].

According to Borkowski (1991: 190), the following definition can be added:

LED4.:  $ex_1 a$  [exactly one  $a$  exists, there exists exactly one  $a$ ]  $\equiv ex a \cdot sol a$ .

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<sup>3</sup>Most of these propositions were originated by Frege (according to R. Grossman (1983: 393-396) young Frege already defined "to exist" as "to be identical with one-self"), and further developed and elaborated on by different authors. The above list is not exhaustive. Additionally, there are such authors who talk about existence as a predicate of the first order (or accept such an interpretation in special circumstances — e.g. Strawson), and such authors who do it within a theory of possible worlds (e.g. for R.M. Adams (1979: 191) "to exist" means "to be in any possible world"). In the Polish professional literature, sets of various logic-based expressions are given, among others, by U. Niklas (1974), L. Koj (1990: 112-125), U. Żegleń (1991).

<sup>4</sup>Ajdukiewicz indicates that these definitions — unlike the Russell-Whitehead definitions — allow us to use the predicate "exists" also to proper names and seem to be closer to colloquial speech. To see other formulations and interpretations of these definitions (and theorems) cf. D.P. Henry (1971: 124-126), Ajdukiewicz (1951), T. Kotarbiński (1986: 193-195), L. Borkowski (1991: 187-191), A.K. Rogalski (1995: 61).

Then in ontology the following Leśniewski's theorem (LT), among others, can be proved:

LT:  $ob\ a \equiv\ ex_1\ a.$

It needs to be highlighted that Ajdukiewicz — using Leśniewski's language — refers (directly or indirectly) in his article not only to the fourth trend (as has been shown), but also to the remaining three mentioned research trends concerning existence:

FIRSTLY (in relation to I.3), on the basis of the thesis of ontology "if  $a$  is an object, then  $a$  exists" Ajdukiewicz (contrary to, among others, Twardowski) claims that "no sentence of the form ' $a$  is a non-existing object' can be true" (Giedymin 1978: 211). Then, Ajdukiewicz proceeds to make Twardowski's terminology more precise through introducing the following terms to Twardowski's vocabulary: "merely thought-of object" or "intentional object," "existence only in thought" or *ens/esse intentionale* (this latter term originated in scholasticism — related to the first research trend!). The next step taken by Ajdukiewicz is to show — by means of the appropriate extension of Leśniewski's language — how "it is possible to construct one's own language so as to be able to speak meaningfully of 'real objects' as well as of 'merely thought of [sic!] objects', of 'real existence' as well as of 'merely intentional existence', etc." (Giedymin 1978: 212). In other words, Ajdukiewicz gives an example of a two-part language which allows to talk about two types of objects or modes of existence, distinguished in the third research trend.

SECONDLY (in relation to I.2), this language created by Ajdukiewicz (which he did not regard as his own) is, in terms of structure, similar to the language "in which the idealist asserts his fundamental thesis formulated in the material and not only in the formal mode [...] 'objects of experience do not exist really but only intentionally'" (Giedymin 1978: 218). Ajdukiewicz attempts to prove that "the idealist asserts without any foundation the second, intentional part of his thesis" or "the idealist cannot assert the first part of his thesis in the language he speaks" (Giedymin 1978: 221). By the same token, he makes a severe criticism of idealism, and the criticism is more severe than the one that consists in proving idealism false.

THIRDLY (in relation to I.1), in his most severe criticism of idealism, Ajdukiewicz indirectly shares anti-idealism which is characteristic of the first research trend, and which claims that realism is unquestionable, while "all idealist philosophers devour their own feet" and idealism "engages philosophy in an inextricable series of internal contradictions" (Gilson 1990: 23). It is no coincidence that the eminent Polish Thomist, a former student of Ajdukiewicz, S. Swieżawski writes:

"Filozoficzna postawa Ajdukiewicza pociągała mnie przede wszystkim z uwagi na jego zdecydowany, bezkompromisowy realizm. [...] Postawa idealistyczna wydawała mi się nie do przyjęcia przez normalnie funkcjonujący intelekt [...]"

(1993: 7, 9), which translates:

"Ajdukiewicz's philosophical stance attracted me most of all owing to his decisive and uncompromising realism. [...] Idealistic approach seemed to me to be unacceptable for a normally functioning intellect [...]."

### III. Corrective analysis of Ajdukiewicz's article

The above mentioned relationships between Ajdukiewicz's article and the four research trends concerning existence constitute a presentation of the article's structure. It is possible now to analyze the article in greater detail, by means of the following questions:

a) is Ajdukiewicz's two-part language that includes the notion of intentional object (existence) exact and detailed to a sufficient degree (which is aimed at in the fourth trend)?

b) does Ajdukiewicz give an explication of the notion of intentional object (existence) adequately enough to the content of the notion and the way it functions in ontological theories (of the third type) in which this notion plays a significant role?

c) is Ajdukiewicz's criticism of idealism (connected with the second trend) sufficient in the discussed context?

d) does Ajdukiewicz's criticism of idealism differ in principle from the criticism of idealism by the Thomist E. Gilson (who represents the first trend)?

I answer all these questions negatively. The best justification of the answers will be to propose some corrections and supplements to Ajdukiewicz's article.

Ad a) and b).

The language proposed by Ajdukiewicz consists of two parts: an empirical or realistic language ( $L_r$ ) and intentional language ( $L_h$ ).<sup>5</sup> The former encompasses sentences which — "result from sentences meaningful in ontology by substitution of names for free variables" (Giedymin 1978: 214). What can be asserted<sup>6</sup> as theses of language  $L_r$  are those sentences which directly or indirectly meet the criteria of experience.  $L_h$  differs from  $L_r$  in that the theses of  $L_h$  are accepted not

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<sup>5</sup>Most probably, Ajdukiewicz uses the "h" subscript because his example of intentional language is a language created through adding sentences from a Polish translation of Homer's epics to Leśniewski's ontological theses. The symbol "i" is used by Ajdukiewicz and myself (though in a slightly different way) only while formulating the idealistic language and thesis.

<sup>6</sup>It seems that, in the analysed article, Ajdukiewicz uses the expression 'to accept a sentence (in a particular language)' and 'to accept a thesis (in a particular language)' interchangeably. In another text, Ajdukiewicz gives an explication of the expression "to accept a statement" in the following way: "If a person in a statement utters his belief, then we say that he accepts that statement" (Ajdukiewicz 1974: 106).

on the basis of experience language-external or real objects, but on the basis of assertion that a particular sentence is present in an appropriate text.<sup>7</sup>

What needs to be highlighted at once is that it is better to call  $L_r$  a realistic language, since both languages are empirical languages in a broad sense. They are experience-based languages: accepting sentences in  $L_r$  involves experiencing language-external objects, in  $L_h$  — language objects. Moreover, a phenomenologist would say that (depending on consciousness) intentional objects are experienced in the type of experience that is different from (sensory) experience of real objects, but has something in common with it (see e.g. Stępień 1995: 116). Analogously to the linguistic convention introduced by J. Pelc (1983: 179), which differentiates between a FICTITIOUS object (or an object of fiction) and a FICTIONAL text (or a fiction-based text), it seems to be reasonable to call  $L_h$  — an INTENTIONALIST language as opposed to INTENTIONAL object or existence.

Except for the mentioned remarks, Ajdukiewicz does not characterize in detail the realistic (empirical) language, however he characterizes the intentionalist (intentional) language through an example of a directive for accepting sentences of a language "in which the notion of an intentional object of Homer's epics occurs" (Giedymin 1978: 216). Leaving this open, if such an approach is right (as it can raise some doubts) and sufficient (and it is not), it is possible to reconstruct the following directive for accepting sentences of language  $L_h$  on the basis of Ajdukiewicz's texts (Ajdukiewicz's directive – AD):

AD: it is allowed to accept an object-language sentence  $p$  in intentionalist language  $L_h$  if in realistic language  $L_r$  the meta-linguistic sentence "a certain sentence in text  $x$  is isomorphic to sentence  $p$ " is accepted, or if it is possible to obtain, in  $L_h$  on the basis of the language's inference rules, sentence  $p$  from an object-language sentence (sentences) already accepted in  $L_h$ .<sup>8</sup>

Formulating this directive requires comments, supplements and corrections:

(1) Instead of the sentence of the form *a est b* (given by Ajdukiewicz), the

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<sup>7</sup>It seems that the vocabulary and the syntactic rules of  $L_r$  and  $L_h$  are determined by the vocabulary and the syntactic rules of Leśniewski's ontology as well as a particular natural language (in the case of  $L_h$  – by (a fragment of) the language in which the text is written.

<sup>8</sup>AD is a semantic directive (language directive) in Ajdukiewicz's sense (1985a, 1985b, 1985c or Giedymin 1978: 1-34, 35-66, 67-89). It is a multi-level directive, hence it is difficult to classify it unambiguously as axiomatic, deductive or empirical. The direct relation this directive is based on is the acceptance of a certain sentence in the realistic language (or the derivation of some sentences from other sentences — the deductive directive). Is this acceptance a certain empirical datum (the empirical directive), or a premise of a certain deduction (what deduction?; the deductive directive)? The ultimate basis of AD is the occurrence of sentences in a text. Is the acceptance of the sentences determined by the empirical directive (occurring in a text as an empirical datum), or the axiomatic directive (occurring in a text as a property of the set of axioms of a particular intentionalist language)?

present article makes use of sentence  $p$ , in order not to prejudge the shape of the sentence that can be regarded as acceptable.

(2) The variable  $x$  in the expression "in text  $x$ " can be substituted with a title of any text (e.g. Ajdukiewicz uses *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) or (a part of) a name that designates the text (either independently or in context; Ajdukiewicz uses the indefinite description, e.g. "Homer's texts" (Giedymin 1978: 217)). It needs to be highlighted that what is meant is any (not only a fictional) text, since (if views of phenomenologists are freely paraphrased — cf. Ingarden 1988: 193 and 407) the assertion of occurrence (and even the very utterance) of the sentence in the text is equivalent to the acceptance of a certain intentional state of affairs. This state of affairs (or its equivalent) can also exist in reality, but when asserting its reality it is not enough to refer to the very (even scientific) text. What is needed is to refer to appropriate (e.g. empirical) cognitive operations (whose results can be presented in the scientific text).

(3)  $L_h$  must be relativized to a particular text. Without the relativization  $L_h$  would be an incoherent language, in which (even contradictory) sentences from different texts could be theses. Thus, it is needed to introduce the symbol  $L_{h:x}$  for the intentionalist language for the purpose of text  $x$ , and  $L_{h:x,y}$  — for the intentionalist language for the purpose of text  $x$  and  $y$  (a combination of texts), etc.  $L_h$  is the intentionalist language relativized to any text(s) or all texts (the universal intentionalist language). The antinominality of such a language or some languages that are a combination of texts is not so striking if item (5) of the present considerations will be accepted.

(4) As highlighted by W. Marciszewski (1973: 194-198, 206), who supplements Ajdukiewicz's views, accepting a sentence takes place on account of particular "general characteristics of acceptance." Marciszewski proposes characteristics, which do not allow us to accept internally contradictory sentences or sentences leading to a contradiction in a particular intentionalist language, but agrees on other characteristics of accepting as well. Thus, AD needs to be supplemented with the expression "on account of CA" (that is on account of the adopted characteristics of acceptance) after the verb "to accept."

(5) The adopted characteristics of acceptance should be adjusted to the nature of the text to which a particular intentionalist language is relativized. If the text is a postmodern novel (anti-novel) in which, for example, the narration refers to contradictory states of affairs, then other CA than the one proposed by Marciszewski needs to be adopted. Similarly, inference rules: inference rules of language  $L_{h:x}$  are determined by the nature of text  $x$ , thus they can allow and even prefer (in the case of specific texts) to generate contradictory sentences. The question arises if such a language (and its text) could have its model. According to Marciszewski (1973: 197) — who refers to the characteristics of models of the language of fiction given by Pelc (1971: 122-139) — the answer is no. These

characteristics, however, do not directly imply that creating a model of language with contradictions would not be possible at all. It seems that such a model cannot be excluded, though it would be "overfilled."

(6) As the law of non-contradiction does not apply in specific intentionalist languages (relativized to particular texts), the law of excluded-middle can not apply to all intentionalist languages. On the basis of the law of non-contradiction, a rule (NR) can be formulated to prohibit acceptance (or force rejection<sup>9</sup>) of sentence *not-p*<sup>10</sup> in the case of accepting sentence *p* (or respectively: *p* when *not-p*). Whereas the rule formulated on the basis of the law of excluded-middle (EMR) forces acceptance (prohibits rejection) of at least one of two contradictory sentences: acceptance of sentence *p* in the case of rejecting sentence *not-p* (or respectively: *not-p* when *p*). If, following Ingarden (1987b: 203-207), we accept that every intentional object (due to the finiteness of its acts) has (in its contents) the so called spots of indeterminacy, then EMR does not have a universal application in any (finite) text or any intentionalist language based on this text. For it is possible that in a given intentionalist language neither a particular sentence, nor its negation can be regarded as acceptable. There are a few solutions in such a case:

*PRIMO*: a thesis that needs to be accepted in  $L_{h:x}$  is the joint denial *neither p, nor not-p* (which is equivalent to the negation of the law of excluded-middle), thus both *p* and *not-p* should be rejected; however, since *neither p, nor not-p* is equivalent to *p and not-p*, then rejecting both *p* and *not-p* is equivalent to accepting both of them;

*SECUNDO*: what should be accepted in  $L_{h:x}$  is the alternative *p or not-p* (and, by the same, EMR); however, a language user is not capable of determining which of these sentences (components of the alternative) should be rejected, and which should be accepted, because neither the text nor inference rules determine the acceptance or the rejection of any of these sentences, these sentences are, thus, neutral on account of acceptance/rejection;

*TERTIO*: what should be accepted in  $L_{h:x}$  is the alternative *p or not-p* (and, by the same, EMR); the language user decides which sentences (components of the alternative) should be rejected, and which should be accepted, in an intellectual process called text interpretation.

All these propositions correspond to Ingarden's views. The first,<sup>11</sup> however,

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<sup>9</sup>It is necessary to reject a sentence in  $L_{h:x}$  if neither an isomorphic sentence occurs in text *x*, nor can it be obtained in  $L_{h:x}$  (on the basis of the language's rules) from sentences previously accepted in this language. Thus, what is required to reject a sentence is a familiarity with the whole text and an ability to determine what can not belong to the set of the text's consequences.

<sup>10</sup>Instead of the functor, symbols of the classical propositional calculus, appropriate English words will be used in the present article.

<sup>11</sup>Ingarden (1987b: 205), analyzing the content of R. M. Rilke's poem, writes about



despite Ingarden, leads to our accepting contradiction in all (and not only some) intentional objects<sup>12</sup> (here: intentionalist languages). The second not only highlights the moment of indeterminacy of an object (text), but separates it from a broader background: it neglects the creative role of a receiver of a work of art or a text. The third — free from the above disadvantages and considering the pragmatic context — seems to be the most accurate. According to this proposition a receiver of a work of art or literature processes, in appropriate acts, its concretization (to use Ingarden's term) or interprets a text (to use the terminology adopted here). Opting for the third conception, it is necessary to add to AD that in certain cases,  $p$  can be accepted on account of the interpretative preferences of the receiver (in relation to the sentences here called "neutral").

(7) L. Koj (1990: 117-118), discussing the issues of translating sentences concerning fictitious objects into a meta-language, observes that (to use the terminology adopted here) sentences accepted in  $L_{h:x}$  do not occur in text  $x$ , when  $x$  is written in a foreign language (e.g. Polish) in relation to the language of  $L_{h:x}$  (e.g. English). Following Koj's suggestion, it seems reasonable to, among others, replace the expression "isomorphic" in Ajdukiewicz's directive (as Ajdukiewicz focused his analyses only on Polish texts or translations into Polish) with "synonymous." After all, two isomorphic expressions may have different meanings (while two synonymous expressions may have different shapes); it is not always the case that isomorphic expressions have the same meaning (or synonymous expressions have the same shape).<sup>13</sup> If Pelc's (1971: 15-24) analyses concerning the usage of expressions are to be used, it seems that it is possible (in a certain sense of the word "meaning") to replace the expression "is isomorphic" with the expression "is used in the same way as sentence  $p$ ;" it would be necessary, however, to add: "and occurs in the same usage as  $p$ ." It seems that Pelc would not accept the possibility of having non-isomorphic expressions with exactly the same usage. In  $L_{h:x}$ , however, non-isomorphic sentences are very often accepted in relation to the sentences in text  $x$ .

(8) Although the introduction of the notion of synonymy (or ways of usage and usage) is necessary, it leads to a series of complications and problems (not smaller than the introduction of the notion of translation). Most of all, it turns the

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the poem's protagonist that his body "should have an infinite multitude of various properties, but actually does not have them in the particular intentional object, because the text does not establish them, however, it also does not contradict them."

<sup>12</sup>"A purely intentional object may be contradictory, internally inconsistent or incomplete — BUT NEEDS NOT NECESSARILY BE SO" (Ingarden 1987c: 243).

<sup>13</sup>It is worth considering if it would not be better to talk in this context about a (content? range?) translation of a sentence in the original text into a sentence in  $L_{h:x}$ . The notion of translation raises, however, a series of complicated problems. After all, the notion of synonymy has an advantage in that it can be applied not only to the sentences in which one is the current translation of the other.

arguments — despite the intentions Ajdukiewicz<sup>14</sup> declares in the discussed article — from the purely syntactic plane to the semantic plane (or pragmatic, and at least "functional"). Then arises e.g. the problem of what constitutes synonymy between non-isomorphic sentences (one of which belongs to text  $x$ , and the other is to be accepted in  $L_{h:x}$ ). Koj (1990: 118) also indicates the danger of a vicious circle which consists in that (if Koj's opinion is not misinterpreted here) the meaning (recognizing the meaning?) of a sentence synonymous with  $p$  is determined by its presence (recognizing the presence) in a particular text, and the presence in a text is determined by having a particular meaning. Leaving the complicated issues of the theory of meaning it is enough here to answer that Ajdukiewicz — unlike Koj — does not give an explication of the meaning of sentence  $p$  (or its truth conditions, or even all rules on how to use it), but states only (in a very general directive of accepting) when it is allowed in  $L_{h:x}$  to accept sentence  $p$ : it is allowed to accept sentence  $p$  in  $L_{h:x}$  either when, according to a language user of  $L_{h:x}$ ,  $p$  is synonymous with a sentence in  $x$  (and in a special case, when  $p$  is in  $x$ ), or when  $p$  can be derived from the sentences in  $x$  on the basis of adopted deductive rules. This directive does not even involve a choice of any conception of meaning.

(9) The results presented in items (6) and (8) can serve as a basis to relativize the intentionalist language not only to a text, but also to its user. Since the user of this language (restrained only by own interpretative preferences) decides which of the neutral sentences may be accepted, and since the language user (in the face of a lack of strict rules for determining sentence synonymy) decides if a given sentence is synonymous with a sentence in the text, then languages relativized to the same text can differ in their accepted sentences depending on the decisions of a language user. Thus,  $L_{h:xu}$  is an intentionalist language relativized to text  $x$  and language user  $u$ . Similarly to the possibility of combining texts — shown in item (3) — there is a possibility of communication between users of intentionalist languages and of creating a language relativized to a certain group of users.

(10) Another difficulty observed by Koj (1990: 118) is connected with the fact that text  $x$  may contain e.g. sentences uttered by a protagonist in direct speech and inconsistent with the content of narration. In order to overcome the difficulty, Koj proposes that the truth condition of a sentence about a fictitious object (here: a condition for accepting a given sentence in  $L_{h:xu}$ ) be the occurrence of a synonymous sentence "in work (here: text)  $x$  as imitation of a description of real persons or events." This phrasing seems to be too broad on the one hand (a text's sentences do not need to imitate anything), and too narrow on the other (a text's sentences may imitate not only real objects, and real objects do not reduce to persons and events). Moreover, it ignores the problem of sentences uttered by a text's protagonist, or weakens their role for a particular intentionalist

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<sup>14</sup>"[...] whereas our analysis is purely syntactical" (Giedymin 1978: 215).

language. It is enough to indicate here that sentences uttered by a protagonist of an epic or drama text are sentences of the protagonist of the text (and not of the very text), hence they should be either put into quotation marks<sup>15</sup> (in the case when the protagonist quotes another character's utterances, additional quotation marks are needed, and iteration of a quotation leads to an  $n$ -fold quotation),<sup>16</sup> or treated not as sentences but as parts of sentences of the type: *y said: ...* (or *y: ...* — as in dramatic texts).<sup>17</sup> In these (and similar) special cases, AD will concern accepting sentences synonymous with appropriate quotation-mark-sentences or "whole-sentences." After all, the issue discussed here reveals a broader problem: what is accepted: single sentences, or rather (constituting their context) complexes of sentences, perhaps even together with hidden assumptions and consequences?

(11) It needs to be highlighted that text  $x$  may contain sentences (questions, orders, exclamation sentences) or verbless sentences to whom truth value traditionally are not assigned and which are not said to be accepted (or not) as theses of a language. For example, canto XXVII of "Paradise" in *The Divine Comedy* reads: "O joy! O gladness inexpressible! / O perfect life of love and peacefulness" (Dante 2015). According to the current considerations, there are three possibilities of accepting this verbless sentence (ellipsis?) in the intentionalist language relativized to the translation of *The Divine Comedy*:

*PRIMO*: it is necessary to transform the quoted expression into an indicative sentence whose content corresponds to the content of the quoted expression (so that both expressions are synonymous in aspect); this sentence (e.g. "God's glory causes the joy of eternal life in those in paradise") can be regarded as a thesis of the intentionalist language;

*SECUNDO*: what can be regarded as a thesis (according to item (10)) is either a sentence version of the quoted expression but put in quotation marks, or simply the sentence: "the person speaking (Dante) says: O joy! O gladness [...]!"

*TERTIO*: the quoted expression needs to be accepted in the intentionalist language, but in another sense of the word "acceptance." To "accept the quoted expression" would mean here to "assert that this expression is in the text" or "assert that whoever would be in the world presented (determined) by this text, (s)he should (or could without contradicting this world's order) utter this expression."

(12) It is worth considering if text  $x$  belongs to  $L_{h:xy}$ . There are two possible conceptions. In the first, the text is not a part of appropriate intentionalist

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<sup>15</sup>It is only a quotation mark, so the expression it creates is not a quotation-mark-name.

<sup>16</sup>It is connected with a problematic issue of the so called multi-level fictionality, mentioned by J. Pańniczek (1984) who analyzes selected conceptions of fictional objects and paradoxes related to them.

<sup>17</sup>In lyric and certain types of narration, the whole text is only an utterance of somebody, hence it should be consistently treated as a quotation and all its sentences should be put into quotation marks or preceded by a colon.

language, but a basis to formulate it. Then, the set of theses (of expressions accepted in)  $L_{h:xy}$  is a set of expressions obtained from  $x$  through appropriate operations (e.g. translating or interpreting) and accepted on the basis of operations of accepting determined by AD. In the second conception, the set of theses (of sentence expressions accepted in)  $L_{h:xy}$  ( $T_{L_{h:xy}}$ ) is the smallest set that includes the set of sentences of text  $x$  and is closed due to the operations of accepting determined by AD ( $Cl(x, A_{AD})$ ), thus:

a sentence expression  $E$  belongs to  $T_{L_{h:xy}} \equiv E$  belongs to  $Cl(x, A_{AD})$ ;

and

$x$  is included in  $T_{L_{h:xy}}$ , thus  $x$  is a part of  $L_{h:xy}$ .

What is adopted here is the second conception, according to which using  $L_{h:xy}$  is either uttering (and accepting) the expressions of text  $x$ , or doing certain operations on the text  $x$  (translating, establishing synonymy, deducting, interpreting, etc.), or uttering (and accepting) the results of such operations. The following persons can function as users  $u$  of language  $L_{h:xy}$ : the author of text  $x$ , a reader of text  $x$  who understands the text, a translator, an interpreter, a critic, a continuator who accepts and develops the content of the text.

Taking into account remarks (1)-(12), AD can be formulated anew and changed into a corrected Ajdukiewicz's directive (AD')

AD': it is allowed to accept sentence  $p$  (or " $p$ ") in an intentionalist language that is relativized to text  $x$  and used by user  $u$ , that is in language  $L_{h:xy}$ , on account of the adopted characteristics of accepting CA (determined, among others, by the nature of text  $x$ ), if and only if the meta-language sentence "a certain sentence in  $x$  is regarded by  $u$  of language  $L_{h:xy}$  as synonymous with  $p$  (or " $p$ ")" is accepted in realistic language  $L_r$  on account of CA, or when it is possible to obtain  $p$  (or " $p$ ") in  $L_{h:xy}$  on the basis of the language's inference rules (determined, among others, by the nature of text  $x$ ) and, if necessary, interpretation preferences of  $u$  of language  $L_{h:xy}$  (in relation to neutral sentences of text  $x$ ) from a different, already accepted on account of CA in  $L_{h:xy}$ , sentence (sentences).

The above directive and the preceding remarks provide some more precise information on intentionalist language. However, they contain neither a real definition of intentional existence or intentional object, nor nominal definition of their names. According to AD', it is possible to accept a sentence that contains a certain existential functor, and by the same token asserts, for example, that a given item exists or is an object. On the basis of appropriate ontological definitions by Leśniewski it is possible to eliminate the functor, and, by the same definition, to determine its sense by means of the logical symbols in the definitions. These definitions, if they occur in a given intentionalist language, are only definitions of the expressions "there is (at least one) ...," "... is an object," etc. in the analyzed language. They are, however, neither nominal definitions of the expressions "there is intentionally (at least one) ...," "... is an intentional

object," nor a fortiori real definitions of intentional existence or intentional object. In such a situation, Ajdukiewicz just adds subscript  $h$  ("intentional flat") to the symbols of existential functors as long as they are treated as belonging to the intentionalist language. Thus, he introduces symbols  $ex_h$  and  $ob_h$ , and refers to their meanings as "the notion of intentional existence" and "the notion of intentional object," respectively (by way of analogy, he introduces symbols for certain expressions of the empirical/realistic language:  $ex_r$  and  $ob_r$ , and refers to their meanings as "the notion of real existence" and "the notion of real object"). Because Ajdukiewicz (1985f: 190) does not want to use definitions of semantic nature, and in general attempts "not to contaminate his language with a term with such a bad reputation like the term 'intentional existence'," he retreats from any definition of "intentional existence" and "intentional object."<sup>18</sup>

However, such definitions could be attempted. Here follows a sample set of definitions:

D1:  $p'$  is an intentional state of affairs that is assigned to sentence  $p$  in  $L_{h:xu} \equiv p'$  is a state of affairs that is determined by sentence  $p$  accepted (or potentially accepted) in  $L_{h:xu}$  according to AD', and  $p'$  is determined by sentence  $p$  as an accepted (or potentially accepted) sentence in  $L_{h:ux}$  according to AD' (the second part of the conjunction is necessary, because there could be sentences that are accepted in both  $L_{h:xu}$  and  $L_r$ );<sup>19</sup>

D2:  $a'$  is an intentional object that is assigned to name  $a$  in  $L_{h:xu} \equiv (E p, p')$  ( $a$  is, or can – without a change in the meaning of  $p$  – be, the subject in sentence  $p$  in  $L_{h:xu}$  and  $p'$  is an intentional state of affairs that is assigned to sentence  $p$  in  $L_{h:xu}$ ) (cf. LED3);

D3:  $a'$  (at least one  $a'$ ) exists intentionally on account of language  $L_{h:xu}$  that contains name  $a \equiv (E p, p')$  ( $p$  in  $L_{h:xu}$  has, or can — according to rules in language  $L_{h:xu}$  — have, the shape  $ex a$ , and  $p'$  is an intentional state of affairs that is assigned to sentence  $p$  in  $L_{h:xu}$ ) (cf. LED1.).

The above definitions are real definitions of BEING an intentional state of affairs, an intentional object and intentional existence, but they can be treated as nominal definitions of the respective expressions (by putting them in quotation marks). Under the second approach, it would be said that the term "state of affairs" (or "what is determined by the sentence," if it is possible to eliminate

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<sup>18</sup>Anyway, Ajdukiewicz highlights that his object language contains neither the term "intentional object" nor "real object." The latter could be a synonym of the term "object" at the most.

<sup>19</sup>It needs to be remarked that, according to the content of footnote 9, the condition for the rejection of a sentence is when all conditions for accepting it are not met. In such a case, "it is allowed (possible) to reject  $p$ " is synonymous to "it is not allowed (possible) to accept  $p$ ;" thus, "it is not allowed (possible) to reject  $p$ " is synonymous to "it is not allowed (possible) not to accept  $p$ ," that is "it is possible to accept  $p$ ." If the above is correct, then it is enough to say in D1 "sentence  $p$  accepted (or not rejected)."

this original term by means of the sentence) is a primitive term. What is assumed in the definitions is that the state of affairs is an equivalent to the sentence (preferably, of the shape *a est b*), while the object is an equivalent to the subject of the sentence, and the existence of the object is an equivalent to the sentence that contains functor *ex* (or the sentence that is equivalent to the sentence with the functor).

If the above terminology and the related semantic and ontological assumptions are not accepted, then another set of definitions can be formulated. This set, however, needs to be in accordance with the following generalizing definitions (GD):

GD1: *a* is an intentional object on account of  $L_{h:xu} \equiv$  the sentence "*a* is an object" is (can be) accepted in  $L_{h:xu}$ ;

GD2: *a* exists intentionally on account of  $L_{h:xu} \equiv$  the sentence "*a* exists" is (can be) accepted in  $L_{h:xu}$ .

GD1–GD2 can be specified in various ways depending on the accepted (e.g. included in Leśniewski's ontology) definitions of the object and existence. For example, by means of LED3 it is possible (through appropriate operations) to transform GD1 in D2, while by means of LED1. — GD2 in D3.

The above considerations and their results (DA', D1–D3, GD1–GD2) quite precisely express some intuitions of the Brentano-phenomenological tradition. A representative of this tradition could, however, remark on two serious simplifications made here.

The first is about that an intentional object/existence is relativized to (expressions of) a certain language. Such an object is however — as Ingarden would say (1987b: 162, 196; 1988: 190-193) — only a derivatively intentional object, for language is relativized to particular consciousness acts of the language's users. "A purely intentional object is an equivalent to and a creation of an act or acts of consciousness. There are, however, various types of acts, though correlatively, and various types of intentional objects" (Ingarden 1987b: 162). Thus, the definitions presented above concern only certain types of intentional objects and do not take into consideration their most important relativization — the relativization to acts of consciousness.

The previously quoted article by Marciszewski provides three comments which can help to supplement the above considerations in accordance with Ingarden's conception:

*PRIMO*: it is possible to differentiate between actual texts (here: languages), that are written or uttered, and potential texts (languages), that are only thought but not realized in written or spoken form (Marciszewski 1973: 195); then an intentional object (existence) would need to be relativized to an intentionalist potential language (which would lead, however, to ignoring derivatively intentional objects relativized to actual languages) or to both languages (which would lead,

however, to ignoring the derivativeness of the actual language from the potential language); hence what should be discussed here (although rather artificially) is the relativization of the object to the consciousness layer of intentionalist language or to this language's pre-verbal stage;

*SECUNDO*: it is possible to determine the notion of intentional object (existence) by means of the notion of accepting as a certain act of consciousness (cf. Marciszewski 1973: 206): something is an intentional object if and only if there is an act of accepting of a particular sentence, its pre-verbal content or the object (something) that the sentence/content concerns; however, in the Brentano-phenomenological tradition, intentional objects need not be correlates of acts of accepting, for these acts are preceded by acts of presenting (cf. Twardowski 1965: 4-8, 13, 33);

*TERTIO*: it needs to be stated that something is an intentional object (exists intentionally) if and only if somebody somehow thinks about it (in the broadest sense of the word "thinks" that encompasses any type of act of consciousness characterized by the moment of intention) (Marciszewski 1973: 202), or (it needs to be added) if somebody can think about it provided the person comprehends the complex of signs (resulting from, among others, somebody else's acts of consciousness); a special case of such thinking is the thinking that respects appropriate criteria.

In accordance with the above remarks, the following phenomenological description of intentional object can be proposed (PIO):

PIO: an intentional object is a correlate of acts of consciousness (which, in a special case, meet certain criteria), e.g. thinking, or of their results, e.g. judgements (that create texts/ potential languages), or of linguistic expressions of these results, e.g. sentences that create (actual) texts/ languages; these acts, results or their expressions can be treated either as belonging to a particular individual, or as independent of the individual.<sup>20</sup>

The second simplification consists of neglecting a very important differentiation present in Ingarden's writings (and has equivalents in the Meinong tradition, and, to some extent, in Twardowski). The differentiation is between the intentional object as such ("intentional structure") and its content (Ingarden, 1987b: 195-203; 1988: 181-190). This differentiation allows, among others, to avoid certain paradoxes, e.g. a intentional equivalent of a name exists intentionally, because it is only an equivalent of a linguistic meaning-entity, and at the same time it exists really, because this equivalent is alleged as something real in this entity

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<sup>20</sup>According to Ajdukiewicz (1973), the approach in which the existence of something relies only on being a correlate of acts of consciousness of a certain individual (individuals) is subjective (psychological) idealism, while the approach in which the existence of something relies on being a correlate of the results of acts that are independent of the individual and that meet specific criteria (that are determined by norms) is objective (logical) idealism or transcendental idealism.

(Ingarden 1988: 196). Marciszewski (1973: 204-205) proposes that we express the differences between intentional object and its content through putting the sentence-forming functor in brackets (here: curly brackets), if it is related to the content of intentional object.<sup>21</sup>

Employing the (elaborated and detailed) idea of Marciszewski and the results of the above analyses, it is possible to present the vocabulary and the set of truth conditions for the sentences that have the functor *ex*:

1) sentence  $ex_r a$ <sup>22</sup> – is sentence *ex a* accepted in  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* exists really (actually), thus, according to LED1., if something is real *a*;

2)  $ex_h a$  — is either sentence *ex a* or sentence *not-ex a* accepted in a certain  $L_{h:xu}$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* exists intentionally (thus, according to LED1., something is intentional *a*) on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ , that is person *u* thinks about object *a* or name *a* occurs in  $L_{h:xu}$ ;<sup>23</sup> then there are four possibilities:

2')  $\{ex_r\}_h a$ <sup>24</sup> – is sentence *ex a* accepted in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and

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<sup>21</sup>G. Evans, who examined the issue of (negative) existential sentences and the use of empty names, used K. L. Walton's conception of games of make-believe. An example of such a game is telling a fictional story. In order to specify linguistic expressions which correspond to the content of the game, both authors use the sign " \* \* ". Asterisks (in between which e.g. the narrator's utterances can be put) play the role similar to that of brackets in Marciszewski (cf. Evans 1991: 353-363).

<sup>22</sup>The problem that arises here is where to put the subscript "r" or "h." In my opinion the subscripts specify the language of the whole sentence (which differentiates the sentence's meaning), hence the whole sentence should be put in round brackets, while the subscript should be outside the brackets. Ajdukiewicz, who wanted that the name replacing *a* had the same meaning in both languages, assigns the subscript to the functor and reduces the non-synonymy of appropriate isomorphic sentences — which results from belonging to different languages — to the functor. It is interesting what T. Kotarbiński (1986: 188, 193) would do, as he proposed that "the tense marker is shifted from the copula to the subject or to the subjective complement" (Kotarbiński 1966: 191) (e.g. not "Troy existed," but "former Troy exists"), if he agreed on differentiating 'existential tense marker'?

<sup>23</sup>According to LED1., it would be more precise to say: *u* thinks about something that is *a* (or: *u* thinks that something is *a*; or *u* thinks about something that it is *a*), or: name *a* occurs in language  $L_{h:xu}$  and it is asserted that the name is related to something (e.g. something (presented) that is (presented as) *a*, is presented in the text (as existing/ non-existing, real/ intentional, being such-and-such)). This precise wording was omitted in the set of truth conditions in order not to complicate their formulations. The name "object" occurring in the formulations is synonymous to the colloquial expression "something" (it is not treated as a technical term of Leśniewski's ontology — *ob*; anyway, it would be easier to formulate truth conditions for *ob* than for other functors).

<sup>24</sup>The subscript "r" that appears between curly brackets indicates not that a given



$a$  is a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  exists intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person  $u$  or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ) and is treated in its content as existing really (e.g. object  $a$  is presented in text  $x$  as a real person);

2")  $\{ex_h\}_h a$  — is sentence  $ex a$  accepted in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and  $a$  is a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  not used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$  (e.g.  $a$  occurs in language  $L_{h:xu}$  in expressions put in quotation marks); the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  exists intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person  $u$  or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ) and is treated in its content as existing intentionally (e.g. object  $a$  is presented in text  $x$  as an object of thought of the protagonist of the text);

2'")  $\{not-ex_r\}_h a$  — is sentence  $not-ex a$  accepted in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and  $a$  is a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  exists intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person  $u$  or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ) and is treated in its content as non-existing really (e.g. object  $a$  is presented in text  $x$  as a real person who has just died);

2''")  $\{not-ex_h\}_h a$  — is sentence  $not-ex a$  accepted in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and  $a$  is a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  not used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  exists intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person  $u$  or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ) and is treated in its content as non-existing intentionally (e.g. object  $a$  is presented in text  $x$  as an object which is not thought of by any protagonist of the text);

3)  $not-ex_r a$ <sup>25</sup> — is sentence  $not-ex a$  accepted in a certain language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  does not exist really (thus, according to LED1., nothing is real  $a$ );

4)  $not-ex_h a$  — is sentence  $ex a$  or  $not-ex a$  rejected in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object  $a$  does not exist intentionally (thus,

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functor occurs in a realistic language, but that it occurs in a text (in an intentionalist language) and is treated as referring to something allegedly real (something that is alleged in its content as real). There are other alternative notations, e.g.:  $ex_h\{a_r\}$ ,  $ex_h\{ex_r a\}$ ,  $ex_h\{ex_r\}a$ , they lead, however, to certain difficulties: using the first type of notation consistently makes it impossible to talk about objects treated in their content as non-existing (e.g. 2'"), 2''"); the second notation suggests that contents of intentional objects are only states of affairs (*state of affair* here:  $a$  exists really); the third notation is syntactically incorrect (unless treated as an abbreviation of the expression: *a exists intentionally and a is treated in its content as existing really*).

<sup>25</sup>Bearing Kotarbiński's warning in mind (1986: 190), it would be reasonable to consider where the negation sign should be put. There are four possibilities: before bracketed sentence  $ex_r a$ , before the functor, before the indicator, before the name. The second option was chosen here (it is equivalent to the first one, since one-argument functor negation is in this case equivalent to the negation of the whole sentence with the functor and the argument).

according to LED1., nothing is intentional *a*) on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ , that is person *u* does not think about object *a*, or name *a* does not occur in language  $L_{h:xu}$ ; on account of the content of the object whose intentional existence is negated, by analogy to 2 four possibilities can be differentiated:

4')  $not-\{ex_r\}_h a$  – is sentence *ex a* rejected in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and *a* is a name aspiring to be a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* – treated in its content as existing really — does not exist intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ), that is *u* does not think about such an object or its name does not occur in  $L_{h:xu}$ ;

4'')  $not-\{ex_h\}_h a$  — is sentence *ex a* rejected in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and *a* is a name aspiring to be a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  not used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* – treated in its content as existing intentionally — does not exist intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ );

4''')  $not-\{not-ex_r\}_h a$  — is sentence *not-ex a* rejected in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and *a* is a name aspiring to be a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* – treated in its content as non-existing really – does not exist intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ );

4''''')  $not-\{not-ex_h\}_h a$  — is sentence *not-ex a* rejected in a certain language  $L_{h:xu}$ , and *a* is a name aspiring to be a name of language  $L_{h:xu}$  not used in imitation of a name of language  $L_r$ ; the explicated sentence is true when object *a* – treated in its content as non-existing intentionally — does not exist intentionally (on account of acts of consciousness of person *u* or language  $L_{h:xu}$ ).

Meeting truth conditions is mutually exclusive for 1) and 3). Such analogous pairs are: 2' and 4', 2'' and 4'', 2''' and 4'''', 2'''' and 4''''', 2' and 2'', 2'' and 2''' etc. In the remaining cases truth conditions do not exclude each other. It is assumed here (what Ajdukiewicz seems to tacitly adopt in his formulation of the idealist's thesis) that a given object can exist really (as an element of the real world) and intentionally (as a correlate of acts of consciousness or text's/ language's expressions) (and can also be presented both as real and as intentional). Assuming to the contrary<sup>26</sup> would cause a bigger number of mutually exclusive cases.

The results of the current analyses can also help to check Ajdukiewicz's criticism of idealism. However, it should be highlighted that these results describe

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<sup>26</sup>Such a contrary assumption occurs in Ingarden who claims that objects with different modes of existence cannot be identical, at the most they can be characterized by self-same identity of the content, especially if an intentional object — through which a real object is cognized — completely "overlaps" with it (see Ingarden 1987a: 79; 1987b: 186, 191).

an intentional object and some of its types, but are not its detailed characteristics. Ingarden would refer here to e.g. existential moments which are part of e.g. the existential characteristics of a discussed object. Giving the detailed characteristics of an object is not necessary for realizing what the object is. Anyway, there are some preliminary analyses (Haefliger 1995: 31) by means of which Ingarden's characteristics of a intentional object can be made more specific; hence there is no need to repeat them here.

Ad c).

Ajdukiewicz's formulation of the idealist's thesis (IT) in the object-language (and not meta-language) version can be reconstructed as follows:

IT:  $(x)$  (*not-  $ex_r x$  and  $ex_i x$* ),

or

*(not-  $ex_r a$  and  $ex_i a$ )*

and  $a$  can be replaced by a name of any 'object of experience' or 'thing we encounter in nature' (Ajdukiewicz uses the name *tree*).<sup>27</sup> "In his basic thesis the idealist claims that all things which we encounter in nature, for example trees, do not exist in reality but exist only intentionally." (Giedymin 1978: 219). The first element of the thesis-conjunction is formed in a realistic language, while the second — in a certain intentionalist language which is the idealist's language (hence the subscript  $i$  instead of  $h$ ).

Particular stages of Ajdukiewicz's criticism of the idealistic approach can be reconstructed as follows:

— it is possible to accept IT if both its elements are accepted (since they are linked by conjunction);

— it is possible to accept  $ex_i a$  (the second element of IT) if meta-language sentence  $Z$  ("sentence  $ex_r a$  meets the criteria"<sup>28</sup>) of a realistic language is true;

— if  $Z$  is false, then accepting  $ex_i a$  is groundless;

— if  $Z$  is true, then, on the grounds of  $Z$  being true, what needs to be accepted is not only  $ex_i a$ , but also  $ex_r a$ ; it causes a contradiction between the first element of IT and the sentence accepted on the basis of  $Z$  being true (a contradiction between *not- $ex_r a$*  and  $ex_r a$ );

— conclusion: accepting the idealist's thesis (who consequently uses their language) is either groundless or results in a contradiction.

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<sup>27</sup>In further analysis, for convenience, the symbol  $(x)$  in IT will be omitted on the basis of the rule of omitting the general quantifier. It is worth remarking that perhaps (as Prof. J. Jadacki observed in the discussion following the delivery of the paper; cf. note 1) instead of the functor of the classical propositional calculus *and*, there should be a different functor of the type *and (but) only*.

<sup>28</sup>What is meant here is the specific criteria of accepting sentences formed by objective/ transcendental idealists. In the case of subjective idealism it is sufficient if a sentence is accepted by an appropriate subject (and thus meets the criterion of being accepted).

The results presented in ad a) and ad b) allow us to make the above analyses of Ajdukiewicz more precise and check their correctness. Reading Ajdukiewicz's statements (reconstructed above) literally leads to the following claim: an idealist states in a realistic language: "*a* does not exist really," and states in a certain intentionalist language: "*a* exists intentionally." In the first utterance, the word "really" is not necessary since  $L_r$  concerns only what is real. Hence Ajdukiewicz's formulation of the first element of IT is an abbreviation of the sentence *not-ex a* as accepted in  $L_r$  (cf. 3). Similarly, the second element — sentence  $ex_i a$  is sentence  $ex a$  accepted in a certain intentionalist language (cf. 2).<sup>29</sup>

However, what is text  $x$  to which this language as the language used by an idealist is relativized? This (only potential or actual in Marciszewski's sense) text is a complex of sentences (results or records of thoughts of individual  $u$  or any meta-individual being) which meet appropriate criteria (e.g. being accepted by someone — highlighted in subjective idealism — can be one such criteria). Let's call the text the idealist's text and mark it with  $i$  instead of  $x$ . Applying AD' it needs to be stated (for the sake of simplicity) that it is possible to accept sentence  $ex a$  in  $L_{h:iu}$  (thus, it is possible to simply accept  $ex_h a - ex_i a$  in Ajdukiewicz's notation — or more precisely  $ex_{h:iu} a$ ) if a certain sentence in the complex of sentences that meet the appropriate criteria (thus a sentence of text  $i$ ) is synonymous with sentence  $ex a$  or if  $ex a$  can be derived from sentences already accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$ .

Thus, it is clear that — according to AD' — none of the sentences in  $i$  can be equivalent to a sentence of the form  $ex_r a$ ; at the most it can be synonymous with a sentence of the form  $\{ex_r\}_{h:iu} a$  (this sentence, however, is a sentence of language  $L_{h:iu}$  and not language  $L_r$  — cf. 2'). Sentences of a text (here:  $i$ ) need to belong to an intentionalist language provided that they are read as sentences of a text. Thus they can be assigned with the subscript  $h$ . Assigning them with the subscript  $r$  involves treating them not as sentences of a text, and by the same involves understanding them in a different sense than the sense they have as sentences of a text. Anyway, if there were a sentence with the subscript  $r$  in  $i$ , then an meaning equivalent sentence would also need to have (so that synonymy occurred) the subscript  $r$ . Then it would be necessary to accept a sentence with the subscript  $r$  in  $L_{h:iu}$ , which would result in a paradox since all sentences accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$  on the grounds of AD' are sentences of the intentionalist language, thus they can be assigned only with the subscript  $h$ .

In other words, since all sentences accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$  are intentionalist (sentences with the subscript  $h$ ), then they can be synonymous only with intentionalist

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<sup>29</sup>Perhaps, however, sentence  $ex_h a$  is a sentence accepted in  $L_r$  which asserts that  $a$  is really only a correlate of thought and thus  $a$  exists intentionally (that  $a$  exists so is a real fact and not fiction). However, since (it is actually, really so that)  $a$  exists intentionally, then — on the grounds of GD2 or 2.) — sentence  $ex a$  is accepted in a certain intentionalist language (which is a record of appropriate thoughts).

sentences. By the same token, a text to which the intentionalist language is relativized can not contain realistic sentences (sentences with the subscript  $r$ ) (unless they are put in curly brackets; however even then they are not — to put it more precisely — realistic sentences but intentionalist sentences that imitate realistic sentences). Whereas a sentence of the form  $ex_r a$  is a sentence of language  $L_r$  (cf. 1) (a realistic sentence) and as such cannot occur in text  $i$  (in language  $L_{h:iu}$ ).

On the basis of the above — despite Ajdukiewicz — it can be said that accepting the second element of conjunction IT does not result in rejecting its first element. For when an idealist states that a certain sentence meets specific criteria, then — to use the terminology adopted here — it is possible to say that the idealist states that the sentence (or a synonymous sentence, or a sentence from which the sentence can be derived) belongs to a peculiar (perhaps only potential) text such as a complex of sentences that meet the criteria. Sentences of this complex as sentences of a text (that is, as sentences that meet the criteria) cannot be realistic sentences (thus, they cannot be assigned with the subscript  $r$ ).  $Z$  should not be: "sentence  $ex_r a$  meets the criteria," but: "sentence  $ex a$  meets the criteria (thus, sentence  $ex a$  belongs to text  $i$  which is part of language  $L_{h:iu}$ )." Let us call the second reading:  $Z'$ . When  $Z'$  is true, then sentence  $ex a$  needs to be accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$ , and thus sentence  $ex_h a$  (or more precisely:  $ex_{h:iu} a$ ) or  $\{ex_r\}_{h:iu} a$  (cf. 2, 2') needs to be accepted. It does not relate, however, to accepting  $ex_r a$ . Thus, that  $Z'$  is true does not result in a contradiction within the first element of IT:  $not-ex_r a$ .

The insufficiency of Ajdukiewicz's criticism of idealism is confirmed by the analysis of the structure of the idealist's language. What is this language (or more precisely: the theses of this language) composed of? Firstly, sentences that meet the criteria, thus text  $i$  which (as adopted here) belongs to  $L_{h:iu}$ . Secondly, the remaining part of  $L_{h:iu}$ , thus sentences accepted in this language on the basis of text  $i$ . Thirdly, meta-language sentences of  $L_r$  that assert synonymy between particular sentences of text  $i$  and sentences which claim to be accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$  (in special cases, these will be sentences that only assert the occurrence of a particular sentence in text  $i$ , thus sentences that assert that this sentence meets appropriate criteria). Fourthly, meta-language sentences of  $L_r$  that assert the derivability of particular sentences from sentences already accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$ . As can be seen, an idealist does not need to use the object-language part of  $L_r$ . However, if (s)he uses it, (s)he does so only to be able to present her/his own view to a realist, and (s)he limits her-/him-self to negative existential sentences. A negative object-language existential sentence formulated in  $L_r$  — which occurs in the idealist thesis formulated by Ajdukiewicz — is, however, only a clarifying supplement to the second element of the thesis: since anything that exists exists intentionally, nothing exists otherwise than intentionally, and thus nothing really

exists. Whereas uttering in  $L_r$ , by a consistent idealist, any affirmative object-language sentence (e.g. uttering sentence  $ex_r a$ ) and a negative object-language non-existential sentence is simply impossible (unless curly brackets are used to treat it as a sentence about the content of an intentional object; it is, however — as previously noted — an alleged use of the realistic language).

Taking into account the above discussion, two types of idealism can be differentiated. An "extreme" idealist does not use a realistic object-language (analogously, an "extreme" realist does not use an intentionalist language), hence (s)he does not formulate the thesis in the form proposed by Ajdukiewicz. An "extreme" idealist limits themselves to the second (intentionalist) element of the thesis. Whereas a "moderate" idealist — when it is accepted that (s)he uses a negative object-language existential sentence in the realistic language to present her/his own view to a realist — can formulate their thesis in the form proposed by Ajdukiewicz. Moreover, an idealist — despite Ajdukiewicz — can accept this thesis, for accepting its second element does not result in negating the first element (as the language of a "moderate" idealist contains no affirmative object-language sentence in the realistic language, and thus no  $ex_r a$ ).

Both the "extreme" and the "moderate" idealists must use the meta-language part of the realistic language. But it is not the basis of an argument against idealism. For an idealist needs the meta-language of  $L_r$  only to be able, by means of sentences of this meta-language, to accept object-language sentences of text  $i$  (through asserting that they meet the appropriate criteria, and thus belong to the text) and the remaining object-language sentences of language  $L_{h:iu}$  (through asserting that they are synonymous to or derivable from sentences of text  $i$ ). The meta-language of language  $L_r$  has only auxiliary functions for an idealist (allowing us to accept sentences), while, principally, an idealist uses object-language  $L_{h:iu}$ . Moreover, an idealist firstly formulates sentences in object-language  $L_{h:iu}$ , and only then formulates meta-language sentences in  $L_r$  on the basis of which the former sentences are accepted or rejected. Sentences of the first type are of the form e.g.  $a est b$  and aspire to be sentences of text  $i$  or be accepted in  $L_{h:iu}$ . Sentences of the second type — not reducible to the former sentences — are of the form e.g. "sentence  $p (a est b)$  occurs in text  $i$ " or "a certain sentence that occurs in  $i$  is synonymous to sentence  $p (a est b)$ " or "sentence  $p (a est b)$  is derivable from sentences in  $i$ ."

A similar role is played by the meta-language of the realist's language. Neither realists nor idealists, as long as they only utter sentences, need to use a meta-language. However, as an idealist needs a meta-language to accept sentences, a "critical" realist needs it to critically accept sentences (a condition of this is an assertion that a sentence is uttered on the basis of thorough cognitive criteria and not only on the basis of conjecture). In both cases the meta-language is the meta-language of the realistic language: it concerns sentences as certain real objects in

the real world (for an idealist such objects are particular sentences). It is worth considering — despite Ajdukiewicz — if the idealist's meta-language utterances about sentences cannot be interpreted as utterances about characteristic correlates of thought or of linguistic expressions.<sup>30</sup> With such an interpretation, the idealist's approach retains a particular consistency (whatever exists, it exists intentionally; perhaps with the exception of "a creator of intentionality"), and the dispute between realism and idealism is insoluble (whatever exists can be treated as something only real, or only a correlate, or both).

Further analyses of the idealist's and the realist's language confirm the insolubility of the realism-idealism dispute, and by the same token — almost the impossibility of refuting idealism attempted by Ajdukiewicz.

The realist's thesis differs from IT at least in that a realist negates the first element of IT, and thus accepts object-language thesis  $ex_r a$ . Although an idealist does not use the object-language affirmative part of  $L_r$  appropriately, (s)he can understand this thesis, provided that (s)he realizes that a realist (especially a "critical" realist) had to accept the thesis on the basis of some criteria. If an idealist shares these criteria (e.g. empirical criteria) and if (s)he is convinced that sentence  $ex a$  actually meets the criteria, then (s)he can accept the sentence — as a component of text  $i$  — in her/his intentionalist language. However, is putting this sentence from the realistic to the intentionalist language (thus, changing the subscript  $r$  into the subscript  $h$ ) by an idealist a translation (preserving synonymy) of the realist's thesis into the idealist's language? No, because, although both sentences ( $ex_r a$  and  $ex_h a$ ) are accepted on the basis of the same criteria and differ only in the subscript, they have (as sentences of different languages) different senses: the first asserts that something exists independently of consciousness; the other — that this something can be thought (talked, written, read about, or experienced) according to the criteria. A realist and an idealist can have the same views on the way the world functions (what exists and what it is like), but they must disagree about the understanding of the word "exist" (and by the same token, of all words whose senses contain an existential component). Thus, an idealist can (in certain cases), on the basis of accepting sentence  $ex_r a$  by a realist, assert that sentence  $ex a$  meets the criteria, and by the same token, accept  $ex_h a$ , while a realist can do the same, but the other way round. This fact does not mean, however, that sentences of the realistic language are translatable into sentences of the intentionalist language (and preserve synonymy), but only that users of both

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<sup>30</sup>A problem arises here if these utterances (or their senses, or acts creating them, or their authors) are real objects or intentional correlates. In order to avoid *regressus ad infinitum*, it needs to be definitely admitted that these utterances (or some higher-order beings that originated the utterances) are something real. What is meant here, however, is a characteristic and only reality of being (or of a complex of beings) from which originates everything else that is intentional (such a being can be called "a creator of intentionality").

languages have the same empirical data and use the same criteria of accepting sentences.

On the basis of the above it may even be claimed that the idealist's language and the realist's language exclude each other and have contradictory conceptual apparatuses (close in the sense of the one determined by Ajdukiewicz in his famous article (Giedymin 1978: 67-89), by means of which — on the basis of the same data of experience — two different (though parallel) pictures of the world are created. Using Ajdukiewicz's criteria for choosing between the two conceptual apparatuses, it is difficult to prove the superiority of the realistic over the idealistic apparatus. The latter can be characterized by the same tendency to use non-contradiction, rationalization, decidability, and empirical sensitivity, as the former.<sup>31</sup>

Although both apparatuses exclude each other, there is a possibility of agreement between some idealists and realists. The complicated realism–idealism dispute is related to the differentiation of the realistic object-language and the intentionalist object-language. This differentiation takes place only when there is a need to distinguish statements about objects of the real world from statements about thought correlates or linguistic expressions (texts). An "extreme" realist rejects this differentiation, since sentences about correlates can be reduced to meta-language sentences about linguistic expressions (or their thought-equivalents). A similar stance — although in the opposite direction — is taken by an "extreme" idealist who believes that sentences about objects of the real world should be eliminated in favor of sentences about correlates. What connects a "moderate" idealist and a "moderate" realist, though, is that they accept the above differentiation; moreover, an idealist allows us to use at least part of the realistic language (negative existential sentences), and a realist — the intentionalist language (affirmative and negative sentences of various types — see below).

What is more, a "moderate" realist does not need to negate the second element of IT. For it is possible to assume that a particular object exists both: really (independently of acts of consciousness) and intentionally (as an object thought about according to specific criteria). Then a sentence about the existence of this object can be accepted in both: object-language  $L_r$  and object-language  $L_{h:iu}$  (however, as already mentioned, the sentences will have different senses). However, a realist may introduce (or only allow) the intentionalist language not only to highlight that what really exists (in certain cases) exists also intentionally (is what is thought about according to the criteria), but also to differentiate true sentences from false sentences (or sentences with unassigned truth value) in the realist language. In the latter case, false (or unassigned — as regards truth value) sentences of the realist language can — after the change of the subscript — be

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<sup>31</sup>Most probably, the idealistic apparatus is more complicated than the realistic one, but Ajdukiewicz does not mention the tendency for simplicity among the choice criteria.



accepted (as true) in the intentionalist language. In the intentionalist language so understood, only sentences with unassigned truth value or all uttered (thought) sentences (regardless of their truth value) need be accepted.

#### IV. Conclusion (Ad d))

If the results of the above analyses are true, then Ajdukiewicz's criticism of idealism in the discussed article is not sufficient. It needs (if possible) supplements. Such supplements can be found in two other works by Ajdukiewicz.

In the dissertation *A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism* (Giedymin 1978: 140-154) Ajdukiewicz interprets the standpoint of transcendental idealism (especially in the version by H. Rickert) that it turns out that any true sentence of the idealist's language should be its thesis, which is — in the light of Gödel's theorem — impossible, for the language of natural science (which is not rejected by the idealist) is not complete. However, for example on the basis of the remarks included in (6) *SECUNDO* it is possible to formulate the idealist's intentionalist language as an incomplete language, that is such a language which has pairs of contradictory sentences from which none is a thesis (is accepted), thus – provided the law of excluded-middle applies — there are true sentences in this language which are not its thesis.

In the article *Epistemology and Semiotics* (Giedymin 1978: 182-191) Ajdukiewicz claims that the idealist uses in fact (at least at the beginning of considerations) not an object-language but "the language of syntax, in the broad sense, i.e. with the language which contains names of the expressions of the object-language or the names of thoughts which are meanings of those object-language expressions" (Giedymin 1978: 183). As a result, idealists have "no object-language expressions at their disposal" (184) and if "so abandoned the object-language, i.e. the language which we normally use in everyday life to describe reality, will be unable to say anything about that reality" (191). "If nevertheless he pretends to say something, e.g. if he denies our worlds full reality and attributes to it some sort of dependent existence, then he does so through an unconscious mystification which replaces our object-language by his *quasi*-object-language" (191). In accordance with the above, the presented idealist's intentionalist object-language is only apparently an object-language. Sentences of this language refer to thought correlates or sentences (that meet the criteria), the correlates, however, are not objects, but equivalents of thoughts or sentences. Thus — according to Ajdukiewicz — this language is in fact not about objects but about thoughts or sentences.

Ajdukiewicz's paraphrase of the realism–idealism dispute as an opposition between the object-language of semantics and the meta-object (or quasi-object) language of syntax is close to Gilson's approach to this dispute. According to Gilson (1990: 115) it is a dispute between two methods: "Either one begins with being, in which thought is included — *ab esse ad nosse valet consequentia*;

or one starts from thought, in which being is included – *a nosse ad esse valet consequentia*.” Gilson and Ajdukiewicz — who aim at justifying the thesis that there is no transition from thought to being, or from an utterance about thought to an utterance about being — are in favor of the first element of the above exclusive disjunction. Also, they add that the natural (and primary) cognitive stance of a common man is the realistic stance which involves using the realistic language.

Finally, to weaken (problematize) the stance of both authors, four questions need to be raised. The answers to these questions and some remarks included in ad c) may constitute a basis for a discussion with the realism in Ajdukiewicz and Gilson's version. Firstly, does a common man use, in fact, the realistic language (and adopt the realistic approach), or a neutral language which is appropriately (realistically or idealistically) interpreted by philosophers who argue about the ontic status of what we talk about? Secondly, since thought is not the same as thought correlate, and a sentence about thought is not the same as a sentence about thought correlate, is the idealist's language (which concerns correlates of thoughts and sentences) a quasi-object language in fact? Thirdly, is effective cognition and action of a man who uses only a "quasi-object" intentionalist language possible? And if yes, then does it not constitute a basis for a thesis that idealism has not been totally excluded yet and is a hypothesis characterized by a certain degree of probability? Fourthly, are the best arguments in favor of realism sound if one considers the possibility (observed in a brilliant article by R. Nozick (1981)) that our world is a world of fiction subordinate to a text written by God and that all anti-idealistic arguments proposed in this text are not effective? They are only arguments of protagonists of the world of fiction and their value is the same as arguments of protagonists of drama who argue that they are real, but do not become real only because they argue so.<sup>32</sup>

Answers to these questions require further analyses which go beyond the framework of this article.

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<sup>32</sup>According to the notation adopted here, such arguments would be put in quotation marks (as quotations) in curly brackets (as showing the content of an intentional object).

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