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THE HYPOTHESISING ATTITUDE OF THE SPEAKER AS AN ELEMENT OF SENTENCE CONTENT

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Making some judgment about something is what inheres in all the language acts from the content point of view. This fact has been described many times as the so-called actual division of the utterance. Two basic significative elements have been distinguished and are variously named: the subject and predicate, the theme and rheme, the subiectum and dictum, the datum and novum etc. Those approaches differ from one another and varying qualities are ascribed to different elements of language.

For the following analysis, however, another aspect is important, namely the fact that that judgment is, by nature, a veracity statement — in other words, that the act of ascribing veracity to a given proposition is inherent in every statement. Every language act, if it is an articulation of words that makes sense, is an ascription of veracity to some proposition.

The above assumption may seem inappropriate in relation to commands and questions, and to overtly false utterances, which sentences of literary fiction, lies and jokes can be interpreted to be.

With respect to commands (attempts etc.) and questions, there exists a semantic interpretation of those which makes it possible to treat them in the same way as indicative utterances. Here, the judgment which is made refers to the will of the speaker. Sentences such as *Podaj mi książkę* (*Give me the book*)¹ may, after all, be reformulated as *Chcę, żebyś podał mi książkę* (*I want*

¹Translation of example sentences is provided for the convenience of the English-

you to give me the book); such sentences as *Która godzina?* (*What time is it?*) as *Chcę, żebyś mi powiedział, która godzina* (*I want you to tell me what time it is*). Utterances that are literary fiction differ from the others only in that they refer to some illusory world, different from the real one, and contain information about some illusory truths which somehow exist in that world. Lies and jokes are conscious reversals of the veracity principle, a procedure possible only because that principle is in force, just as an infringement of the rules of a game can occur only when those rules actually exist.

The fact that we ascribe veracity to something is a result of some act of judging. Can it be assumed that this act is fundamentally identical in all language situations — or are we dealing with a greater or lesser variety of those acts? Most generally, what all acts of speech have in common is the fact of assuming something to be true; at the foundation of that assumption, in turn, lies the speaker's greater or lesser knowledge regarding the given subject. This knowledge is inherent also in the imperative and rogative utterances: *Wiem, że chcę...* (*I know that I want...*). This knowledge, which I here assume as a certain constant value that lies at the basis of every language act, may as well refer either directly to proper content of the utterance, that is to what is being stated about something, or to the act of judging itself. In other words, one can know this or that — but one can also know that one doesn't know (or one does know) whether it is this or that, and speak about it.

So we can say what we know, and we can say that we know it, but not entirely in the same way. The act of judging is a type of reality, too, and just like anything else may be a topic of an utterance.

Knowledge is a constant value that constitutes every utterance. This must be understood in the following way: while uttering some utterance, the sender simultaneously undertakes to suppose that he possessed the relevant knowledge. In this situation, it is good to strictly differentiate between knowledge and certainty. I refer here not so much to abstract terms, detached from the colloquial language and used, for instance, in the scholarly studies of philosophy or sociology (to which terms varying values may be ascribed according to the need), but to the equivalents of the expressions: *wiem* (*I know*) and *jestem pewien* (*I am certain*). We are more willing to accept that it is knowledge, not certainty, that is the equivalent of ascribing veracity to something. Of course, the sentence: *Jan tam był* (*John was there*)

language reader. While every care is taken that the translation reflects the Polish example accurately, considerations found in this essay refer to the Polish sentences and to the grammatical structure of the Polish language (translator's note).

may refer either to the situation in which the speaker (henceforward: *S*) knows that John was there, or to the situation in which he is only certain of it. However, the use of expressions *wiem* (*I know*) and *jestem pewien* (*I am certain*) points to the fact that sentences of the type *Wiem, że Jan tam był* (*I know that John was there*) are closer to sentences of the type *Jan tam był* (*John was there*) than those of the type *Jestem pewien, że Jan tam był* (*I am certain that John was there*). The sentence *Wiem, że Jan tam był* (*I know that John was there*) conveys, among others, the information that John was there, whereas in the sentence *Jestem pewien, że Jan tam był* (*I am certain that John was there*) this information is not conveyed. Let us also compare sentences *Jakub wie, że Jan tam był* (*James knows that John was there*) and *Jakub jest pewien, że Jan tam był* (*James is certain that John was there*). In the first, *S* states, among others, that John was there, whereas the second sentence does not convey that information. *S* may use it when he considers the judgment expressed by *Jan tam był* (*John was there*) to be true, or when he considers it to be untrue, or when he knows nothing about it.

The difference between knowledge and certainty is also pointed to by some expressions of the *nie wiem, ale jestem pewien* (*I don't know, but I am certain*) type, for instance in the utterance: *Nie wiem, czy to było tu, ale jestem pewien, że tak* (*I don't know if it was here, but I am certain it was*). Also, after hearing an utterance which does not contain any information on *S*'s act of judging, it is more natural to ask *Skąd wiesz?* (*How do you know?*) than *Dlaczego jesteś pewien?* (*Why are you certain?*).

Certainty, as opposed to knowledge, is gradable. One can be more or less certain, whereas one cannot more or less know something. Knowledge cannot be greater or lesser, it can just be. The "extent" of knowledge is, of course, an entirely different issue. One can say *Jestem tego bardziej pewien teraz, niż przedtem* (*I am more certain of it now than before*). One cannot say *Teraz wiem to bardziej niż przedtem* (*Now I know it more than before*), although one can say *Teraz wiem na ten temat więcej, niż przedtem* (*Now I know more about this than before*).

On the other hand, a slightly different approach is suggested by the expression *prawie pewien* (*almost certain*), which seems to indicate that certainty, too, can be treated as a definite "point" rather than a gradable quality.

Some of the reflections by Ryle (Ryle 1951: 44-45) referring to the relationship between faith and knowledge can also refer to the relationship between certainty and knowledge. Ryle is of the opinion that knowledge

refers to ability, whereas faith refers to motivation. It is possible to ask *Dlaczego wierzysz?* (*Why do you believe?*), as well as *Dlaczego jesteś pewien?* (*Why are you certain?*), but the question *Dlaczego wiesz?* (*Why do you know?*) is not possible. Faith is a kind of judgment, whereas knowledge is a state of the mind.

Summing up the above considerations, it can be stated that the initial conception of knowledge as the thing that constitutes an utterance remains valid; certainty, in turn, shall henceforward be treated as a type of judgment typical to the sender in the situation when he does not possess definite knowledge about a given topic.

The act of judging is an ordinary element of reality and an utterance may refer to it, may speak about it. On the other hand, all utterances are based on an act of judging. As well, all are certain theorems, because they ascribe veracity to some proposition. Analysing utterances that ascribe veracity to judgments speaking about the act of judging, it is easy to notice that their nature is rather remarkable in this respect. On the one hand, it is possible to single out utterances, whose topic is the proposition on which they are based. In other words: what the *S* knows is what he is saying about something. This happens when an element of the text (henceforward: *E*) informing about the act of judging (a certain state of the sender) is the main predicate of the given utterance (henceforward: *MP*); in speech this is usually the stressed clause. On the other hand, however, there are utterances whose topic is not the proposition that constitutes them, but the subject of judgment, to which the act of judging refers. Then, the *E* referring to the act of judging point to the *MP*. For instance: in the utterance *On na pewno tam był* (*He was certainly there*) the thing which is spoken about, and which is known, is the speaker's certainty. In the utterance *On na pewno tam był* (*He certainly was there*) what is known is the speaker's assumption, and what is spoken about is "his being there". All utterances can be classified according to the types of information conveyed by the specific types of utterances.

1. Direct information regarding *R'* (The symbol *R'* shall signify that part of reality to which the *MP* of the utterance refers).

This includes both the positive and the negative assertion. Utterances of this type contain information regarding the basis on which the judgment was taken by the sender (this basis is the *S*'s knowledge) and the information regarding *R'*. Examples: *On tam był* (*He was there*); *Niē wiem, czy on tam był* (*I don't know if he was there*); *Jestem pewien, że on tam był* (*I am certain that he was there*).

2. Absence of information regarding *R'* (or: information about the *S*'s

lack of the possibility of sending this information).

Utterances of this type contain information regarding the lack of foundation for accepting a judgment by the *S* (*nie wiem / I don't know*) and the absence of information about *R'*. Example: *Nie wiem, czy on tam był (I don't know whether he was there)*.

3. Indirect information regarding *R'* (information regarding the *S*'s suppositions about *R'*).

Utterances of this type contain information regarding the lack of foundation for fully accepting a judgment by the *S*, the existence of certain predispositions in the *S* for accepting a judgment, and what this judgment might be. Examples: *Przypuszczam, że on tam był (I suppose he was there)*; *Jestem pewien, że on tam był (I am certain he was there)*; *On tam chyba był (He may have been there)*.

Between the second and third type there is a fundamental affinity. In both cases (and in opposition to the first type) we are dealing with an absence of the unified foundation for accepting a judgment; ascribing veracity to that judgment would constitute real information for the recipient. Compare also the frequently occurring utterances of the type: *Nie wiem, ale myślę, że tak (I don't know, but I think it is so)*; *Nie wiem, ale chyba tak (I don't know, but it may be so)*.

Definition of the relationship between an affirmation, negation and utterances of the third type may seem to be a debatable issue.

Currently the dominant approach is the one excluding the topic of negation from the concerns of modality. Yet some approaches include an assumption that the indicators of subjective uncertainty, such as *chyba* (*may/maybe*), can be treated as being in between an indicator of affirmation and an indicator of negation. Such an assumption to a certain extent reflects the commonsensical intuition and is not entirely unfounded. What is being said about the fact expressed in the dictum in utterances with the *chyba* element may suggest that the *chyba E* is situated between the indicators of affirmation and the indicators of negation. As pointed out by Bogusławski (Bogusławski 1971: 127), such *E*'s as *chyba* are predicative expressions, in contrast to such indicators of negation as *nie* (*no/not*).

In the following section, we shall be dealing mainly with utterances containing information on the *S*'s less-than-full conviction regarding the truth of the expressed judgment. These are fundamentally two-part utterances, at least on the surface.

That part of the utterance which contains information regarding the attitude of the speaker to the veracity or probability of some judgment

will henceforward be referred to as the modus, the part of the utterance expressing that judgment will be referred to as the dictum.

Thus, in the utterance: *On tu chyba był* (*He may have been here*), *chyba* has the function of the modus, while *on tu był* is the dictum. In the utterance: *Mam nadzieję, że on tu był* (*I hope that he was here*), *mam nadzieję* is the modus, *on tu był* is the dictum.

The function of the modus can be fulfilled by lexical elements of various types. It is therefore incorrect to introduce an artificial differentiation between utterances in which the modus has a one-word form and those in which it is a phrase; utterances in which the modus is a verb and those where its function is fulfilled by a particle or an adverb.

At this point emerges the problem of content relationships between the modus and the dictum. To what does the modus essentially refer? The issue is quite clear in the case of modal verbs such as *sądzę* (*I suppose*), *przypuszczam* (*I assume*) etc., in the constructions *sądzę, że* (*I suppose that*) + dictum. In the utterance: *Sądzę, że on tu był* (*I suppose that he was here*) the entire modus *sądzę* refers to the phrase *on tu był*. But what is the situation in utterances in which such modus as *chyba*, *przypuszczalnie* or *jak myślę* (*may/maybe, possibly, as I think*) does not precede the dictum, but is located inside it? It cannot be assumed that the *chyba E* in the utterance *On siedział u mnie chyba do dziesiątej* (*He sat at my place until maybe ten o'clock*) refers directly to the entire utterance outside of *chyba*. In such utterances the element which has the function of the modus (henceforward, for short, E_m) refers to the foreground predicate, i.e. to what the speaker considers most important in the entire utterance and what is accentuated by the logical stress. In the utterance: *Słońce zaszło chyba dawno* (*The sun may have set a long while ago*) what is being said is not that the sun has set, but that its setting happened (presumably) a long while ago. Incidentally, E_m does not have to stand right by the main predicate; for instance, in the utterance: *On chyba to wtedy zrobił przez pomyłkę* (*I suppose he did that then by mistake*) E_m *chyba* refers to the phrase *przez pomyłkę* (*by mistake*), which is accentuated as the *MP* by the logical stress. In order to emphasise semantic relationships occurring in utterances with E_m placed inside the dictum, it is possible to paraphrase them as utterances with a nominal predicate:

Słońce zaszło chyba dawno. (*The sun may have set a long while ago.*)

→ *Zajście słońca było chyba dawno.* (*The sunset may have been a long while ago.*)

Jan czytał, jak sądzę, niewiele. (*John, I think, read very little.*)

→ *Tego, co Jan czytał, było jak sądzę niewiele.* (*There was, I think, very little of what John read.*)

Such utterances as the paraphrases above are not usually used in the language; they are cited here exclusively in order to emphasise the semantic relationships under discussion.

Examples of sentences with more complicated relationships can easily be found, however. The utterance: *Przyszedł do mnie Stefan ze swoim chyba najstarszym synem* (*Steven came to me with his son, the eldest, I think*) may be uttered with the emphasis on *Stefan* as the main predicate, while *chyba*, serving here as the modus, indisputably refers to *najstarszym*: this is indicated by its position. Also, this utterance cannot be paraphrased thus:

Przyszedł do mnie Stefan ze swoim chyba najstarszym synem (*Steven came to me with his son, the oldest, I think*)

→ *Ten syn Stefana, z którym on do mnie przyszedł, jest jego najstarszym synem* (*That son of Steven's, with whom he came to me, is his eldest*)

One solution is to assume that we are dealing here with two messages: one that Steven came to me with his son, and the other that this son was Steven's eldest. This approach may be supported for instance by the way stresses are placed. It must be noted that although *Stefan* may be the main predicate of the whole, a stronger stress falls also on *najstarszym* (*eldest*) — at least it is definitely a stronger stress than on *swoim* (*his*) or on *synem* (*son*).

Generally, therefore, it can be assumed that in such utterances as those cited above, the element serving as the modus refers to the main predicate of the utterance and, in concert with the logical stress, points to which section of that utterance is its main predicate.

We would, therefore, be dealing with the following situation: E_m may refer to either the entire utterance outside it, or to the main predicate of that utterance. In reference to this, two types of modality have been distinguished: sentential modality and segmental modality (cf. e.g. Adamec 1971; Ermolaeva 1963; Svoboda 1966 and others²). It seems, however, that there is no essential difference between the two. If a given E_m (or any other E) refers to entire utterance outside it, as for instance in:

Myślę, że on tu był wczoraj (*I think he was here yesterday*),

it refers mainly to this part of that utterance which can be shown to be the main predicate by stressing it in speech, and by using word order or through the broad context in writing. If, in turn, an E_m (or other E) refers

²Terms used by those authors differ, but their opinions are similar.

directly to that main predicate, as in:

On tu był chyba wczoraj

Chyba on tu był wczoraj

*On chyba tu był wczoraj*³

then through the main predicate it refers to the entire utterance. There is no essential difference in meaning between the following utterances:

Myślę, że on tu był wczoraj (*I think he was here yesterday*)

On tu był chyba wczoraj (*He may have been here yesterday*)

The only difference is that in utterances with such E_m as *myślę, sądzę* etc. only the logical stress or the word order indicate which part is the main predicate (cf. *Myślę, że on tu wczoraj był*), while in utterances with E_m of the *chyba* type the *MP* is indicated, to a certain extent, also by the position of that E_m .

From the above classification it transpires that utterances containing E_m may be included in two of the groups distinguished earlier: the first and the third one. Let us consider the differences between those two types of E_m usage.

1. E_m are present in utterances whose topic is the proposition that constitutes them (E_m are the *MP*).

These utterances are about the speaker. They tell us mostly about the attitude of the speaker to the veracity of the judgment expressed in the dictum. Here E_m 's occupy the position of main predicates, in speech they are most often emphasised with sentence stress. The following utterances are examples of that:

Jestem absolutnie pēwien, że on tam był. (*I am absolutely cērtain that he was there.*)

Ja wātpię, czy on to potrafi zrobić. (*I dōubt that he can do it.*)

Móim zdaniem było to trochę inaczej. (*In mýópinion it happened a bit differently.*)

Możliwe jest małe opóźnienie. (*A small delay is pōssible.*)

Utterances of this type are used when the *S* expresses either a strong certainty or a strong doubtfulness, emphasises the subjectivity of the judgment, or concedes its objectivity. The last circumstance is not contradictory to the proposition that we are dealing with utterances about the *S*. Both in the sentence: *Możliwe jest małe opóźnienie* (*A small delay is pēssible*) and the sentences of the *Ona na pēwno była ładna* (*She was cērtainly lovely*) type (as opposed to sentences of the *Ona na pewno była ładna* (*She was certainly*

³All these sentences signify *He may have been here yesterday*, with different meanings possible due to stress variation (translator's note).

lévely) type) tell us about the *S* and about the fact that he considers some judgment as close to the truth or far from it, and only later about what that judgment may have been.

Not all the E_m 's may be used in those situations. Those E_m 's which express the relatively low level of the speaker's certainty regarding the truth of the judgment (such as *przypuszczam, chyba, może, prawdopodobnie, pewnie* (*I suppose, maybe, possibly, presumably, certainly* etc.) may become the *MP* only when the recipient's attention is directed to the fact of this and not any other *E* being used, as for instance in the following utterances:

Nie mówię, że wiem, ale przypuszczam, że on przyjdzie. (I am not saying I knéw, but I presūme he will come.)

(— *Czy on przyjdzie?*) — *Méże przyjdzie. (— Will he come? — Māýbe he will come.)*

In the second example, the sentence may be interpreted as: *Nie mówię „przyjdzie”, ale „może przyjdzie”* (I am not saying "he will come" but "maybe he will come").

2. E_m are present in utterances whose topic is the subject of the judgment (E_m are not the *MP*).

The E_m 's are not the main predicates here, they are not emphasised by sentence stress. The main predicates of such sentences are the main predicates of the sentences that function as the dictum. Let us compare two sentences:

Jestem péwien, że Jan tam był (I am cértain that John was there)

Jestem pewien, że Jan tam był (I am certain that John wās there).

The first is an utterance about the speaker. It tells us that he is certain of the veracity of the sentence *Jan tam był (John was there)*: E_m is the main predicate here.

The second is about John. It tells us that the speaker is certain that John was there. E_m is not the main predicate here. Utterances of this type tell us mainly about what judgment the speaker is expressing his attitude to (one way or another).

A special type of E_m usage is involved in situations when the subjective uncertainty of the speaker does not refer to the veracity of the occurrence or non-occurrence of the fact described in the dictum, or to the true state of affairs that the dictum states, but to the aptness of some expression that the *S* had used. This E_m usage may be described as meta-lingual. It does not speak of any extra-lingual reality, but only expresses doubt as to the adequacy of the description of reality by a given expression or expressions. The described reality itself is very well known to the speaker, but he is not

certain whether he has been able to describe it aptly, or he is not certain whether the inclusion (by naming) of something among the phenomena of this or that type is justified. The following sentences are examples of utterances with E_m in this function:

To jest chyba zielone (This is green, I think)

(the S knows what it is like, but is not sure whether it can be called green).

Myślę, że on jest przystojny (I think he is handsome)

this sentence can be interpreted as:

Myślę, że mogę go nazwać przystojnym (I think I can call him handsome).

The sentence: (— *Co to jest?*) — *To chyba antylopa gnu.* (— *What is this? — Perhaps it's a wildebeest*) should, in my opinion, be interpreted as:

To zwierzę nazywa się chyba „antylopa gnu” (Perhaps this animal is called „wildebeest”).

Usages of this type occur particularly frequently in sentences with a nominal predicate, because they usually involve the possibility of naming something in some way. Other utterances are also possible, however, e.g.:

On chyba się czołga, a nie pełza (I think he is creeping, not crawling),

which means: *To, co on teraz robi, nazwałbym raczej czołganiem się, a nie pełzaniem (What he is doing now I would call creeping rather than crawling).* That last sentence can be used in a situation when the S is very well able to see what the person in question is doing, but is unsure how to call that action. If, seeing a silhouette moving in the distance, we say: *On chyba biegnie (I think he is running),* our uncertainty refers not to the designation of its way of moving, but to what that person is really doing.

The E 's whose usage is limited to these types of situations are, for instance, (to) *mi wygląda (na)... (it seems to me to be...)*, *można to nazwać (it can be called)*, *można powiedzieć (it can be said)* etc. The last E here is used mainly in sentences with a nominal predicate (*Można powiedzieć, że to jest wspaniałe — This can be said to be wonderful*). E_m 's frequently used in this situation are *chyba (may/maybe/perhaps)* and *raczej (rather)*.

Clarification is necessary here, however. All applications of E_m may, theoretically, be one way or another reduced to hesitation regarding the choice of expression. For instance, in the sentence: *On chyba tam był (I think he was there),* hesitation between *był (was)* and *nie był (wasn't)* can be discerned. Nevertheless, in those cases, that hesitation as to the choice of expression is accompanied by hesitation as to the choice of judgment. When an utterance of the *to jest chyba zielone (this is green, I think)* type is used, it seems that hesitation as to the choice of expression is identical to

hesitation as to the choice of judgment.

Intuitively, we are apt to divide all the expressions informing on *S*'s less-than-full conviction regarding the veracity of the dictum into those which express a supposition that the judgment expressed in the dictum is true, and those which express a supposition that the judgment expressed in the dictum is false. These expressions may be called, respectively, *E*'s expressing supposition (E_s for short) and *E*'s expressing doubt (E_d).

It may seem that, fundamentally, E_s and E_d have a similar nature. If the sender neither affirms nor negates some judgment, he may have a two-fold attitude to it: he may be leaning towards considering it true or towards considering it false. In both cases, however, the judgment in question will be the same (regardless of whether this judgment contains a negation or no). Thus, the utterance: *Przypuszczam, że on nie przyjdzie* (*I assume he will not come*) and *Wątpię, czy on przyjdzie* (*I doubt he will come*) refer to the same judgment, *on przyjdzie* (*he will come*), and express the same content. What is different is only the manner of expressing that content; but perhaps there is no need to suggest here the existence of any particularly essential differences between supposing and doubting.

Yet the difference between supposing and doubting is indicated by the following facts.

From the psychological point of view, supposing something is linked with a certain "positive" state of the mind, whereas doubting — with a "negative" one. In my opinion, Peirce's reflections on the nature of conviction and doubt (cf. Dobrosielski 1967: 103) and their mutual relationship may be applied (with some reservations) also to the nature of the relationship between supposing and doubting.

In the case of a supposition, we are usually speaking of some reality — we suppose that something is this or that way; in any case, we are referring to some facts (or at least we can refer to them). In the case of doubt, we are expressing our (negative) attitude only to the possibility of accepting some already-formulated judgment as true, even if that judgment were not verbally expressed. In other words, we are then not speaking directly about reality, to which some judgment refers, but about the judgment, and often even about a concrete utterance. Of course, using the *E przypuszczam* (*I suppose*) we may also speak about an utterance, but we may "suppose" anything, whereas we may "doubt" only something that has been in some way formulated.

When a sentence: *Wątpię, czy Piotr był na koncercie* (*I doubt Peter was at the concert*) opens some larger text, this sentence contains the

suggestion that it was possible to suppose, or that someone is supposing, that Peter did attend the concert. If, however, this text begins with the sentence: *Przypuszczam, że Piotr był na koncercie* (*I suppose Peter was at the concert*), it is not thereby suggested that there exists, or may exist, some judgment opposite to that contained in the dictum. To compare: it is not usual to begin an "independent" text (that is one not referring to other texts) from such sentences as *Nieprawda, że pociąg odszedł* (*It is not true the train had gone*).

The inventory of *E*'s expressing supposition cannot be broadened to include *E*'s expressing doubt; yet if an *E_s* is negated, we may obtain an *E_d*.

Let us compare the following utterances:

Wątpię, żeby mu się to udało (*I doubt he will be able to achieve this*)

Nie przypuszczam, żeby mu się to udało (*I don't suppose he will be able to achieve this*).

In the first utterance, the sender is aware of some "active" approach to the veracity of the judgment contained in the dictum (henceforward this will be shortened to *DJV* — dictum judgment veracity) which springs from the attitude of doubt.

In the second utterance, the sender does not speak directly of his having any active approach to the *DJV*, but he does speak of not having a certain active approach to the absence of supposition. The fact that the sender does not have the attitude of "supposing" towards the *DJV* may, for instance, signify that he has no basis for making a supposition. Essentially, however, the *S* is informing us about some attitude of his towards the *DJV* — he is formulating a dictum and he does not consider whatever the dictum expresses to be probable or possible. In practice, this means that he considers that which the dictum expresses to be impossible or not very probable. "Not supposing" is a similarly (if perhaps slightly more weakly) active approach to the *DJV* as supposing — or doubting. In other words, *nie przypuszczam* (*I don't suppose*) can be substituted in utterances with *wątpię* (*I doubt*) rather than with *nie jest tak, że przypuszczam* (*it is not so that I suppose*)⁴.

A certain differentiation has to be made, however. The *E nie przypuszczam* and similar *E*'s may appear in the construction of the *nie przypuszczam, żeby* + dictum type, as well as in the construction of the *nie przypuszczam, że* + dictum. There is a difference between the meaning of those two constructions. Let us compare the following utterances:

⁴This does not refer to past tense forms. *Nie przypuszczałem* (*I did not suppose*) will never mean *wątpilem* (*I doubted*); it means: *nie jest tak, że przypuszczałem* (*it is not so that I supposed*).

Nie sądzę, że to był on (I don't think that it was he)

Nie sądzę, żeby to był on (I don't think that it could have been he)

Nie przypuszczam, że to było tak (I don't suppose that it happened thus)

Nie przypuszczam, żeby to było tak (I don't suppose that it could have happened thus)

All those utterances refer to the situation of doubting. However, the utterances *Nie sądzę, że to był on* and *Nie przypuszczam, że to było tak* intuitively seem closer to negation than the other two utterances.

Let us, in turn, compare the following:

Przypuszczam, że mu się to uda (I suppose he will manage to achieve this)

Nie wątpię, że mu się to uda (I have no doubt that he will manage to achieve this)

Here, the relationship is slightly different. We immediately notice a fundamental distinction between the two utterances. The second, it is true, does not speak about the existence of some attitude $S : DJV$, but about its absence; yet this absence is an absence of doubt. The absence of doubt means certainty. Such an E as *nie wątpię (I don't doubt)*, when with the logical stress, emphasises an affirmation of the judgment contained in the dictum to which it refers. The fact of that using this E without the logical stress indicates that this attitude is not "purely affirmative". Then, the situation is the same as in utterances with the non-stressed *na pewno (certainly)*, which, contrary to appearances, contain some suggestion of uncertainty. Usually, however, such E's as *nie wątpię* occur with the logical stress.

Generally, it may be stated that $\sim E_s$'s (negated E's expressing supposition) are semantically similar to E_d 's, whereas utterances with negated E's expressing doubt are close to categorical utterances. *Nie wątpię, nie mam wątpliwości, nie ulega wątpliwości (I don't doubt, I have no doubt, undoubtedly)* can be included among such $\sim E_d$'s.

However, negatives of stressed E's of the *jestem pewien, jestem przekonany (I am sure, I am convinced)* etc. type cannot be included among the E_d 's. This is because, essentially, *nie jestem pewien, czy tak a tak (I am not sure whether this or that)* does not express supposition that it is not so that this or that, but often quite the opposite, cf.:

Nie jestem pewien, czy przyjdzie, ale przypuszczam, że tak (I am not sure whether he will come, but I suppose he will)

and also: *Nie jestem pewien, czy jest tak, czy inaczej (I am not sure if it is thus or otherwise)*. The expression *nie jestem pewien, czy (I am not sure whether)* opens both the possibilities. This expressions is, in a sense,

analogous to *Nie wiem, czy jest tak a tak* (*I don't know whether this or that*).

Certain symmetrical relationships can be observed between some E 's expressing stressed affirmation, stressed negation, supposition and doubt (i.e., respectively: certain, inconceivable, possible/probable and doubtful) and their negations (i.e. uncertain, conceivable, impossible/improbable and undoubted). With respect to meaning, there are the following pairs of counterparts:

- stressed affirmation (\pm): negation of doubt ($\sim d$)
- stressed negation ($=$): negation of supposition ($\sim s$)
- negation of stressed affirmation ($\sim \pm$): doubt (d)
- negation of stressed negation ($\sim =$): supposition (s)

The following table illustrates those relationships:

	(\pm)	($=$)	
($\sim d$)	certain = undoubted a)	inconceivable = impossible/improbable c)	($\sim s$)
(d)	uncertain = doubtful b)	conceivable = possible/probable d)	(s)
	($\sim \pm$)	($\sim =$)	

a) *Jego powrót jest pewny.* (*His return is certain.*)

Jego dobra wola jest niewątpliwa. (*His goodwill is undoubted.*)

b) *Wątpliwe, czy on przyjdzie.* (*It is doubtful that he will come.*)

Jego powrót jest niepewny. (*His return is not certain.*)

c) *Wykluczone, żeby on to zrobił.* (*It is inconceivable that he would do this.*)

Niemożliwe, żeby to było tak. (*It is impossible to have happened thus.*)

d) *Niewykluczone, że on się jeszcze namysli.* (*It is conceivable that he changes his mind.*)

Możliwe, że jeszcze przyjdzie. (*It is still possible that he comes.*)

When we are dealing with such modal particles as *chyba, może, zapewne, pewnie, na pewno* (*maybe, perhaps, surely, certainly, for certain*) etc., establishing the supposition/doubt relationship brings about many reservations.

Generally, such E_m 's cannot appear in their negated form, or, more precisely, if we encounter those E_m 's with a negation that precedes them and refers to them (i.e. such expressions as *nie chyba, nie może, nie pewnie* etc.),

then *chyba*, *może* etc. are names of expressions, not expressions themselves. After all, the following utterances are acceptable:

(— *On chyba już tu był.*) — *Nie „chyba”, ale na pewno.* (— *Maybe he has been here before. — Not “maybe”, but for certain.*)

(— *On pewnie zasnął.*) — *Nie „pewnie” zasnął, ale nie ma najmniejszej wątpliwości, że zasnął.* (— *Perhaps he overslept. — It’s not that he “perhaps” overslept, there is no doubt at all that he did.*)

The problem arises whether such utterances as:

On chyba już nie przyjdzie (*Maybe he will not come*)

Chyba nie wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy (*Maybe he didn’t know what we were speaking about*)

should be treated as equivalent to:

Przypuszczam, że on już nie przyjdzie (*I suppose he will not come*)

Przypuszczam, że nie wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy (*I suppose he didn’t know what we were speaking about*)

or rather equivalent to:

Nie przypuszczam, żeby on jeszcze przyszedł (*I don’t suppose he will come*)

(*Wątpię, żeby on jeszcze przyszedł* — *I doubt he will come*)

Nie przypuszczam, żeby on wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy (*I don’t suppose he knew what we were speaking about*)

(*Wątpię, żeby on wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy* — *I doubt he knew what we were speaking about*)

In other words, the question is whether such utterances may be broken up thus: *chyba* + dictum (with negation), e.g.:

Chyba: nie wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy (*Maybe: he didn’t know what we were speaking about*)

or: *chyba nie* + dictum (without negation), e.g.:

Chyba nie: wiedział, o czym mówiliśmy (*Maybe not: he knew what we were speaking about*).

It is difficult to propose any conclusion to this question that would be final, non-arbitrary and supported with appropriate reasoning.

Bibliography

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