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## ON CERTAIN CONTEMPORARY CONTENTS IN WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Originally published as "O pewnych aktualnych motywach w Wilhelma von Humboldta filozofii języka," *Studia Semiotyczne* 14–15 (1986), 105–119. Translated by Kaja Kowalska.

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Wilhelm von Humboldt's philosophy of language anticipated the present and surely also the future of language research to such an extent that now it still may be considered an interesting proposal. A certain linguistic treatment is necessary to show the current theoretical value of Humboldt's philosophy, which would be a rather controversial one from the viewpoint of a historian: it requires an explication of Humboldt's views using today's commonly accepted terminology. On one hand, such a decision is justified by the aim of the attempt (it should not be regarded as a mere presentation of Humboldt's mind and language conception, but rather a free contemporary interpretation of it), and on the other hand, by terminological fluctuation in the texts of this author, where traditional terms appear next to modern ones.<sup>1</sup> The aim

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<sup>1</sup>Quotations refer to the following source texts: W. v. Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I — XVII, ed. A. Leitzmann, B. Gebhardt, W. Richter, Berlin: Behr, 1903—1936, de Gruyter, 1968 — numbers of volumes and pages follow, translation into English by K.K., and W. v. Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts*, Berlin: S. Calvary Co., 1876 — later on as *Sprachbau* + page number: translation into English by K.K. Broad passages are taken from *On Language. On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species*. Ed. Michael Losonsky, Translated by Peter Heath, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, (accessed October, 2012) — later on as *Diversity*.

of the present contribution to the contemporary discussions on mentalism is to show how essential the problem of thinking and mind is for linguistic theory, and to present a certain consequent concept of language based on mental phenomena. In the first part the general outline of mind functioning is sketched, the second part presents language as an intellectual process.

## 1. INTELLECTUAL PROCESS

According to Humboldt, there are two spheres in which the mind's activity is performed in parallel and equal ways: thinking — let us call it cognitive — which is about the outer and the inner reality of a human being, as well as language — all the intellectual procedures that give the cognitive thinking its language form: let us call these verbalizing thinking.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Humboldt states a "double activity of the mind that drives [man — K.K.] to the thought and word" ("die zwiefache Geistesthätigkeit, die ihn auf den Gedanken und das Wort treibt" - V, 323). Because "in the language, everything is mental" ([Da] "alles in der Sprache geistig ist" — V, 395), "language is the formative organ of thought" — *Diversity* ("[ist] die Sprache das bildende Organ des Gedankens", *Sprachbau*, 64). "Language is one of the fields whence the general mental power of human beings emerges in constantly active operation" — *Diversity* ("Die Sprache ist eine der Seiten, von welchen aus die allgemeine menschliche Geisteskraft in beständig thätige Wirksamkeit tritt — *Sprachbau*, 26). "The division of mankind into peoples [...], and the diversity of their languages [...], are indeed directly linked with each other, but are also connected with, and dependent upon, a third and higher phenomenon, the growth of man's mental powers" — *Diversity* ("Die Vertheilung des Menschengeschlechts in Völker [...] und die Verschiedenheit seiner Sprachen [...] hängen zwar unmittelbar mit einander zusammen, stehen aber auch in Verbindung und unter Abhängigkeit einer dritten, höheren Erscheinung, der Erzeugung menschlicher Geisteskraft" — *Sprachbau*, 16-17). Languages "grew up in similarly conditioned fashion, along with mental power, and form at the same time the animating inspiring principle of the latter. But neither proceeds in succession to or apart from the other, for each is utterly and inseparably the same act of the intellectual faculty" — *Diversity* ([Die Sprachen] "wachsen auf gleich bedingte Weise mit der Geisteskraft empor, und bilden zugleich das belebend anregende Princip derselben. Beides aber geht nicht nach einander und abgesondert vor sich, sondern ist durchaus und unzertrennlich dieselbe Handlung des intellectuellen Vermögens" — *Sprachbau*, 51). "For intellectuality and language allow and further only forms that are mutually congenial to one another" — *Diversity* ("Denn die Intellectualität und die Sprache gestalten und befördern nur einander gegenseitig zusagende Formen" — *Sprachbau*, 52). However, they are not identical with one another: "Though it appears as not possible to think without language, man still knows thought from word" ("Nun ist es zwar unmöglich, ohne die Sprache zu denken. Allein der Mensch unterscheidet doch den Gedanken vom Wort" — V, 323). There exists a "double activity of the mind that drives [man — K.K.] to the thought" ("zwiefache Geistesthätigkeit, die ihn auf den Gedanken [...] treibt" — V, 323) and "a thinking disjoined from the

The relationship between these two kinds of the mind's performance is called the symbolization relationship; it results in verbal thinking.

Cognitive as well as verbalizing thinking are the only forms of the mind's existence. Our mind is not a substance; it exists as long as it works, and only in the way it works; it is a kind of energy, which is only describable by the forms of its performance, but not by its core, as its core does not exist without its forms. The way it works can be described, but not the way it is: the mind is namely exactly the way it works.<sup>3</sup>

It does not mean the merely hypothetical existence of the mind; any negation of the mind can be put on a par with negation of culture, civilization and language. Any explanation endeavours of human behavior in these fields, using empiric categories, turn out to be unsuccessful; if one is willing to explain them, one should attribute them to the inner human intellectual activity.<sup>4</sup>

There is a certain analogy between the forms of the mind's work:<sup>5</sup> the

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garment of language" ("von der Einkleidung in Sprache geschiedenen Gedanken" — V, 323) but "Thinking and speaking mutually perfect one another" ([wobei] "Denken und Sprechen sich immer wechselseitig vollenden" - *Sprachbau*, 289).

<sup>3</sup>Thou Humboldt "is lacking the specified notion of mind" ([Humboldt] "fehlt" [zwar] "der bestimmte Begriff des Geistes" — IV, 288), still "the existence of spirit as such can be thought of only in and as activity" — *Diversity* ([doch] "lässt sich das Dasein des Geistes überhaupt nur in Thätigkeit und als solche denken", *Sprachbau*, 56). "the mental faculty exists only as activity" ("das geistige Vermögen hat aber sein Dasein allein in seiner Thätigkeit" — *Sprachbau*, 104). "Thinking is a steady development, a movement exclusively inward, in which nothing as steady, stable or resting can be assumed" ("Das Denken [...] ist ein fortschreitendes Entwickeln, eine bloss innere Bewegung, in der nichts Bleibendes, Ständiges, Ruhendes angenommen werden kann" — V, 376-377). The same of language: "Language, regarded in its real nature, is an enduring thing, and at every moment a transitory one" — *Diversity* ([Genauso ist die Sprache], "in ihrem wirklichen Wesen aufgefasst", "etwas beständig und in jedem Augenblicke Vorübergehendes" — *Sprachbau*, 55).

<sup>4</sup>"This development [of the language faculty — K.K.] is not the one of an instinct that could be explained exclusively physiologically" ("Diese Entwicklung [des Sprachvermögens] ist aber nicht die eines Instincts, der bloss physiologisch erklärt werden könnte" — *Sprachbau*, 306, cf. also *Sprachbau* § 2-7); "[...] this connection of outwardly unlinked phenomena [culture, civilization and language — K.K.] must lie in a common inner cause [...]" — *Diversity* ("[...] so muss dieser Zusammenhang äusserlich nicht verbundener Erscheinungen in einer allgemeinen inneren Ursach liegen [„,]" — *Sprachbau*, 26, cf. also *Sprachbau* § 2-7).

<sup>5</sup>"Since man therefore first began to speak as he was not able to think without a language, thus the form he had given to his speech were determined by the **communal laws** of thinking" ("Weil der Mensch zuerst darum sprach, weil er ohne Sprache nicht zu denken vermochte, so bestimmte die Allgemeinheit der Denkgesetze die Form, die

differences between cognitive and verbalizing thinking are based on the diversity of the reference object, not of the way. The cognitive activity of our intellect performs some reality treatments, altering them into the already learnt reality. These treatments include distinction between things as well as relationships between them. Linguistic activity of the mind symbolizes the cognitive one, transferring it back to the physical reality (text).<sup>6</sup>

The cognitive and verbalizing mind's performance is a constant process, as it is not possible to remain quiescent for something that is supposed to be an action *ex definitione*. This process is eternal for the mankind: a human being is a human being as long as his mind works, as long as he is capable of thinking and of speaking.<sup>7</sup> This does not exclude neither the hypothesis

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er seiner Rede gab" — VII, 596). "If language should be produced in conformity to the thought, it must in its structure be, as far as possible, appropriate to the organism of the thought" [i.e., to the structure of thinking — K.K.] ("Soll nun die Sprache dem Denken gerecht seyn, so muss sie in ihrem Baue, soviel als möglich, seinem Organismus [i.e., der Struktur des Denkens — E.K.] entsprechen" — IV, 307); the term "organism" is by Humboldt used interchangeably with the term "structure" (*Struktur* — cf. *Sprachbau*, 205). On the analogy between language and thought: "According to the mysterious analogy appearing between all the human faculties [Vermögen], as soon as man clearly recognized an object as distinct from him, he must have at the same time produced a sound that had to refer to this object [...] The same analogy has remained valid later on. When the man was looking for linguistic signs, his intellect was busy at distinguishing. It thereat continuously created wholes that were not real things, but were concepts permitting every single division and a new combination. After this, the tongue [*Zunge*] thus also selected articulated sounds consisting of elements that allowed multiple combinations" ("[...] nach der geheimen Analogie, die zwischen allen Vermögen des Menschen ist, musste der Mensch, sobald er deutlich einen Gegenstand als geschieden von sich erkannte, auch unmittelbar den Ton aussprechen, der denselben bezeichnen sollte [...] Dieselbe Analogie wirkte weiter fort. Als der Mensch Sprachzeichen suchte, hatte sein Verstand das Geschäft zu unterscheiden. Er bildete ferner dabei Ganze, die nicht wirkliche Dinge, sondern Begriffe [...], abermalige Trennung und neue Verbindung, zulassend, waren. Diesem gemäss wählte also auch die Zunge articulirte Töne, solche die aus Elementen bestehen, welche vielfache neue Zusammensetzungen erlauben" — VII, 582-583).

<sup>6</sup>"Intellectual activity that is entirely internal, and to some extent passing without trace, becomes, through sound, externalized in speech and perceptible to the senses" — *Diversity* ("Die intellektuelle Thätigkeit, durchaus geistig, durchaus innerlich, und gewissermassen spurlos vorübergehend, wird durch den Laut in der Rede äusserlich und wahrnehmbar für die Sinne" (*Sprachbau*, 64). Language is the "everlasting intermediary, uniting mind and nature" (Die Sprache ist "ewige Vermittlerin zwischen dem Geiste und der Natur" — *Sprachbau*, 215).

<sup>7</sup>"For us, who receive light from a brief past only, language shares this *infinitude*, without beginning or end, with the whole existence of mankind" — *Diversity* ("Die Sprache hat diese anfangs- und endlose Unendlichkeit für uns, denen nur eine kurze

of the chronological beginning of the language nor the evolutionary theory; the eternity of the cognitive-linguistic process as a matter of fact comprises the thesis about constitution of the humanity by thought and language.

Now, let us name certain consequences of the concept of the double-working (cognitive as well as verbalising) mind, which is considered to be a twofold eternal intellectual process.

An intellectual process, in whichever form — may it be cognitive or linguistic — consists in manifold creation. First and foremost, it changes the reality, which, learnt and defined by empirically perceivable words, is not a mere physical reality any more. Thus, the phenomenon of the mind's existence is creative as itself — the phenomenon of thinking and the one of language. Besides, this process is nothing more than a variety of changes, which develop one from another; where there are there no changes, no process exists, only continuation exists. Our mind does not last, but our mind functions; while functioning, it changes itself, but at the same time it also changes everything that it influences. This means, an intellectual process should have certain components: some techniques to make changes in itself as well as means to alter the object it influences. The results of this formation are the next step of the creative change introduced by the process. As the intellectual process is performed eternally (admittedly, eternity is here relativized to the human's perspective, but it may be absolutized for the greater intellectual comfort), the changes it introduces are unending and so are the changes occurring in it; thus, there needs to be the opportunity to be able to be endlessly creative as well as the ability of self-creation. Finally, in spite of its endlessness, seen as an indispensable attribute of the human's mind, the mental process can be assigned to an individual human being: it can be performed in only the one individual, being at the same time the process of his development as well as his self-creation. Hence, not only the mental process is creative in terms of its capabilities, but also, or maybe mainly, an individual is creative in the process: the performance of our mind acts as a tool and as a goal of the development of an individual.

Let us now consider the place of communication in our discussion, supposing language is the mind's procedure parallel to the thinking process. As Humboldt claims, there is nonetheless no direct transfer from one human's consciousness to the other one, but people still have a sense of belonging

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Vergangenheit Licht zuwirft mit dem ganzen Dasein des Menschengeschlechts gemein" (*Sprachbau*, 76). "All comprehension of man lies only between the two [i.e., in the language — K.K.]" — *Diversity* ("Alles Begreifen des Menschen liegt in der Mitte von beiden [d.h. von der Sprache — E.K.]" (*Sprachbau*, 48).

to the same species and a need to contact with others intellectually as well as emotionally, which results from their mind.<sup>8</sup> This need is satisfied by \communication, of which the most precise tool is language, being the medium in perceiving the physical reality of the mind and in creating its own reality — the mental one.

The need of the intellectual contact, which would support the self-creation of an individual, provides a bridge between the mind of an individual and the mind of the other one, namely communication.<sup>9</sup> The bridge of the text is only symbolic and conventional: actually, it is a mere impulse created on the other side of the gap between two people's consciousness as well; it works when the other part accepts the impulse. Communication is a part of the mental process in two ways: through the process of text production by the text producer (the text recipient's task is to receive the text) as well as through the fact that the text producer is able to have a verbalized thought (which is then received by the recipient on the basis of the text). In that way it is possible to maintain the double parallel character of the mind's procedures: text production by the text producer as well as text reception by the text make both the verbalization process of our mind, which is performed in the minds of both parts of a communication act, though the way it is performed is not the same; the process of verbalized thought creation and the one of interpreting it belong both to cognitive thinking. That means the interpretation act is as creative as the creation act: it is necessary for the recipient to have the ability to understand the text. The difference between

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<sup>8</sup>"Between mind and mind there exists no other intermediary than the language" ("Zwischen Denkkraft und Denkkraft [...] giebt es keine andre Vermittlerin, als die Sprache" — VI, 26). "Nor do we even have [...] the remotest inkling of another as an individual consciousness" — *Diversity* ("Wir haben auch nicht einmal die entfernteste Ahndung eines andren, als eines individuellen Bewusstseins - *Sprachbau*, 45). "The power of thinking needs something that is like it and yet different from it. By the like it *is* kindled, and by the different it obtains a touchstone of the essentiality of its inner creations" — *Diversity* ("Die Denkkraft bedarf etwas ihr Gleiches und doch von ihr Geschiednes. Durch das Gleiche wird sie entzündet, durch das von ihr Geschiedne erhält sie einen Prüfstein der Wesenheit ihrer innren Erzeugungen" — *Sprachbau*, 68).

<sup>9</sup>"Nobody means a word precisely and exactly of what his neighbour does, [...] Thus all understanding is at the same time a non understanding, all occurrence in thought and feeling at the same time a divergence" — *Diversity* "Keiner denkt bei dem Worte gerade und genau das, was der andre. [...] Alles Verstehen ist daher immer zugleich ein Nicht-Verstehen, alle Uebereinstimmung in Gedanken und Gefühlen zugleich ein Auseinandergehen" — *Sprachbau*, 78); language "creates bridges from one individuality to another, and intermediates in understanding one another" (die Sprache "baut wohl Brücken von einer Individualität zur andern, und vermittelt das gegenseitige Verständnis" — *Sprachbau*, 208).

the text recipient and the text producer is that the stimulus to produce one's own thought is different (the recipient's stimulus is the perceived text, the producer's — any other stimulus), and not their participation in communication. Understanding of a text requires namely the same mind's activity as the text production.<sup>10</sup>

In this approach, it would be simply irrelevant to what extent the recipient used the empirical reality and to what extent this has already been shaped in his mind (either by the epoch's mind or by the idea processed by historians, or simply available to them directly) or how much of the text producer's initial idea his current utterance contains. The author or the content transferred by the text producer are not significant for the reception. Important is the content which the text recipient could create by himself. In other words, one can understand only things one can think up. Hence, an interpretation can be one of the forms of an intellectual creation, meaning it is a part of the mental process.

The phenomenon of a communicative medium is the other aspect of the creative intellect's working; if you continue to use the interpretation scheme applied above, you should state that the one text is something different if you regard it as a kind of expression, and it is different if you regard it as a communicate for the recipient — among others with regard to honesty category use, which can be supposed in expression, but which would be risky in the communication process. The presupposition as regards the diligence of the text producer is therefore justified as a premise, either enthymematic or expressed *explicite* when analyzing a text in the sense of an expressed thought, i.e. in its relation to the producer and not with reference to the recipient, for the former may have various intentions towards the latter. The ground of communication requires different descriptive measures because it makes a new quality in the production of the language.

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<sup>10</sup>"Understanding of a word only takes place because one would be able to speak the latter by itself" ("Man versteht das gehörte Wort nur, weil man es selbst hätte sagen können" — V, 382). "There can be nothing present in the soul, save for one's own activity [...]" — *Diversity* ("Es kann in der Seele nichts, als durch eigne Thätigkeit, vorhanden sein [...]" — *Sprachbau*, 68); cf. also VI, 174. "[...] nor is it otherwise with understanding. It wholly rests upon an inner self-creation, and conversing together is only stimulating for the hearer's dispositions" — ("[...] dass auch das Verstehen ganz auf der inneren Selbstthätigkeit beruht, und das Sprechen miteinander nur ein gegenseitiges Wecken des Vermögens des Hörenden ist" — VI, 176). "[...] and language as depending upon speaking as well as understanding always is only a common effect for both the speakers" ("[...] und abhängig zugleich vom Meynen und Verstehen ist die Sprache allemal nur das gemeinschaftliche Resultat beider Sprechenden" — VII, 597).

The description of a creative intellectual process (in the above interpretation) concerns the processes of cognition and language equally, yet in a different manner. The reason why it is impossible to identify thinking with language would be that they are complementary and in principle non-reducible to each other. This can be exemplified as follows: depending on linguistic measures the most eminent heuristic intuition can be formulated accurately or be oversimplified to a banality by a less successful verbalization, while even the most banal thought can become a linguistic discovery in poetry. In order to explain this phenomenon (if the above interpretation is right) we obviously must propose more detailed hypotheses concerning the relation between language and thinking that would be as significant as the hypothesis of the intellectual character of both of them.

The issue of the non-identicalness of the cognitive and linguistic processes from Humboldt's perspective can be reconstructed in the following way: the cognitive thinking is a kind of superstructure over the physical reality, as it were. The reality of thinking is a sort of a mind-constituted and verbalized meta-reality.<sup>11</sup> The process of cognition has several stages. The first stage embraces the constitution of an image based on observation: this includes the analysis (the identification of features perceived in time and space) and the synthesis (the unification of the features into an image). The second stage consists in creating notions: in this case the mind's activity comprises the analysis (of various images) and the synthesis (of the images of a certain kind into a notion). An indispensable link between an image and a notion is a word; if the word that we can apply for different images of certain common features or for different instances of a given object were not created, a notion could never exist, and, conversely, the word will not exist if there is not a notion.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>"[...] language becomes [...] a world created as congenial to the reality" (VI, 364). "If we imagine language as a second world constituted by man from the impressions perceived by him from the real world, then words therein are the individual objects [...]" ("Wenn man sich die Sprache als eine zweite, von dem Menschen nach den Eindrücken, die er von der wahren empfängt, aus sich selbst heraus objectivirte Welt vorstellt, so sind die Wörter die einzelnen Gegenstände darin [...]" — *Sprachbau*, 88).

<sup>12</sup>"The nature of thinking lies in reflecting, that is, in the act by which the thinking subject is opposed to what he has thought [...]. Now, in order to reflect we must in our mind arrest the continuous flow of impressions in order to concentrate on something, comprehend this something as a separate unit (*Einheit*), and set it as an object over and against our thinking activity" ("Das Wesen des Denkens besteht im Reflectiren, d.h. im Unterscheiden des Denkenden von dem Gedachten. Um zu reflectiren, muss der Geist in seiner fortschreitenden Thätigkeit [...] das eben Vorgestellte in eine



The introduction of the term "notion" permits us to explain why we use exactly the same word for different instances of a given object or for different images of these instances in our consciousness. It also helps us answer the question of how we can tell that an object belongs (or not) to the category of objects denoted by this particular word after having seen the object for the first time. The prognostic value would be a measure of clarity of the notion denoted by a given word.

Even though the creation of a notion and its lexical equivalent is a simultaneous process, their emergence occurs as a different intellectual and analytic-synthetic procedure in both cases. They both use different elements and have different results. While creating a notion, the mind uses images it had previously singled out — these are perceptive units that can be resolved into images — i.e. sensory equivalents of the perceived features. In the process of creating a word the mind uses linguistic units (phonemes) that can also be divided into features. In both cases it manages the rules of carrying out operations as well. Therefore, the intellectual (cognitive and linguistic) process occurs by means of articulative measures on several levels with the use of rules of creating the higher-order units. The rules of articulation and creation are specifically different for both of these mind activities.<sup>13</sup>

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Einheit fassen, und auf diese Weise, als Gegenstand, sich selbst entgegenstellen" — VII, 581). "The activity of the senses must combine synthetically with the inner action of the mind, and from this combination the idea is ejected, becomes an object *vis-a-vis* the subjective power, and, perceived anew as such, returns back into the latter. [...] But language is indispensable for this. [...] and without this transformation, occurring constantly with the help of language [...] into an objectivity that returns to the subject, the act of concept-formation, and with it all true thinking, is impossible" ("Die Thätigkeit der Sinne muss sich mit der inneren Handlung des Geistes synthetisch verbinden, und aus dieser Verbindung reisst sich die Vorstellung los, wird, der subjektiven Kraft gegenüber, zum Object, und kehrt, als solche aufs neue wahrgenommen, in jene zurück. Hierzu aber ist die Sprache unentbehrlich; [...] ohne diese, wo Sprache mitwirkt, auch stillschweigend immer vorgehende Versetzung in zum Subject zurückkehrende Objectivität ist die Bildung des Begriffs, mithin alles wahre Denken, unmöglich" — *Sprachbau*, 66-67).

<sup>13</sup>In man, two domains combine with one another, which are capable of dividing itself up into a finite number of elements, but also to combine the latter *ad infinitum*, in which each part always presents its particular nature as a relation to the parts of its domain. Man possesses the power to divide these domains, mentally by reflection, physically by articulation, and to connect the elements again, mentally by a synthesis of the intellect, physically by accent, that connects syllables into words and words into speech. [...] Their mutual interpenetration must be caused by the same power that arises from the mind" ("Es vereinigen sich also im Menschen zwei Gebiete, welche

Before we can describe the consequences of such a perspective, we must indicate another important aspect of the outlined epistemological schema. A word that is placed between the images of reality (mental units) and notions (intellectual units) means, according to Humboldt, that the mind accesses the reality through both its cognitive and linguistic processes. The linguistic categories co-determine the cognition equally with other categories of the intellect. In a way language — as an existing one we did not create — is another cognitive category, a way of perceiving the world that must be allowed for in the gnoseology. The mind consorts with the objects provided by senses and language.<sup>14</sup>

The only thing remaining is to ponder the legitimacy of introducing the category of "notion" — or more generally "mind" — into linguistic research. First, let us define the issue not as a question of the ontological status of the terminology but rather one of validity of analyzing language (in whatever form) in the context of more extended research, i.e. anthropological, philosophical, sociological and psychological.

The simplest explanation would be: an object itself imposes it, because of a wide variety of its functions and relations it forms with all sorts of

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der Theilung bis auf eine übersehbare Zahl fester Elemente, der Verbindung dieser aber bis ins Unendliche fähig sind, und in welchen jeder Theil seine eigenthümliche Natur immer zugleich als Verhältnis zu den zu ihm gehörenden darstellt. Der Mensch besitzt die Kraft, diese Gebiete zu theilen, geistig durch Reflexion, körperlich durch Articulation, und ihre Theile wieder zu verbinden, geistig durch die Synthesis des Verstandes, körperlich durch den Accent, welcher die Silben zum Worte, und die Worte zur Rede vereint. [...] Ihre wechselseitige Durchdringung kann nur durch eine und dieselbe Kraft geschehen, und diese nur vom Verstande ausgehen" — IV, 4).

<sup>14</sup>There "[...] resides in every language a characteristic worldview" (60): as the individual sound stands between man and the object, so the entire language steps in between him and the nature that operates, both inwardly and outwardly, upon him. He surrounds himself with a world of sounds, so as to take up and process within himself the world of objects [...] Man lives primarily with objects, indeed, since feeling and acting in him depend on his presentations, he actually does so exclusively, as language presents them to him" — *Diversity* ("[...] so liegt in jeder Sprache eine eigenthümliche Weltansicht. Wie der einzelne Laut zwischen den Gegenstand und den Menschen, so tritt die ganze Sprache zwischen ihn und die innerlich und äusserlich auf ihn einwirkende Natur. Er umgiebt sich mit einer Welt von Lauten, um die Welt von Gegenständen in sich aufzunehmen und zu bearbeiten. [...] Der Mensch lebt mit den Gegenständen hauptsächlich, ja, da Empfinden und Handeln in ihm von seinen Vorstellungen abhängen, sogar ausschliesslich so, wie die Sprache sie ihm zuführt" (*Sprachbau*, 72-3). But "in passing, by means of it [i.e., language — E.K.], into a world of sounds, we do not abandon the world that really surrounds us" — *Diversity* ([jedoch] "indem wir an ihrer Hand in eine Welt von Lauten übergehen, verlassen wir nicht die uns wirklich umgebende" — (*Sprachbau*, 74).

reality aspects. However, this is not an argument for the opponents of non-presuppositional knowledge.<sup>15</sup> It would be difficult for the supporters of the thesis on the disproportion of scientific theories to outline the limits of a more general theory which would include the phenomena described as a part of a previous theory that is being replaced. Nonetheless, an identical problem appears in the so called "pure" linguistics. The question of the transition from phonology to morphology, from morphology to syntax etc. (the theories that use different terminological systems), is usually ostentatiously neglected. Since it is impossible to discuss the thesis on inter-theoretical disproportion within this dissertation, it will suffice to merely indicate this issue.

However, it is significant to discuss the problem of relation between the language theory and a more extended theory (e.g. theory of mind) from a different perspective: not as a question of transition from the language theory to a more general theory but as an issue concerning the scope of phenomena that should be explained within the extended theory. Aside from the argument indicating the greater explanatory power and the like, that are accessible in the reference books<sup>16</sup> and support the creation of theories that go beyond the corpus analysis, there is no doubt that the types of described facts must be limited. A general theory of everything does not explain anything, hence, even the most extended language theory must be limited to the facts that are directly connected with language. One of such facts is the interpretation: it is of immense significance to decide how, and not if, to describe it, either as a physical behavior or as behavioral directives (that are — if they are just a directive — non-certifiable, exactly like mental facts in verbal and out of verbal behavior) or finally as a mentalistic category. According to Humboldt, the uniformity of the conception seems to support the latter.

If we assume that there are two types of mind activity and that the reaction of symbolization occurs between them, we can place language within mental facts and thereby identify not only non-identicalness but also a direct connection of thinking and language. When a given mind activity is

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<sup>15</sup>I mean here the so called epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend (1963: 29): "What happens here when a transition is made from a theory T' to a wider theory T (which, we shall assume, is capable of covering all the phenomena that have been covered by T') is something much more radical than incorporation of the unchanged theory T' [...] into the context of T. What does happen is, rather, a complete replacement of the ontology of T' by the ontology of T, and a corresponding change of the meanings of the descriptive elements of T' (provided these elements and this formalism are still used)".

<sup>16</sup>Cf. Chomsky (1964), Katz (1964).

assumed, there is no reason to reject a priori any hypothesis that surely is easier to prove than to disprove, i.e. the hypothesis concerning the similarity of intellectual processes. Some theses concerning language then pertain — retaining the non-identicalness — also to thinking. Perceiving language and thinking as two fields that are structurally isomorphic, thereby retaining the assumption of articulacy (division) that has been outlined above and creativity of both thinking and language let us treat both as systems. A mental system would then have to be assumed as a very general theory which uses cognitive variables (impressions), cognitive constants (time and space), a certain amount of general patterns of forming notions and schemes of logical reasoning. The functioning of such a hypothetical construction of mind would result in creating any sensible thought.

It seems that many of Humboldt's concepts aim towards this conclusion: in view of the (assumed) versatility of the mental system, in which the cognitive information changes but the general schemes of combining and functioning of the information remain the same, we can — if this explicative procedure is right — perceive this system as a theory formulated in a language that is unknown and inaccessible to empirical knowledge. Any ethnic language with its characteristic morphological structure (semantic and grammatical) would be a model of this theory. The functioning of the mental structures is of course a very subtle and abstract process so we can inspect these structures only through further close-up research in which we examine the sphere that is, because of its structure, mostly similar to thinking — an example of such a directly cognate field are languages. By detecting the regularities of logic ruling all accessible ethnic languages we can gain an insight into the functioning of mental structures which are not given directly but in the form of language systems that have already been interpreted and filled with notional content.<sup>17</sup> In view of the phenomenon of the variety of languages and the universality of the principles of thinking (that is independent from natural or symbolic language which we use by formulating the principles) it would be justified to seek one of many models

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<sup>17</sup>According to Humboldt, languages are "forms of thinking" ("Formen des Denkens" — V, 419), and linguistics is "a method of passing the domain of thinking through the diversity of languages" ("Methode, das Gebiet des Denkens durch die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachen auszumessen" — IV, 288). Humboldt also speaks of an "invisible organism of the mind, laws of thinking, classification of its categories" ("dem unsichtbaren Organismus des Geistes, den Gesetzen des Denkens, der Classification seiner Kategorien" — VI, 24). "Thus, a study of earth's languages is a world history of thinking and feeling of mankind" ("Das Studium der Sprachen des Erdbodens ist also die Weltgeschichte der Gedanken und Empfindungen der Menschheit" — VII, 602-603).

of a logical-cognitive system in every language. After all, we practically operate words or texts in their physical form; they are an empirical material that helps the researchers construct the theory of language.<sup>18</sup> For the sake of methodological accuracy, researchers have to base their findings on the language material and by treating it as a given one (or, alternatively by constructing its theoretical model), search for mental universals through their linguistic interpretation. If we want the language description to be adequate, we must consider the transition from a language to the cognitive system. On the basis of the language description we can draw conclusions in relation to thinking only within a more general theory of mind. In that case the approach will be methodologically justified and not — as usually happens — intuitive.

By this interpretation the discussed conception of analogical cognitive and language procedures reinforces the logical theory of a natural language; by describing the regularities of a given language regardless of its morphological form, the conception introduces the mind structures. Such an approach also creates the basis for the referential semantics (Stanosz, Nowaczyk 1976): a language system that is a projection of mental structures can be interpreted in various reality fields. According to Humboldt, in the cognitive reality the mind discovers the regularities in accordance with its own structure that is reflected by means of language, hence the abstracted (and alternatively formulated in an artificial language) regularities of a natural language can — through its relation with the mental system — pertain to reality or its fragments recognized by the mind.<sup>19</sup>

The cognitive and language systems use different elements but the

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<sup>18</sup>”This comparison of language with an ideal domain as with something it refers to, seems [...] to require a descent from concepts to words [...] However, passing this way is suppressed by an inner hindrance for concepts, being stamped with individual words, cannot represent anything general any more [...]” (“Diese Vergleichung der Sprache mit dem ideellen Gebiete, als demjenigen, dessen Bezeichnung sie ist, scheint [...] zu fordern, von den Begriffen aus zu den Wörtern herabzusteigen [...]. Das Verfolgen dieses Weges wird aber durch ein inneres Hindernis gehemmt, da die Begriffe, so wie man sie mit einzelnen Wörtern stempelt, nicht mehr bloss etwas Allgemeines [...] darstellen können” — *Sprachbau* 122).

<sup>19</sup>”Our subsequent reflection discovers therein [i.e., in the nature — K.K.] a regularity congenial to our mental form. [...] All this we find again [...] within language [...] The regularity of language's own structure is akin to that of nature” — *Diversity* (“Unser Nachdenken entdeckt in ihr [d.h. in der Natur — E.K.] eine unserer Geistesform zusagende Gesetzmässigkeit [...]. Alles dies finden wir [...] in der Sprache wieder. [...] Mit der Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur ist die ihres eigenen Baues verwandt [...]”— *Sprachbau* ,74).

ways of using them are analogical: thinking and language are based on procedures in a given structure (i.e. collection of mutually related elements). In case of language it would be a morphological structure and in case of cognitive thinking — a conceptual framework. These procedures lead to new results: a sentence/text in the first and a thought/mental complex in the second case. Both the structure and the products of the operations as well as operations themselves are parts of systems. The analysis of the interpretation mechanisms means in fact the analysis of the relation between the two systems. On the basis of the above mentioned findings we can attribute the observed phenomenon of double articulation in language (division into morphemes and phonemes) to thinking. This is the main reason why the category of "notion" has been introduced into the discussion about language.

An important issue that arises while discussing the legitimacy of applying mental categories to linguistic phenomena is the potential illegitimacy of setting apart mental beings such as "notions" that are understood in a colloquial way. However, in the depicted theory the notions are not substantialist beings: they are rather units that can be isolated in mental processes, in a ceaseless mind's activity.<sup>20</sup> The notions are parts of the mind's activity and thus are included in the procedure of creation. A notion can be fixed only within a word, although a notion gets recreated every time a word is uttered — the same applies to thoughts and sentences — a new thought gets formed every time a sentence is uttered. A "notion" is more about the activity of understanding than about its effect, it is more of a verb than a noun. The process of thinking consists of understanding activity, notions are the units which get distinguished in the continuum of this process. An intellectual process, like any other one, including the physical process of speaking, has to comprise differences and changes; what is more, these changes must happen in accordance with the rules, i.e. they must be repeatable but not necessarily repeated. It has to be possible to distinguish the oppositions of multiple kinds and levels (the way to do this is a separate issue) that occur between certain units. The transition from a phonological opposition to a phoneme — i.e. a phonological unit takes place in the same way. The ontological

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<sup>20</sup>Thinking consists then, for Humboldt "in segmenting its own course, thereby forming whole units out of certain portions of its activity, and in opposing these formations to other formations, collectively, however, as objects, in opposition to the thinking subject" ("Das Wesen des Denkens besteht also darin, Abschnitte in seinem eignen Gange zu machen; dadurch aus gewissen Portionen seiner Thätigkeit Ganze zu bilden; und diese Bildungen einzeln sich selbst unter einander, alle zusammen aber, als Objecte, dem denkenden Subjecte entgegenzusetzen" — VII. 581).

status of the notion would be then similar to the one of the phoneme.<sup>21</sup> A phoneme determines a certain class of abstraction on account of some interesting phonological qualities in a given language and, in similar way, a notion could be described as a complex of semantically relevant features that are crucial for distinguishing and identifying images (hence objects). Therefore, perceiving the language as a process creates a uniform criterion for its comprehensive description from its phonological characteristics to interpretation.

Having briefly pondered on the subject, let us now discuss it in greater detail: since the theory of the double character of intellectual processes has already been generally outlined, let us focus more on the process of language.

## 2. LANGUAGE AS AN INTELLECTUAL PROCESS

The basic phenomenon of language — considered logically prior to the researcher and primary to the user of language — is uttering; all the procedures that are used in uttering constitute language. The priority of speech over the language system is coherent with Humboldt's dynamic conception of mind as an activity; language is a verbalizing activity of the mind. The process of uttering consists in transforming a non-verbalized intellectual intuition into text.<sup>22</sup> However, verbalized intuition, deserves to

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<sup>21</sup>"From the mass of thinking that still waits to be specified and shaped, a word tears out a number of properties, it ties them with one another, and by selecting sounds, connecting them with other related words and by adding accidental further meanings, it provides them with shape and character" ("Aus der Masse des unbestimmten, gleichsam formlosen Denkens reisst ein Wort eine gewisse Anzahl von Merkmalen heraus, verbindet sie, giebt ihnen durch die Wahl der Laute die Verbindung mit andern verwandten Wörtern [...] Gestalt und Farbe" (IV, 248). On the phoneme, cf. Batóg (1961).

<sup>22</sup>"We must look upon language, not as a dead product, but far more as a producing [...] Language, regarded in its real nature, is an enduring thing, and at every moment a transitory one [...] In itself it is no product (*Ergon*), but an activity (*Energieia*). Its true definition can therefore only be a genetic one. For it is the ever-repeated mental labour of making the articulated sound capable of expressing thought. In a direct and strict sense, this is the definition of speech on any occasion; in its true and essential meaning, however, we can also regard, as it were, only the totality of this speaking as the language" — *Diversity* ("Man muss die Sprache nicht sowohl wie ein todttes Erzeugtes, sondern weit mehr wie eine Erzeugung ansehen [...]. Die Sprache, in ihrem wirklichen Wesen aufgefasst, ist etwas beständig und in jedem Augenblicke Vorübergehendes [...]. Sie selbst ist kein Werk (*Ergon*), sondern eine Thätigkeit (*Energieia*). Ihre wahre Definition kann daher nur eine genetische sein. Sie ist nämlich die sich ewig wiederholende Arbeit des Geistes, den articulirten Laut zum Ausdruck des

be called a thought; nevertheless, possessing of a non-verbalized intuition is a condition for uttering.

Uttering, then, appears not as relatively easy to understand, but as easy to describe ascriptions of once and for all defined texts to the given events, but rather it is the whole complex of procedures that leads from a non-verbalized cognitive thought (this is the name we are giving, to make it easier, to the intuition, until it has been symbolized in the language) to the ready text.

It is obvious now that in the production of the simplest text the existence of purely linguistic techniques which permit its production is taken for granted: as such techniques appear in the generative mechanisms of language, i.e. rules determining operations made on the morphological structure of language, as well as the structure itself, which is determined by certain rules too. Apart from these syntactic mechanisms, every act of uttering includes a mechanism underlying the interpretation: rules of a semantic nature in an adequate way give permission to ascribe appropriate syntactic phenomena (including phonology) to any mental intuition, and *vice versa*: to ascribe certain mental phenomena to the given syntactic phenomena, as it happens to be during the perception of language. Generally, in a linguistic interpretation act, the translation of any mental intuition into linguistic meanings (conceptual thinking) is included.

The condition for the application of the (syntactic and interpretative) generative mechanism is its coherence and recursiveness. In other words, rules that determine the process of transforming mental intuitions into utterances must stay in relation to each other, i.e., they must constitute a system that must be an open one, which permits an indefinite number of uses.

According to Humboldt, the first postulate resolves itself in the claim of the hierarchical articulation (segmentation) of language, the second one — with the problem of creativity (the "infiniteness" of language); these are the two sides of the process of language production.<sup>23</sup>

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Gedanken fähig zu machen. Unmittelbar und streng genommen, ist dies die Definition des jedesmaligen Sprechens; aber im wahren und wesentlichen Sinne kann man auch nur gleichsam die Totalität dieses Sprechens als die Sprache ansehen" — *Sprachbau*, 54-56).

<sup>23</sup>Both the articulation and the form of mental activity "divide their field into basic parts; a combining of them constitutes exclusively such wholes that strive to become parts of new wholes" ("[zerlegen] ihr Gebiet in Grundtheile, deren Zusammenfügung lauter solche Ganze bildet, welche das Streben in sich tragen, Theile neuer Ganzen zu werden" — *Sprachbau*. 81).



The articulateness and creativity thesis concerns the uttering procedure in a special way. The articulation and creation properties render uttering unimportant, and — in extreme cases (deaf-and-dumb persons) — where there are no production of sounds, but an action of mind: these techniques are both of intellectual, not of physical nature.<sup>24</sup>

These properties initiate a new factor in the process of transforming a non-verbalized thought into a text: they underlie the syntactic production of language and, therefore initiate the presence of the language system in each act of uttering.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>"That language really is quite inward and possible without producing and perceiving of sounds, that teaches the case of deaf-and-dumb-persons. [...] They learn to understand speaking by movements of the speech organs [...] It only can happen because they also possess an articulation faculty [...] They learn it not only because they, like other people, possess an intellect (*Vernunft*), but also the linguistic faculty (*Sprachfähigkeit*)" ("Dass die Sprache wirklich ganz innerlich ist, und auch ohne Lauthervorbringung und Vernehmung möglich bleibt, lehrt das Beispiel der Taubstummen. [...] sie lernen [...] das Gesprochene an der Bewegung der Sprachwerkzeuge [...] verstehen [...]. Dies kann nur durch das, auch ihnen beiwohnende Articulationsvermögen geschehen. [...] Sie erlernen dies, nicht bloss dadurch, dass sie Vernunft, wie andre Menschen, sondern [...] dadurch, dass sie auch Sprachfähigkeit besitzen." — V, 375-376, cf. *Sprachbau*. 80).

<sup>25</sup>"Apart from the mere evoking of a word's meaning articulation presents the word directly through its form as a part of an infinite whole, a language. Thanks to the form, there exists, even in individual words, the possibility to construe from their elements a really indeterminate number of other words in conformity to specific feelings and rules" — *Diversity* ("Nun ist aber dasjenige, was die Articulation dem blossen Hervorrufen seiner Bedeutung [...] hinzufügt, dass sie das Wort unmittelbar durch seine Form als einen Theil eines unendlichen Ganzen, einer Sprache, darstellt. Denn es ist durch sie, auch in einzelnen Wörtern, die Möglichkeit gegeben, aus den Elementen dieser eine wirklich bis ins Unbestimmte gehende Anzahl anderer Wörter nach bestimmten Gefühlen und Regeln zu bilden [...]") — *Sprachbau*. 69). "There exists nothing singular in the language, each of the elements of language appears only as a part of a whole" ("Es giebt nichts Einzelnes in der Sprache, jedes ihrer Elemente kündigt sich nur als Theil eines Ganzen an" — IV, 14-15). "Language may be compared with an extraordinary fabric whose each part more or less recognizably is connected with another part and all of them with the whole. When speaking, man touches [...] only a separated one; but instinctively he always does it in a way, as were at the same moment all the parts present for him, with which the single one necessarily must be in conformity" ("Man kann die Sprache mit einem ungeheuren Gewebe vergleichen, in dem jeder Theil mit dem andren und alle mit dem Ganzen in mehr oder weniger deutlich erkennbarem Zusammenhange stehen. Der Mensch berührt im Sprechen [...] immer nur einen abgesonderten Theil dieses Gewebes, thut dies aber instinctmässig immer dergestalt, als wären ihm zugleich alle, mit welchen jener einzelne nothwendig in Uebereinstimmung stehen muss, im gleichen Augenblick gegenwärtig" — *Sprachbau*).

This statement may be understood in the following way: each articulated element (from the range of a first or a second articulation) applied in the utterance, is produced to constitute opposition to other elements, not necessarily present in the text, but belonging to the structure. Consequently, if the text belongs to the system (and every text of any language belongs to the language *ex definitione*), then the system must be included in the text, at least in two ways: as discriminated in the text, then in a given moment unmarked, nevertheless — as an opposition element — an existing and therefore relevant possibility, as well as on the level of research: the text is the only way to elicit the system regularities conveyed by it. Of course, a single corpus may not demonstrate all the system regularities, since uttering as an intellectual matter is an infinite process and the limits of utterance are put forward optionally or even fortuitously, it is therefore not easy to obtain a representative attempt/pattern/sample/proof: this is a technical issue by itself.

Focusing utterances in language research is inevitably followed by introducing the category of the text (an effect of uttering) on the one hand, and the category of the structure on the other hand. Uttering does not belong to structure, while it is a system procedure (the text also belongs to the system — it is an effect of operations made on morphological structure); uttering in a necessary way takes the structure for granted (and not *vice versa*). In other words, uttering anything in any language means reactivating the structure of this language for the purposes of the given utterance; a presence of the system is necessary for the text to become a real existing one.

In this way, the system steps in between non-verbalized thought and the ready text; uttering is not simply ascribing certain words to certain objects or even thoughts, but every activation of the structure, the text generation rules, the interpretation rules, and certainly the constituting of a new text — ‘new’ always in the sense of an event, and not for the reason of an innovative value of the thought expressed. In this sense, every utterance appears as a

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85-86). "It [language — K.K.] must in each moment of its being possess what it makes a whole" ("sie [die Sprache — E.K.] muss in jedem Augenblick ihres Daseyns dasjenige besitzen, was sie zu einem Ganzen macht" — IV, 3). "In this way language resides in every human being in its whole range, which means, however, nothing else but that everyone possesses [...] a system of rules — K.K.), to bring forth gradually the whole of language from within himself, or when brought forth to understand it, as outer or inner occasion may determine" ("Es liegt daher in jedem Menschen die Sprache in ihrem ganzen Umfange, was aber nichts anders sagen will, als dass jeder ein [...] geregeltes System besitzt, die ganze Sprache, wie es äussere oder innere Veranlassung herbeiführt, nach und nach hervorzubringen, oder hervorgebracht zu verstehen" — V, 382).

creative (it constitutes the text) and a re-creative one (it re-activates the structure and the functions). The re-creativity appears as a creativity as well; the only existence to which the system can be ascribed is the one which manifests itself partially in the text, and implies the remaining, not the manifested part. This implicative language system existence is not only intersubjective in its nature, but it is also a practically verifiable one: it must manifest itself in other texts that use other rules. This circumstance results in the fact that the only thing we can recognize in the language — apart from ready linguistic products — is an existence of the structure as well as uttering rules: what comes to a realization, is real.

Creation, posed by the uttering process, has also a cognitive aspect, apart from the syntactic aspect (the "infiniteness" of language, i.e. the recursivity of rules) and the genetic one (creating the utterance by activating the system). In the uttering process that runs from non-formatted thought to the physical text, then from mind to the outer reality, a thought — still being verbalized — meets the prism of the linguistic reality structuring, and it leaves this prism as a rather linguistically refracted one. The change of direction may not be significant, since the evolution of language runs according to the laws of intellect, but even though it is invisible, it nevertheless always occurs: for instance from associations of a purely linguistic nature, from the specificity of grammatical laws<sup>26</sup> as well as from the differences between the imagined world and the view of the world that is conveyed by language. Because the way from the text to thought, i.e. the interpretation, also runs through

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<sup>26</sup>"As a matter of fact, during the speech course the form of a grammar is inwardly connected with the form of thinking, because a sentence [...] is always an uttering of what has been thought. However, it is necessary to distinguish not only of both form and matter, but also of form and form [...]. Grammar not always clearly refers to what — as a logical form — in an obvious way is connected with the content of thinking, but grammar builds on constructions corresponding to no separate logical form. [...] Here, language appears as a peculiar activity of its own. The mental activity is different from it, and, though a pure thinking without language, being a mere abstraction, constitutes no separate concept, it nevertheless may be assumed to appear as an unmeasurable volume serving [...] as a comparison point for a language-dependent thinking" ("Die Form der Grammatik ist zwar mit der Form des Denkens in der Rede innig verbunden, da der Satz [...] immer die Aussage eines Gedachten ist. Dennoch ist es notwendig, beide von einander, mithin nicht bloss Form von Materie, sondern auch Form von Form sorgfältig zu trennen. [...] [...] Die Sprache tritt hier ganz eigentlich in ihrer nur ihr angehörenden Wirksamkeit auf. Die des Denkens wird von ihr getrennt, und obgleich das reine Denken ohne Sprache gar keinen bestimmten Begriff giebt, und eine blosser Abstraction ist, so kann es doch als eine unmessbare Grösse vorausgesetzt werden, um zu einem Vergleichungspunkte des durch Sprache gefärbten Denkens [...] zu dienen [...]") — VI, 349-350).

the system of language (therein consists perception and the acquisition of language), thoughts expressed and interpreted are always influenced by the linguistic world view, and not solely by the empirical one. For the cognition, every language carries its own view of the world, since it structures the reality in a different way (which, compared with the oppositional nature of elements articulated, is not to be disregarded for the semantic structures of languages as a whole): this linguistic view of the world determines the acts of cognition in which the linguistic categories are used by the subject.<sup>27</sup>

However, linguistic determination may be partially verified, in cognition; apart from a linguistic approach to object, the mind also makes use of images (their formatting is certainly based on sensory data), so the language rather co-determinates, not totally determinates, this view of the reality. As Humboldt claims, the learning of a foreign language with its own world semantization may be helpful with the neutralization of the cognitive determination by language: it permits us to acquire a new standpoint in the reality — the view one had until the current moment. Having the ability to speak the languages would enable an overview of the already realized cognitive capacities of the human mind, if not all of them. Such an attempt is unrealizable, but speaking even one or some foreign languages fluently would increase one's cognitive capacities to a great extent.<sup>28</sup>

The creation of a semantized world during which every uttering is followed by a certain important consequence. Linguistic reality symbolizes a reality already known (i.e., a conceptual one). A symbol always makes things distinct and precise, but at the same time it also sets some restrictions: words evoke only certain aspects of what they refer to; thus, they leave behind an area of non-determinacy. What has been expressed, inspires the mind to search for new means of expression.<sup>29</sup> In this sense, non-determinacy

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<sup>27</sup>"All the words, by which different languages want to designate the same concept, may be imagined as a setting of limits within the same space of the domain of thinking; however, settings that never entirely coincide" (IV, 248). "[...] different languages are not different ways of designating the same thing; they are its different views" ("[...] mehrere Sprachen sind nicht ebensoviele Bezeichnungen einer Sache; es sind verschiedene Ansichten derselben" — VII, 602).

<sup>28</sup>"To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new standpoint in the world-view" — *Diversity* ("Die Erlernung einer fremden Sprache sollte daher die Gewinnung eines neuen Standpunktes in der bisherigen Weltansicht sein [...] — *Sprachbau*, 73).

<sup>29</sup>"What the soul is capable of expressing is only a fragment [...] To this single fragment the requirement of a further presentation and evaluation is joined, then the ones directly contained in it [...]" ("Was die Seele hervorbringen mag, so ist es nur Bruchstück [...]; an das Einzelne hängt sich die Forderung weiterer Darstellung und

stimulates the progress in the uttering process. Out of necessity, this process is a never-ending one, because the language exists to symbolize, and it always does this inaccurately: a complete identification of symbol and denotat is not possible by the terms of definition and through the difference in their functions. Therefore, the process of uttering is always an infinite one, irrespective of the finiteness of physical texts and their authors: infinite in the sense of chronology and definition.

An *a priori* imperfection of the language: the impossibility of a complete expression is one of the properties which guarantee the self-creativity of the linguistic process. This is a systemic guarantee for the potential creative change of linguistic rules that inevitably must take place, for the existing expression technics seem not to be sufficient. By this immanent teleology included in the system, the language changes diachronically. Language changes are stimulated by language usage;<sup>30</sup> in a certain sense, every use of language is a change (creation), but some uses of language are followed by transformations in the morphological structure. It should be possible because the language structure, for the same reason as the text effects, also belongs to the uttering effects; being construed during the speaking process, it may be reconstructed as such, less or more innovatively, according to the needs of the given use of language. It can be applied in the case of syntactic rules (in a larger sense, including phonological rules), as well as of the rules of interpretation. Technical change possibilities of the linguistic rules are situated in construing the system during the uttering; a necessity of such a change also lies in the system itself, and it follows from the inadequacy of this system in respect to the mental system.

The phenomenon of linguistic creativity in Humboldt's philosophy can

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Entwicklung, als in ihm unmittelbar liegt [...]” — *Sprachbau*, 220).

<sup>30</sup>“Language is formatted by *speaking*, and *speaking* is the *expression of thought or feeling*” (“Die Sprache wird durch Sprechen gebildet, und das Sprechen ist Ausdruck des Gedanken oder der Empfindung” — *Sprachbau*, 204). [...] from speaking there constitutes itself language, a stock of words and a system of rules [...]” (“Aus dem Sprechen [...] erzeugt sich die Sprache, ein Vorrath von Wörtern und System von Regeln [...]” — V, 338). “[...] every generation nevertheless produces a change in it, which only too often escapes notice. For the change does not always reside in the words and forms themselves, but at times only in their differently modified usage; and where writing and literature are lacking, the latter is harder to perceive” — *Diversity* (“[...] bringt demungeachtet jede Generation eine Veränderung in ihr hervor, die sich nur oft der Beobachtung entzieht. Denn die Veränderung liegt nicht immer in den Wörtern und Formen selbst, sondern bisweilen nur in dem anders modificirten Gebrauche derselben; und dies letztere ist, wo Schrift und Literatur mangeln, schwieriger wahrzunehmen” — *Sprachbau*, 78).

also be explained in the other way. The linguistic process follows step by step intellectual processes that precede the concept: I mean here the preverbal mental intuition at the stage of image analysis. During image synthesis into the concept, a homogenous action of the mind, existing until now, splits into cognitive (concept beginning) and linguistic ones (word beginning). If the mind at this moment gave up uttering, the mental process would be interrupted, but the definition seems to exclude this. Therefore, since a cognitive action in a certain direction has been started and certain images have been analyzed, i.e., since the mental intuition (we may call it disposition) has started, the mind tends to provide a conceptual and a verbal precision. The cognitive activity of mind precedes and implies linguistic action, and guarantees the continuation of the verbalization process.

As it has been stressed above, the conception introduced — a rather free transcription of Humboldt's ideas in the philosophy of language — elucidates language as a creative phenomenon, where creativity may be understood in various ways, it enables us to look at language in a communication frame, it also is an attempt to outline the role of language in cognition; the present description is only merely a summary of the mentioned aspects of Wilhelm von Humboldt's linguistic and philosophical output, and it certainly does not intend to provide a synthesis of ideas of this linguist and philosopher.

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