

Józef Japola

METAPHOR: A QUEST FOR A NEW ASPECT

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In an attempt to find the manifestation of human activity most associated with metaphor, and its most appropriate context, one must undoubtedly think of language. Understandably, a metaphor is thus encountered in a number of areas where language is used. This obvious and natural statement of fact (surely, the scope of "metaphor" is more than that, though) was neither clear nor certain when we see it from a historical perspective. A far narrower range of conditions was more easily accepted, which held that in analyzing the essence and functions of imagery, metaphor or symbol, we above all engage in reading poetry.

However, this in turn implies the aesthetics, which is unthinkable without philosophy. Literary scholars themselves pointed to some interdependencies in this logically self-explanatory sequence. Emphasizing the philosophical "background" of metaphor, Edmund Wilson wrote that: "a revolution in the imagery of poetry is in reality a revolution in metaphysics" (Wilson 1931: 5–6). Another literary critic, Rosemond Tuve, made such a generalization about her research "It seems to me that we must admit that the radical difference in philosophical outlook stands behind and is even responsible for a radical difference between the imagery of these earlier poets and much poetic imagery in our day" (Tuve 1947: 245). As we can see, literary scholars, aware of the importance of metaphor, which is placed on a par with thought and speech, have also paid attention to its other than literary and artistic values, and handed it over, as it were, to philosophy. Meanwhile, what representatives of this discipline did was to show resentment or, at best, a lack of interest in metaphor.

No wonder that in a situation where "to draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him — like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting," Max Black, author of the famous paper on metaphor, had to write: "but since philosophers (for all their notorious interest in language) have so neglected the subject, I must get what help I can from the literary critics. They, at least, do not accept the commandment "Thou shalt not commit metaphor," or assume that metaphor is incompatible with serious thought"¹ (Black 1962: 25). Let us ponder why the subject was — as Charlton put it — "hitherto lit only by the tallow candles of groping students of literature" (1975: 273).

It is hard to prejudge what caused the change of attitude on the part of philosophers, who finally have engaged in the study of metaphor. This did not happen overnight, though. After the Aristotelian approach, which was valid and unchallenged through the ages, the first step was taken by Vico and the romantics, even if their ideas caused no concrete, directly observable effects. These results came much later. It is possible to risk the hypothesis that a change in an attitude to metaphor was made possible by the changes in philosophy itself and the changes in the sphere of philosophers' interests. The subsequent stages of this evolution were accurately, though lightly, summarized by Gordon Baker in an otherwise serious essay:

Once upon a time philosophers were intellectual gadflies who tormented other intellectuals with ultimate questions as they sought to reveal the deepest and most general truths about the world. 'What is truth? What is the essence of beauty? What is the nature of reality?', they asked; and the answers, they hoped, would fit together to constitute the Queen of Sciences. Though potentially dangerous or subversive, philosophers were not yet truly venomous. This was the next stage of their evolution: they grew stings and became hornets. 'How do you know?', they asked of persons who claimed that God existed, that there were minds peopling other bodies, that the world contained physical objects, or that science could predict the future. With this relentlessly repeated question they aimed to set men free from obscurantism, dogma, arguments from authority, and *argumenta ad verecundiam*. Even if no fruitful answers emerged, they would succeed in diffusing the spirit of protestantism into all intellectual inquiries. Philosophy should reign as King of the Jungle, having the ecological function of curbing excessive growth in the other sciences. Suddenly and rather inexplicably degeneration set in. Philosophers lost their stings and

¹It is worth noting that even out of about 60 papers on metaphor written in Polish approximately 10% of them are those written by philosophers or people associated with philosophy. Such a ratio speaks for itself in the context of this article and testifies to yet another case of our backwardness.

became gnats; they buzzed about asking 'What does "..." mean?' or "What do you mean by "...?"' Ceaseless repetition of this question merely spreads irritation and the widespread complaint that they had turned their backs on the world and its real problems. They themselves fortified this impression by describing their activities as second-order inquiries which yielded no truths, theories, or explanations; and some even trumpeted that most of the important ultimate questions were meaningless. The gain from the linguistic turn, it was urged, would be clarity. (Baker 1974: 156)

Therefore, in the final stage of the history of philosophy its linguistic "climate" came to foster the research on metaphor. This, however, has not changed its still negative attitude towards metaphor.

Philosophers' reluctance to metaphor, most conspicuous in neo-positivists' interest in language, might have been caused by the rejection of metaphysics since the two are frequently linked, not only in literary scholarship. Trying to determine what metaphorical utterances are, Edward Ballard refers to a tradition that is to certain extent established (e.g. in W. M. Urban's works) and assumes that metaphysical utterances are: 1. supra-empirical, 2. non-literal, i.e. metaphorical, 3. referential to the whole only (Ballard 1948). The non-literal quality is the most important for us here. A conviction about the existence of a clear link between metaphysics and metaphor could undoubtedly cause such a strong dislike of the latter. Historically, yet another fact is significant: beginning with the Lockean concept it was assumed that the claims of natural sciences are exact replicas of the real world,² while metaphysical claims are always metaphorical, but not the other way round. Thus, the prestige of philosophy, already weakened, was in further jeopardy from a new threat: of "being unscientific," which could be warded off for instance by rejecting its strong imprints, for what was thought to be a metaphor.

Philosophical research on metaphor, initially conducted with caution and not without reservations, meant to provide its better understanding, resulted in the acknowledgement of the benefits of metaphor's usage. In addition to the interest in metaphor as a component of language, metaphor began to be studied as a means of expression which afforded unmatched

²A peculiar pendant of this thesis, occurring to this day, outside the so-called world of science (but in it, too) is a distorted and vulgarized, crass and mythical belief that the label "scientific" determines the truth of facts or judgments, particularly in natural sciences. It is a nuisance that in these cases science is understood intuitively and vaguely; as it is equated only with one of its properties, i.e. an empirical or rational one.

possibilities. This is how Beardsley's "indispensability thesis" was explicitly formulated, gained ground and came to win followers, which stated that some views and philosophical assertions cannot be rendered by linguistic means other than a metaphor.

The process, once begun, advances with new aspects of the problem constantly appearing. Philosophers study not only the philosophical background of metaphor, received as legacy from literary scholarship, but they investigate the role of metaphor in philosophical discourse. Also, they do not neglect any opportunity to make metaphor itself a subject of philosophical reflection.

The three philosophical aspects as well as the poetic role do not represent the totality of the issues connected with metaphor; the "environment" of metaphor is not limited to poetry and philosophy. An increased awareness of metaphor, that is, its importance and universality that lies also beyond language, is coupled with the acknowledgement of its tremendous role in a variety of scholarly disciplines, in conceptual thinking and, simply, in life.

This new situation in the research of metaphor was most succinctly expressed by Dean Rohovit, a psychiatrist — a practitioner of a science which, along with psychology, has the highest expectations of metaphor. He follows E. Freeman Sharpe saying: "The motivation behind the study of metaphor has progressed beyond simply an interest in literary style. The philosopher, rhetorician, linguist, and psychiatrist each look to the other for their respective contributions." (Rohovit 1960: 293)

A contention of the famous scholar, Ernest Nagel, provides a testimony to great transformations in opinions on the role and meaning of metaphor, as well as to its scholarly elevation of a kind:

The widespread use of metaphors, whether they are dead or alive, testifies to a pervasive human talent for finding resemblances between new experiences and familiar facts, so that what is novel is in consequence mastered by subsuming it under established distinctions.³

Nagel's attitude is clear proof of the legitimacy of the presence of metaphor and its beneficial and relevant functions in one more field: science.

Yet, are the two types of research on metaphor — in rhetoric and philosophy — exhaustive of the accomplishments in the field? Are these philosophers and other scholars who are trying to learn about consequences of metaphor still within the bounds of these two investigative aspects or,

³One can find examples of the role of metaphor as an important tool in a scientific process in Ernest Nagel's book. These can be also found in H. Nash (1963).

perhaps, do they delineate a third orientation? Let us find out how thoroughly the practical effects of metaphor usage have been recognized and elaborated on, particularly in situations where metaphors are indispensable or, worse still, where we have forgotten that we are using metaphors and we believe we "touch" reality, or its fragments. This group of scholars is not interested in metaphor seen as: 1. a dominant feature of language, 2. a unique usage of a word, a unique meaning; they study 3. a range of results, consequences of its use as a "technique of depicting" reality. This seems to be the most promising type of research on metaphor and also the future of its studies.

Let us take a closer look at this issue by analyzing some texts from the perspective that will be arbitrarily called a "language — reality relationship." Though, naturally, in practice this will come down to analyzing the relationship between metaphor and reality, or in other words to studying the role metaphor plays in expressing and representing reality. Although an awareness of the existence of this linguistic relationship or function — and indirectly of a metaphor too — is not a recent discovery, some of its aspects still seem not quite well known and appreciated. Let us begin with the renowned Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, which still sounds innovative:

[...] the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. [...] We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Mandelbaum 1949: 163)

On the other hand the philosopher Wilbur Marshall Urban in his 1939 book devoted to the language — reality relationship expresses a conviction that the issue of establishing the connection between language and reality is important for the theory of metaphor in view of the fact that if language determines reality, and a large part of it is a metaphor, then the latter is of great importance in a verbal shaping of reality. Urban wrote: "the limits of my language are the limits of my world [...] the problem of what we can know is so closely bound up with the question of what we can say" (Urban 1939: 21—22), what was assumed to mean that although the world can exist without people describing it, the world as it is described does not exist without those who describe it. It never happens that we KNOW the world without a discourse. There is no source of information that would be independent from the discourse. What we cannot talk about or what cannot be described does not exist for us. This is not to say that language conforms

to reality or that reality cannot exist without being known. It only implies that OUR cognition of reality requires communication.

Undoubtedly, Pepper's *World Hypotheses* is one of the remarkable and original works on the role of metaphor in describing reality. Pepper's book is an attempt to construct a notion of root metaphor and to record the most important metaphors of the kind. These root metaphors have been shaping our conception of reality and the way it is verbally expressed. In analyzing various philosophical systems Pepper came to a conclusion that their beginning and their progress is always associated with the so-called root metaphor. The book can be divided into two parts: 1. establishing the research procedure, the methodology, and 2. its practical application as a test of the value of the analyzed hypotheses. The path that leads to the former is a rejection of dogmatism,⁴ that means all those theories that refer to the obvious, certain, undoubted, meaningless, etc.⁵ In positive terms, we need to recognize that "the method of hypotheticality is one and maybe the only way to build metaphysical hypotheses" (Pepper 1935: 15).

Research conducted by means of the method established by Pepper demonstrates that the hypothesis that describes the world which — according to the theory of root metaphor — is supposed to encompass all facts, originates from a scheme based on a small set of facts, which later expends in such a way as to include all the facts. A thing, an idea or a set of facts underlying such a hypothesis is a genuine root metaphor. Establishing or revealing root metaphors takes place through an insight into theories or hypotheses that describe the world. Eclecticism, combining elements of different root metaphors, leads to confusion. Concepts that have lost ties with their root metaphors are pure abstractions. Of the many hypotheses that Pepper analyzes, quite a number does not stand trial and needs to be rejected. Pepper sees the following as relatively fruitful root metaphors:

⁴Dogmatism is harmful in the cognitive process as it avoids analysis, does not attempt to investigate the research material, i.e. does not try to question some things, treating them as e. g. self-evident. Pepper thinks that the self-evidence is not a cognitive criterion but, conversely, a refusal to apply a cognitive criterion.

⁵Without denying some research achievement to the people applying dogmatic methods, Pepper rejects the traditional method of deduction (implies evident axioms), the traditional inductive method of discovering rules by a generalization that derives from "unquestionable" facts, the Cartesian method of doubting as well as its extension known as solipsism, Kant's method of shaping phenomena on the basis of categories and intuitive forms adopted a priori, a mystical method of calling unreal whatever is not determined by emotion, a positivist method of calling insignificant that which goes beyond an arbitrary definition and meaning or that which does not lend itself to being expressed with atomic propositions.

similarity; it generates immanent realism;
form + matter; generates transcendent realism;
push + pull; generates mechanism;
organic whole; generates objective realism;
temporal process; generates contextualism (metaphysical pragmatism).
(see Pepper 1935: 15)

Alas, none of these hypotheses can be sustained in its totality. The scholar discusses in more detail four relatively apposite hypotheses describing the world: formism,⁶ mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. Similarity is the root metaphor in formism. The hypothesis occurs in two forms: immanent and transcendent formism. In each, there are three categories; in both variants the category of forms and the category of forms appearing in nature are adopted. It is the first of these categories that differentiates them: "characters" is the category for immanent formism, while a norm is for transcendent formism.

A machine is the root metaphor within mechanism. The types of mechanisms considered to be fundamental differentiate this philosophical orientation into its different kinds. The metaphor that stands for it is significant not only in physics, as can be expected, but also in biology or psychology; we see it already in the doctrine of the ancient atomists.

Unlike the two preceding (analytical) ones, contextualism is a hypothesis of a synthetic nature. This is why it is more difficult to detect its root metaphor. Pepper claims that a "historical event" might, perhaps, be one, and not necessarily a past event but "the event alive in its present" (Pepper 1966: 232), in its context. Pepper admits that linguistic examples should include verbs only: laughing at a joke, solving a problem, building a boat, removing an obstacle, creating a poem, talking to a friend. Contextualists believe that everything consists of such events (Pepper 1966: 233).

Difficulties in finding the root metaphor in organicism are similar to those found to be true of contextualism. Here metaphor always appears as a process, and, of course, an organicist is interested in the INTEGRATION of a process and not its CONTINUITY. Among categories of organicism

⁶To avoid the discussion of the names of the philosophical orientations, Pepper made use of the four labels, which are not necessarily known. Formism is REALISM in its many varieties (Plato, Aristotle, the scholastics, neo-scholastics, neo-realists and modern Cambridge realists); mechanism is actually NATURALISM or MATERIALISM (linked to Democritus, Lucretius, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reichenbach); contextualism refers to PRAGMATISM (Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey, Mead); organicism means ABSOLUTE (OBJECTIVE) IDEALISM (Schelling, Hegel, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce) (Pepper 1966: 141—142).

are, on the one hand, a record of the stages of an organic process and, on the other, the recording of the significant features of the already attained organic structures. An accomplished structure is an ideal objective of the subsequent stages of the process.

Although some similarity of intentions can be detected, metaphysical and rather 'philosophizing' book, *World Hypotheses*, is clearly different from the book — a collection of essays — entitled *Science as Metaphor* (Olson 1971), which describes the changes that the subsequent trendy analogies, metaphors and scientific models caused in the outlook of Western man. The stages of these changes are: a new philosophy of scientific revolutions associated with the names of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, which demolished traditional beliefs about the cosmic order; the 17th century mechanical philosophy, where God has ceased to be a father and become the divine engineer; the decline of religion and a deification of light; a precedent, established by the spread of Darwinism, together with subsequent discoveries, had an impact on energetics and thermodynamics (sciences dealing with the transmission and processing of energy), which became the "natural" sources of inspiration. Thermodynamics, in particular, already present in such domains as chemistry, cosmology, mechanics, geology, electronics, etc., became a temptation⁷ strong enough to be used in psychology, sociology or even religion (cf. Hiebert 1966).

A very powerful influence, which still is visible in Western society, is also analyzed in *Science as Metaphor*. This influence is related to the ideas of Sigmund Freud, who once more referred to the animal nature of man. In the USA in particular, there are extensive data indicating that the impact of Freud and psychoanalysis cannot be overestimated. (This will be discussed below.)

Researchers not only take specific concepts from the sciences, but also sometimes they transfer whole scientific methods or techniques to other disciplines. The already mentioned case of Henry Adams, whose work oscillated between science and philosophy, occasioned some more general

⁷Henry Adams, an American historian and humanist, is a particular case of submissiveness to these sciences. On the basis of the I and II law of thermodynamics, the theory of evolution, the phase rule and some 19th century astronomical and cosmological concepts, he tried to create the science of history in the manner of the sciences. The collected data led him to an assumption, contradictory to common sense, that evolution is not tantamount to progress and growth, but that it indicates a progressing biological and social degeneration of mankind. J. Mindel's article (1965) contains concise bibliographical information on what was written about such an interesting figure as Henry Adams.

observations on metaphor, presented by the historian of ideas Joseph Mindel (1965).

In Mindel's opinion, practice proves that even if we nowadays easily accept the role of metaphor in the formulation of theory, we fail to remember the metaphorical contents of some empirical laws. Yet, the essence of the chosen metaphor not only determines the kind of conducted experiments but also an interpretation of the observations.

The evidence can be found, writes Mindel, in the interesting book by J.B. Conant, discussing the story of phlogiston and other forgotten concepts in natural sciences (Conant 1937). The author also mentions more contemporary problems related to metaphor, which resulted from the fact that scholars underestimated its illusive nature and offered too far-reaching speculations. Behaviorists erred in this way; in their design of educational machines, they almost literally merged the laws of animal learning (the known) and the laws of human learning (the unknown). The methods of animal learning — well researched and developed for animals — failed because they were transferred mechanically and in their entirety to the educational process in schools, rejecting the uncharted components of the human learning processes.

Mindel's observations suggest that metaphor does not have to be "true" to be useful. Its value lies in stimulating the author's thought, indicating new directions. The metaphor should elucidate the intentions and the line of reasoning of the writer. However, because metaphor is something very personal, it does happen that "the window it opens for its inventor may be an opaque wall for his audience" (Mindel 1965: 99).

As we can see, we are faced with a reflection which, in reading some "scholarly" settlements anew, looks at them from a very peculiar perspective, leads to their verification: either confirmation or rejection. Hermann G. Stelzner's paper is close to these principles (Stelzner 1965).

Stelzner's article illustrates the relevance of Rohovit's observation. Although the author's reflection heads towards a much narrower issue than was the case in the two books mentioned — as he seeks to establish what sort of language is used in contemporary research on linguistic communication — more general observations and conclusions are corroborated.

The researcher focuses on three circles of concepts: mechanistic, biological or evolutionary and military. The reason behind this kind of interest on the part of Stelzner is the fact that "The predominant interests and ideas of any period are reflected in its figurative language which in turn affects and influences the subjects to which it is applied. Figurative

descriptions may suggest properties and relationships which in reality do not exist. Thus the consequences of figurative expression, both substantively and methodologically, cannot be minimized" (Stelzner 1965: 52).

Mechanism is one of the first basic metaphors, conspicuous and ever-present in the reflection on various aspects of discourse. The very conception of metaphor of mechanism goes back to the 17th century and is inseparable from the figure of Isaac Newton. Stelzner demonstrates that the titles of the following works testify to its influence: *Elements of Rhetoric* or *Elements of Logic* (even today books are written in Poland "On the Tools and Objects of Cognition" [I. Dąmbska]); definitions make it even more emphatic: "Regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the better arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect produced" (Spencer 1930 quoted by Stelzner 1965: 53).

Whatever man discovered — according to the then unquestioned and irrefutable Newton's conception — was considered to be a copy of Nature, which in itself was considered a perfect machine. It was claimed that the order and organization proper to machine ought to be transposed onto "speech composition", that is, to organize it "into a carefully integrated whole". Among the speech tools, bibliography, note-taking and lexicon expansion are mentioned. Discourse is the "basic tool of all social activity" (Stelzner 1965: 54).

Not only did the image of mechanism have an impact on the analysis of speech and the speaker, but it also modeled the study on figures in official orations. The instrument of analysis used in these investigations was made up of the carefully established and connected elements (usually along the structure: man — message — addressee), which interact to provide a product conforming to the exactness of machine and dependency upon it.

The biological metaphor, for which Darwin indirectly bears responsibility, is another seminal and readily used base metaphor. Thanks to it, a new view of reality was made possible: from abstraction — as W. James put it — a turn was made towards the concrete, from the incomplete towards the adequate; verbal solutions were replaced by facts; activity was placed above a priori given principles. The value of connection (mechanics) was questioned; evolution became the basis of appropriate analogy; biological organism became an appropriate image. Terms such as: living, growth, change, adaptation, function and process began to circulate. Idea, recognized as a "cell", was forced to "fight for its place," selection was associated with the survival of the fittest. Thoughts could be vivid and sound, speech gained its

identity. Talking was to require, as it was claimed, no methods and rules, but an "object", which in itself should be "stimulating," yet it ought to be additionally "revived" while being transmitted. Stelzner doubts whether this could be achieved without rules and methods (machines and tools).

Military figures, such as strategy, attack, defense, storm, position are the last of the group of metaphors discussed in Stelzner's article. The author noticed that "militarization" of metaphors occurs where biological metaphors are poor, e.g. in the description of rhetorical activities and in the oratory art. While the analysis of the line of argumentation suggests that, particularly in more sizeable books, where it is done in a separate chapter, authors recourse to language of description that is "demilitarized."

The conclusions from the observations confirm the unavoidable need for the use of figurative language. Metaphors have power that is unknown to literal expressions as they can constrict and underscore the image presented. While fresh — they act upon emotions and they get too familiar before we realize that we have not in fact revealed their identity but only an analogy. A change of the image causes the change in the method and unless we notice that the picture is metaphorical, reification may occur. Instead of the planned and expected explication, something quite the opposite might take place; it is not always easy to distinguish metaphor from literalism.

One should not that much refrain oneself from using metaphors, but rather should bear in mind the effects of using metaphors, so that they will not impose properties on the object or demonstrate relations that do not exist in the object. It is also significant to recognize the consequences of this fact for the analysis itself and the teaching of metaphors. Stelzner indicates a number of issues that still need to be resolved.

The third orientation in the research on metaphor shows particular richness and appears particularly interesting in psychological and psychiatric studies. We owe psychology its particular contribution in the understanding of imagery. One could after all speak of three stages of the evolution of these studies: 1. naïve mentalism, 2. rejection (under the influence of behaviorism) of the theses advanced in the initial period and 3. a new appreciation of studies on imagery, which has been the case since the 1960s.

It was in the last period that, apart from the growing number of papers, several books⁸ were published: chronologically, these include A. Richardson, *Mental Imagery* (NY: Springer 1969), M.J. Horovitz, *Image Formation and Cognition* (NY: Appleton 1970), S.J. Segal (ed.), *The Adaptive Functions*

⁸McKellar's *Imagination and Thinking: a Psychological Analysis* (1957) is the only book of this kind that was published in the 1950s.

of Imagery (NY: Academic 1971), P.W. Sheenan (ed.), *The Function and Nature of Imagery* (NY: Academic 1972).

Robert R. Holt sees the cause of the rise of this kind of research on the one hand in the interest taken in cinema and television (McLuhan's theses) and, on the other, in the large-scale abuse of hallucinogenic substances, what could be observed in particular in the 1960s. Those caused interest in conscious phenomena of subjective nature, dreams, daydreams, fantasies, attention, feelings, and the other altered states of consciousness. This orientation of research in its totality is beyond the purview of this article. Therefore, noting only its existence, attention will be focused on the psychological-psychiatric section of this research that concentrates on the issue of metaphor (Holt 1972).

Before the psychological interest in metaphor nearly turned against itself, undermining the existence of imagination, "images" and imagery, psychologists restrained themselves to some less radical observations. They noticed that subjective experience can best be expressed by means of metaphor. Fromm, a neo-analyst, asserts that

symbolic language is language in which we express inner experience as if it were a sensory experience, as if it were something we were doing or something that was done to us in the world of things. Symbolic language is language in which the world outside is a symbol of the world inside, a symbol for our souls and our minds (Fromm 1957: 12).

— tying two realities that used to be separated before.

So is the case with the concept of isomorphism in Gestalt psychology. Köhler maintains that making use of metaphors leads to the existence of "some degree of similarity between some specific experiences of the inner and the outer world" (Köhler 1929: 244—245).

Consideration was also given to largely unnoticed role of metaphor in expressing and receiving inner states. In Skinner's opinion, metaphor is among the few ways in which society can avoid personal and intimate issues and, as a result, impose verbal labels on private and inner states of stimulation (Skinner 1957). Similarly, Miller is convinced that having just a few public terms for inner states, we can share them by including them in the descriptions of whole situations that could evoke similar experiences (Miller 1951). Gendlin sees in metaphor one of the few ways of generating and expressing utterly new meanings (Gendlin 1962).

The endeavors of Freud, who researched the symbolism of dreams, gained influence also thanks to his disciples and followers. A separate and

multifaceted Freudian orientation in the research of metaphor is worth mentioning. Let's mention just two names. Ella Sharpe, a disciple of Freud's, uncompromising in her views of metaphor, believes that, through language, metaphor connects sensual experiences with thought. Metaphor is — like for Aristotle — a transfer of meaning from one word to another, but this time a transfer from the physical to the psychological. Similarly to etymology, which allows an unearthing of a past civilization, a person's metaphors reveal one's previous experiences. Clinical research ought to reach the genuine basis of the patient's past experiences through his/her metaphors because a metaphor is not only a compromise between *ego*, *superego* and *id* but also a vicarious channel for physical relief (Sharpe 1940).⁹

Pederson-Krag, another Freud scholar, illustrated how Freud used metaphors, a personification in particular, in his elaboration of the concept of linking ego's libido and object libido. She also signaled possible misunderstandings which occur if we, too faithfully, want to follow the implications of particular metaphorical formulas of psychoanalysis (Pederson-Krag 1956).¹⁰

Anderson, in opposition to Pederson-Krag, maintains that there is a link between the low repute of psychology as a discipline and the fact that it "appear[s] to change and discard [its] metaphors with discouraging speed" (Anderson 1964: 176). Mind, usually featured metaphorically, is a notable and perfect example. To describe it "technological parallels have been favored and behaviour has been variously studied as a sort of physiological, biochemical, or engineering product, to be most adequately described and analyzed by mathematical methods of the physical sciences" (Anderson 1964: 176—177). One of the most recent metaphors in this matter — "brain is a calculating / computing / logical / digital machine" (Anderson 1964: 176) — also has numerous shortcomings if consistently applied. One should, in fact, avoid literal treatment of metaphors in psychology, while appreciating their ambiguity (Anderson 1958).

Robert H. Knapp seeks to make a unique tool out of metaphor. He strives to establish a list of poetic adequacy of metaphorical expressions patterned on the Bogardus seven-grade scale. He made a list of metaphors on the basis of random examples of the metaphoric language from Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*, and featured six abstract categories concerning important aspects of life. These include: time, conscience, death, success, love and self-image. Knapp demonstrates how the metaphor scale functions as measure of people's attitudes (Knapp 1960).

⁹W. Muncie (1967), a physician, is also a Freud scholar.

¹⁰C.C. Anderson (1964) opposes some theses of proposed by Pederson-Krag.

Referring to Asch,¹¹ he reminds us that psychic states or people are described with the same means in different cultures (usually pertaining to physical phenomena). Psychoanalytical literature speaks of "two kinds of thought processes [in metaphorical usage]: primary and secondary. The primary thought processes govern essentially the mechanism of the dream construction and some types of psychologically primitive conscious fantasy such as found in schizophrenia. The secondary thought processes are those typically associated with the reality principle and are directed towards the effective coping with the environment. [...] The secondary... are... dominated by Aristotelian logic while the primary thought processes are ruled by a paleologic (Knapp 1960: 389; cf. Domarus 1946).¹² It is assumed that metaphor, on account of its "capacity to equate two widely divergent objects or situations by virtue of a common attribute," yields in effect a relationship between deep and unconscious attitudes and their open expression in language. A patient, estimating the poetic appropriateness of a metaphor, expresses, according to Knapp's hypothesis, his/her own attitude — the one which is deeply hidden and dependent upon the six a priori categories of metaphoric utterances.

Dean Rohovit, the aforementioned psychiatrist, states that psychiatrists, increasingly more conscious of a need in psychotherapy for precise comprehension of a patient's utterance, focused their attention on the remarkable role of metaphor. Clinical observation informs that the content describing the past and present life problems of the person undergoing therapy tend to be partly expressed by metaphor (Rohovit 1960).¹³

Rohovit's interest in metaphor emerged from listening to the tapes of interviews with patients. Rohovit believes that the patient's decision to use a particular metaphor during the conversation with the therapist is explained in the context of its associations with unique and unconscious processes.

¹¹S. E. Asch (1958) proposed the metaphorical scale as a measure of attitude for such a research.

¹²In Aristotle, two objects are equivalent if they are substantively identical. In the paleological system they are considered identical when they possess certain "salient attributes" (even though they are profoundly different substantively); a shared attribute may be configurational, utilitarian, and functional likeness, or presence/appearance in precise time or place. According such an analysis, metaphor as a literary and poetic device shows striking similarity to dreams. Its effectiveness and applicability comes above all from the possibility of combining two distant situations or objects on the basis of a shared attribute. The skill of a poet lies in this capacity.

¹³Having reviewed a range of positions taken by various scholars towards metaphor, Rohovit concludes that there is great confusion and puts forward his own proposal, which he calls a psycho-dynamic interpretation of metaphor.

Idiosyncratic examples were selected for the analysis, i.e. metaphors evidently significant for the patient. The metaphors that simply placed the interviewee in a subculture were not taken into account.

During the next appointment the patient was asked about his/her "free association" connected with a given metaphor. On the basis of these associations and the metaphor itself, Rohovit presented his comment. It so happened that the three analyzed metaphors (*gotten on me, he sails into me and takes it out on me, come over me*) have overt sexual connotations and are interpreted in this vein by the therapist and the patients alike.

Jonathan Culler's claim that two types of explorations — which he calls *via philosophica* and *via metaphorica* — are one of the standard ideas concerning the types of reflection on metaphor. The first type of analysis would place metaphor in the "space" between sense and referent or an extra-textual equivalent; it would be a reflection on an object AS something. The second one keeps metaphor on the level of meanings, between two meanings, between what is literal, verbally proper and periphrastic, vicarious. As a consequence of the first position, metaphor is an indispensable, salient feature of language whose "verbal detours gestures obliquely towards" objects. The second way of thinking presents metaphor as a special use of language, noticeable and studied against the background of the language used non-metaphorically (Culler 1974: 219).

My observations may lead the readers to feel that the sheer number of cases presented here suggests the existence of another orientation in the study of metaphor and that the two ways of thinking about metaphor proposed by Culler are not enough. A number of offered examples share something, what can be called, *via pragmatica*.

It seems that this orientation has the greatest research possibilities. How long can one split the structure of metaphor (*v. rhet.*) as a specific linguistic phenomenon? The possibilities seem quite limited. Similarly, an adequate theory of language — if it existed — should resolve the problems belonging to the sphere of *via philosophica*. Only *via pragmatica*, having as the basis the relevant solutions of the former two, could take on a large scale a detailed analysis of gains and losses, dangers and benefits, distortions and truths that we owe to the use of different varieties of metaphor. Unfortunately, it needs to be admitted that it is only a call which is yet to be answered. Obviously, any attempt at implementation somehow brings closer its fulfillment. Possibilities would greatly expand if Professor Shibbes's belief about the necessity of creating a science of metaphor as a separate discipline was treated seriously.

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